Parliamentary Strengthening and the Paris Principles
Uganda case study

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* Disclaimer: The views presented in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of DFID or CIDA, whose financial support for this research is nevertheless gratefully acknowledged.

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAPPG</td>
<td>African All Party Parliamentary Group (UK Parliament)</td>
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<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism</td>
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<td>AWEPA</td>
<td>European Parliamentarians for Africa</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Commonwealth Parliamentary Association</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>FINMAP</td>
<td>Financial Management and Accountability Programme</td>
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<td>NRA/M/C</td>
<td>National Resistance Army/Movement/Council</td>
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<td>PDCO</td>
<td>Parliamentary Development and Coordination Office</td>
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<td>PEAP</td>
<td>Poverty Eradication Action Plan (Uganda’s PRSP)</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>PSIDP</td>
<td>Parliamentary Strategic Investment and Development Plan</td>
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<td>Sida</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>SUNY</td>
<td>State University of New York</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNECA</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Commission for Africa</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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Executive summary

Introduction

In theory, parliaments are one of the key institutions of democracy, playing an important role in terms of legislation, oversight and representation. Regrettably, in many developing countries – as well as in many developed countries – parliaments are weak, ineffective and marginalised.

Parliamentary strengthening aims to enhance the effectiveness of parliaments through institutional development, through building the capacity of parliamentary staff, MPs and committees, and through putting in place the nuts and bolts of infrastructure and equipment. However, there is little systematic research or analysis about the effectiveness of parliaments or about the effectiveness of parliamentary strengthening. This makes it difficult for those considering whether and how to spend resources on parliamentary strengthening to make well-informed decisions. It is local politics rather than the actions of Development Partners that play the major role in shaping the effectiveness of a country’s Parliament, but Development Partners can make a difference and have a responsibility to ensure that their engagement is as effective as possible.

This report is one component of a research project on “Parliamentary strengthening and the Paris Principles”. The overall aim of the project is to generate better evidence about parliamentary strengthening, in order to inform decisions about whether and how to provide support to parliaments in developing countries. The project – a collaboration between ODI and the Parliamentary Centre, with funding provided by DFID and CIDA – has involved four country case studies; Cambodia, Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda. The vantage point taken for our analysis is that of the Paris Principles on Aid Effectiveness.

The Paris Principles and parliamentary strengthening

The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness is an international agreement between donors and recipients of aid to make aid more effective. At its core are five inter-locking principles, adherence to which is expected to make aid more effective; ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability. The Paris Principles provide a potentially useful vantage point from which to map the landscape of parliamentary strengthening and could – if they were applied in this sphere – enhance the effectiveness of parliaments and parliamentary strengthening. The intention is not to assess whether parliamentary strengthening activities have been influenced by the Paris Declaration; it would be too soon to make such an assessment. Rather, it is to use the Paris Principles as a vantage point for examining the landscape of parliamentary strengthening.

Ownership: Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle were a parliament to exercise effective leadership over efforts to improve its capacity and performance, for instance through having a clear strategy for parliamentary development that is respected by donors, along with a programme to put it into action. Ownership in parliamentary strengthening implies that it is demand-led and responsive to the needs of the parliament.

Alignment: Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle if donors’ support to parliaments were based on the parliament’s own development strategy, if such support made use of parliament’s own systems for managing resources and if support was provided in a predictable and timely manner that fits well with parliamentary and political timetables.

Harmonisation: Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle if donors coordinated their support to parliaments, using common arrangements and procedures, with each donor focussing on its areas of expertise rather than duplicating their efforts. At the very least,
Parliamentary strengthening and the Paris principles: Uganda case study

harmonisation in parliamentary strengthening implies that donors begin with a clear map of the landscape of parliamentary strengthening before thinking about how they can best add value.

**Managing for Results:** Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle if the work of donors and parliaments were driven by a focus on increasing parliamentary effectiveness. This would imply putting in place and making use of frameworks for monitoring and evaluating progress on parliamentary strengthening and making decisions about future activities on the basis of such monitoring and evaluation.

**Mutual Accountability:** Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle if donors and parliaments conducted joint assessments of progress on parliamentary strengthening, with parliaments sharing information with their other stakeholders and donors making available information about their parliamentary strengthening activities.

**Politics, democracy and parliament**

Parliaments do not operate in a vacuum; their functioning and effectiveness is shaped very much by the context – and particularly the political context – of which they are part. The legacy of one or no-party rule and the continuing dominance of the NRM, the Executive and President Museveni – now able to run for the Presidency again in 2011 – continue to shape the functioning and performance of the Ugandan Parliament. The elections of 2006 were the first to be held under the multi-party system for 25 years. It will take some time for the relationship between the new political system and the Parliament to settle and for the 54% of MPs who are first-time MPs to find their feet.

Assessing the performance of the Parliament of Uganda is, as in many other countries, extremely challenging. This is because neither Parliament itself nor its Development Partners have as yet put sufficient effort into establishing frameworks for performance assessment or into collecting data on performance. In terms of legislation it is too early to assess the performance of the Eighth Parliament. The independence of previous parliaments has been compromised, and, on occasion, bought, but there are some grounds for optimism. The Sixth and Seventh Parliaments managed to pass important bills, improving some bills though their participation in the policy process and in some cases managing to pass bills that strengthened Parliament’s role and independence from the Executive. Notable examples include the Budget Act of 2001 and the Access to Information Act of 2005.

In terms of representation, voters do not feel that their MPs do an effective job of representing their interests, taking the view that most MPs are in politics primarily for their own ends. In Uganda as in many developing countries voters, many of them living in poverty, expect their MPs to deliver development to their constituencies rather than demanding that they play an effective role in terms of legislation and oversight. This issue must be addressed if parliamentary strengthening is to be effective. Understanding the functioning of political parties is crucial too, particularly in a country such as Uganda where multi-party politics is new. Development Partners may be nervous but they urgently need to increase their engagement with political parties to support the emergence of parliamentary democracy as a competition between ideas and agendas rather than a contest between individuals.

As regards oversight, there are some concerns that the current Eighth Parliament is proving to be less effective than the Sixth in particular. It is widely believed that under the no-party system, and the system of individual merit, MPs were more able and willing to speak out and that under the multi-party dispensation they are required to toe the party line. This too is a challenge that could be addressed by Development Partners engaging more with political parties and party caucuses. Nevertheless – despite some backward steps such as the replacement of Committee Chairs with Government loyalists in July 2008 and the fact that Parliament was unable to effectively exert its
will in relation to the recent National Social Security Fund Scandal – oversight does seem to have improved in some regards, with the accountability committees asking searching questions of Ministries and Departments and with Parliament engaging more effectively with the budget process.

The landscape of parliamentary strengthening

A number of Development Partners have engaged in parliamentary strengthening in Uganda since 1996, with USAID, UNDP and DFID playing particularly important roles. In the years immediately following the elections of 1996, the focus was on the provision of equipment and training for MPs and parliamentary staff. From around 1998 considerable efforts were made to put in place some key parliamentary institutions including the Parliamentary Commission, the Parliamentary Service and the Parliamentary Budget Office and then – setting out Parliament’s vision and seeking to ensure that Development Partners aligned their support with it – the Parliamentary Strategic Investment and Development Plan and the Parliamentary Development and Coordination Office.

Development Partners pushed hard for these institutions to be established, but, as their necessity was recognised by the Parliament itself, they encountered little opposition. More recently, Development Partners have shifted their attention from the supply-side of parliamentary strengthening to the demand-side, working more on parliamentary outreach and civic engagement, and – most recently – situating parliamentary strengthening within a wider programme of work on Deepening Democracy.

Mapping the landscape of parliamentary strengthening from the perspective of the Paris Principles generates a number of insights. On ownership, for many years the Government of Uganda has been keen to build a partnership of equals on aid effectiveness with its Development Partners. The Parliament of Uganda, with some initial prompting and support, has taken a similar stance, setting out its own plans for its development in the Parliamentary Strategic Investment and Development Plan (PSIDP) as well as working with Development Partners to establish a Parliamentary Budget Office. It is notable, if somewhat paradoxical, that the key parliamentary institutions were established under the Movement no-party system of politics (Kasfir and Twebaze, 2005). The existence of the Parliamentary Budget Office and the PSIDP – as well as a number of other key parliamentary institutions – put Uganda towards the forefront of parliaments in developing countries, clearly asserting Parliament’s ownership over its destiny and over the use to be made of resources provided for parliamentary strengthening. Development Partners have played a commendable role in supporting the establishment of these institutions.

To encourage the alignment of parliamentary support with the PSIDP the Parliament of Uganda – again, with the support of Development Partners – has established the Parliamentary Development and Coordination Office (PDCO). PDCO provides the principal link between Parliament and the Development Partners, with the vast majority of funds for parliamentary strengthening channelled through PDCO. The Parliamentary Development and Coordination Office is regarded as an increasingly effective collaborator and provides something of a model for parliaments in other developing countries.

On harmonisation, the recently-established Deepening Democracy programme promises much improvement with shared goals, better information sharing, less duplication and lower transactions costs as well as an agenda that extends beyond Parliament to include the wider political system. There is however further work to be done. A number of key Development Partners are somewhat marginal to the Deepening Democracy programme and one important element of support to Parliament provided by the Financial Management and Accountability Programme is imperfectly coordinated with other parliamentary support. It is to be hoped that Deepening Democracy will demonstrate the benefits of harmonisation to Development Partners, to the Parliament and to the Government of Uganda.
On managing for results and on mutual accountability, there is considerable room for progress with few donors conducting systematic evaluations of their support to Parliament and little effort having been put into assessing the effectiveness of Parliament. The PSIDP provides a potentially useful framework as well as requiring an annual assessment of Parliament’s performance. Development Partners will need to push and provide support to ensure that such potential is realised and that such assessments take place. They should also instigate the practice of providing annual reports to Parliament and encouraging Parliament to hold them to account for progress made on Deepening Democracy.

Conclusions

Mapping the landscape of parliamentary strengthening from the perspective of the Paris Principles has revealed a number of useful insights about parliamentary strengthening in Uganda and how it, and the performance of Parliament itself, can be enhanced. Available evidence suggests that if parliamentary strengthening were conducted in a manner that were more in line with the Paris Principles, then it would be more effective.

But as with aid effectiveness more widely, politics is key. Donors may be reluctant to engage in parliamentary strengthening in an explicitly political manner, but there is no doubt that parliamentary strengthening requires a good understanding of the political terrain. In Uganda, a country that has only recently emerged from a system of no-party rule and that continues to be dominated by the NRM and President Museveni, it will take a sustained effort from Development Partners and from Parliament itself – alongside a favourable shift in the political landscape – to build a Parliament that is an effective and independent player in the country’s system of governance.
1: Introduction

1. In theory, parliament is one of the key institutions of democracy, playing an important role in terms of legislation, oversight and representation. Regrettably, in many developing countries – as well as in many developed countries – parliaments are weak and ineffective.

2. Parliamentary strengthening, supported by a range of bilateral and multilateral donors, aims to enhance the effectiveness of parliaments. However, there is little systematic research or analysis about the effectiveness of parliaments or about the effectiveness of parliamentary strengthening. This makes it difficult for those considering whether and how to spend resources on parliamentary strengthening to make well-informed decisions. It is local politics rather than the actions of Development Partners that play the major role in shaping the effectiveness of a country’s Parliament, but Development Partners can make a difference and have a responsibility to ensure that their engagement is as effective as possible.

3. This report is one component of a research project on “Parliamentary strengthening and the Paris Principles”. The aim of the research project is to generate better evidence about parliamentary strengthening, to inform policy and practice. Emphasising the ways in which a country’s political context shapes its experience of parliamentary strengthening, the project explores the landscape of parliamentary strengthening, taking the Paris Principles on aid effectiveness as a vantage point.¹

4. The Overseas Development Institute has led the research project, with the Parliamentary Centre leading on data collection and analysis for the country case studies. This report is one of four country case studies; the others concern Cambodia, Ghana and Tanzania.² The report proceeds as follows:
   - Chapter two provides an introduction to the role of parliament in theory and practice, to the field of parliamentary strengthening and to the particular angle – the Paris Principles – taken by this research project;
   - Chapter three provides an introduction to politics and democracy in Uganda, putting the Ugandan Parliament in context;
   - Chapter four examines the performance of the Ugandan Parliament;
   - Chapter five maps out the landscape of parliamentary strengthening in Uganda;
   - Chapter six examines the landscape of parliamentary strengthening in Uganda from the vantage point of the Paris Principles; and,
   - Chapter seven sets out a series of conclusions and recommendations.

¹ The intention is not to assess whether parliamentary strengthening activities have been influenced by the Paris Declaration; it would be too soon to make such an assessment. Rather, it is to use the Paris Principles as a vantage point for examining the landscape of parliamentary strengthening.
² See Annex A for a note on selection of country case studies.
2: Parliaments and parliamentary strengthening

Parliaments in theory and practice

5. Traditionally, parliaments are seen as having three primary roles: legislation, oversight and representation. Legislation concerns passing the laws which make up a country’s legal framework. Oversight is about keeping an eye on the activities of the executive and holding the executive to account on behalf of the country’s citizens. And representation is about collecting, aggregating and expressing the concerns, opinions and preferences of the country’s citizens, through the political process.

6. Parliaments can play an important role in delivering governance which is good for poverty reduction. Good governance requires that there is a state that is capable, accountable and responsive (DFID, 2006). Assuming that poverty reduction is the goal, a capable state is one that is able to formulate and implement policies that are effective for poverty reduction. An accountable state is one that answers to its citizens, particularly in the event that it fails to live up to its promises. A responsive state is one that seeks to identify and meet the needs of its citizens.

Figure 1: Governance and Parliaments: Elements and Roles

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<th>Effective governance</th>
<th>Parliamentary roles</th>
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<td>State capability</td>
<td>Legislation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>Oversight</td>
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<tr>
<td>Responsiveness</td>
<td>Representation</td>
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Source: Hudson, 2007

7. Mapping the roles of parliaments onto the elements of good governance (see figure 1) illustrates the contribution that parliaments can make to the delivery of good governance. Legislation is part of state capability, with law-making an important means through which capable states formulate and implement policies. Oversight can contribute to ensuring that the state is accountable to its citizens. And representation – of citizens’ views to the government – is key to responsiveness.

8. In practice, parliaments in many developing countries are weak and ineffective and contribute little to good governance and poverty reduction. For instance, the African Governance Report for 2005 found that: “In terms of enacting laws, debating national issues, checking the activities of the government and in general promoting the welfare of the people, these duties and obligations are rarely performed with efficiency and effectiveness” (UNECA, 2005).

9. There are a number of reasons for the ineffectiveness of parliaments in developing countries. First, parliaments are in a weak position in many political systems, where they are marginalised by the executive and constrained by a constitution which fails to provide for parliamentary independence. Second, parliaments often lack institutional capacity and resources and are dependent on the executive for access to resources. Third, parliaments are often by-passed in the policy process, both by dominant executives and by bilateral and multilateral donors that deal with executive rather than Parliament. Fourth, MPs often lack knowledge, experience, skills and resources. And fifth, voters – as a result of social and cultural norms – are often more concerned that their MPs provide them and their constituencies with school and hospital fees, funeral expenses, roads and electricity, than that they legislate, oversee and represent their interests effectively in Parliament (see Hudson and Wren, 2007). In a country such as Uganda that has
only recently made the transition from what was effectively a system of one-party rule under the National Resistance Movement Organisation to a multi-party democracy, there are particular challenges for Parliament.

Parliamentary strengthening

10. In recent years an increasing number of organisations have become involved in efforts to strengthen and support parliaments in developing countries, in effect seeking to narrow the gap between parliaments’ potential contribution to good governance and poverty reduction and their performance in practice. Donors’ interest in parliaments is informed by a renewed emphasis on country ownership and domestic accountability, and by donors’ enthusiasm to ensure that spending decisions are scrutinized and that aid is spent effectively.

11. Globally, in terms of bilateral donors, USAID, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) CIDA, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) and the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) are particularly active, alongside Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Germany. In terms of multilateral organisations, the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-American Development Bank and the European Union are prominent. In addition, there are a number of national and international parliamentary organisations and networks including the Parliamentary Centre, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA), the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank (PNoWB) and the Global Organisation of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (GOPAC). Parliamentary strengthening activities range from training individual MPs, to working with parliament as an institution, to engaging with the wider political system within which parliament operates.

12. The wisdom of investing resources in parliamentary strengthening depends on the difference that parliamentary strengthening makes, to parliamentary effectiveness and ultimately to development outcomes. Regrettably, donors have made little headway with generating systematic evidence or analysis about the effectiveness of parliamentary strengthening (although see Hubli and Schmidt, 2005), or about the effectiveness of parliaments themselves (Hudson and Wren, 2007, p.16). The World Bank Institute, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and others are working to establish frameworks for assessing parliamentary effectiveness and a number of useful initiatives to shed light on the functioning of parliaments in developing countries are underway, including the work of the African Legislatures Project. Nevertheless, the absence of evidence and analysis remains a serious problem for those tasked with making decisions about whether and how to spend resources on parliamentary strengthening.

Parliamentary strengthening and the Paris Principles: The research project

13. The overall aim of this research project is to generate better evidence about parliamentary strengthening, in order to inform decisions – made by donors and others – about whether and how to provide support to parliaments in developing countries. The vantage point taken for our analysis is that of the Paris Principles on aid effectiveness; ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability. Support provided by donors for parliamentary strengthening is a minor component of aid, but using the Paris Principles as a vantage point or analytical lens can, we believe, generate useful and relevant insights (see figure 2).

3 The initial ambition of this research project was to examine the extent to which consistency with the Paris Principles made for more effective parliamentary strengthening. As the project progressed, methodological challenges and data availability made it prudent to scale back the project’s ambitions.

4 The DFID-UNDP-World Bank Institute donor consultation on parliamentary strengthening which took place in May 2007 identified the development of good practice principles for donor support to parliamentary strengthening as one of the ways of moving the parliamentary strengthening agenda forward, specifically
The Paris Principles on aid effectiveness

The Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness is an international agreement by donors and recipients of aid to make aid more effective. At its core are five inter-locking principles, adherence to which is expected to make aid more effective. First is the principle of ownership; that aid is used most effectively when developing countries – governments, in consultation with parliament and civil society – take charge of their own development plans and use aid in a coordinated manner to implement those plans. Second is the principle of alignment; that aid should be provided and spent in a manner that supports a country’s development plans. Third is the principle of harmonisation; that donors should coordinate their support to particular developing countries to reduce duplication and transaction costs. Fourth is managing for results; that aid management and planning should be driven by a focus on results. And fifth, is mutual accountability; that donors and recipients of aid should be accountable to each other, in a transparent manner, for aid effectiveness.\(^5\)

The relevance of the Paris Principles to parliamentary strengthening

**Ownership:** Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle if a parliament to exercise effective leadership over efforts to improve its capacity and performance, for instance through having a clear strategy for parliamentary development that is respected by donors, along with a programme to put it into action. Ownership in parliamentary strengthening implies that it is demand-led and responsive to the needs of the parliament.

**Alignment:** Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle if donors’ support to parliaments was based on the parliament’s development strategy, if such support made use of parliament’s own systems for managing resources and if support was provided in a predictable and timely manner that fits well with parliamentary and political timetables.

**Harmonisation:** Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle if donors coordinated their support to parliaments, using common arrangements and procedures, with each donor focussing on its areas of expertise rather than duplicating their efforts. At the very least, harmonisation in parliamentary strengthening implies that donors begin with a clear map of the landscape of parliamentary strengthening before thinking about how they can best add value.

**Managing for Results:** Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle if the work of donors and parliaments were driven by a focus on increasing parliamentary effectiveness. This would imply putting in place and making use of frameworks for monitoring and evaluating progress on parliamentary strengthening and making decisions about future activities on the basis of such monitoring and evaluation.

**Mutual Accountability:** Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle if donors and parliaments conducted joint assessments of progress on parliamentary strengthening, with parliaments sharing information with their other stakeholders and donors making available information about their parliamentary strengthening activities.

14. In Uganda, the research process was led by staff from the Parliamentary Centre’s Africa Headquarters and from ODI, working alongside a local researcher. A series of semi-structured interviews were conducted with representatives from the key stakeholders in the field of parliamentary strengthening. As well as MPs and parliamentary staff, these included indicating that such principles should build on the Paris principles on aid effectiveness as well as on the OECD-DAC’s capacity building principles. See [http://sdnhq.undp.org/governance/parls](http://sdnhq.undp.org/governance/parls)

\(^5\) While the focus of this research project is not on the role of parliaments in aid effectiveness, it is worth noting that under the Paris Declaration developing countries are committed to “strengthen as appropriate the parliamentary role in national development strategies and/or budgets” (para 48 of Paris Declaration).
representatives from bilateral and multilateral Development Partners (donors), and civil society organisations (see Annex B for a list of interviewees). In addition to these research interviews, a number of documentary sources were reviewed. Prior to the in-country phase of the research those Development Partners that have been active in parliamentary strengthening in Uganda were invited to provide documentation – including evaluations – of their activities. A number of Development Partners provided useful information.
3: Politics, democracy and parliament

15. Parliaments do not operate in a vacuum; their functioning and effectiveness is shaped very much by the country context and in particular the political context (Hudson and Wren, 2007). This chapter outlines Uganda's post-independence political history and the gradual emergence of multi-party democracy through a series of Presidential and Parliamentary elections.

16. While Uganda opted for multi-party democracy in 2005 and held elections under the new multi-party system in 2006, politics remains dominated by President Museveni and the National Resistance Movement. With the Constitution abolished, ignored and amended by a series of Presidents (APRM, 2007b, p.6), there are some concerns about the stability of democracy and the multi-party system (see USAID, 2005 and World Bank, 2005 for excellent analyses of governance, democracy and the political economy of Uganda). These issues have important implications for the functioning and effectiveness of Parliament and for its position in the country's system of governance.

From independence to the gradual emergence of multi-party democracy

17. Uganda gained independence from Britain in 1962, with Milton Obote, the country's first Prime Minister, leading a coalition government formed from an alliance between the United People's Congress and Kabaka-Yekka. In 1966, the alliance shattered as Prime Minister Obote overthrew the President, abolished the Constitution and gave himself more powers. Under a new Republican Constitution, President Obote sought to strengthen multi-party democracy but was himself ousted in a coup led by General Idi Amin in 1971. Idi Amin's dictatorship was characterised by brutality and economic mismanagement, with the 1972 expulsion of Uganda's Asian community a particular low-point.

18. Milton Obote was restored as President in 1980 following the overthrowal of Amin by a combination of Ugandan exiles and the Tanzanian army but was unable to restore the country's battered economy, despite the assistance of the World Bank and IMF. Obote was once again deposed in a military takeover in 1985 although his successor, Tito Okello, remained in power only until the National Resistance Army/Movement took power in 1986. Emerging victorious after a long-running guerrilla war, the NRM installed Yoweri Museveni as President. At his inauguration President Museveni declared that “the problems of Africa, and Uganda in particular, are caused by leaders who overstay in power, which breeds impunity, corruption and promotes patronage” (Global Integrity, 2006, p.2). Museveni is still the President of Uganda.

19. In the years since 1986, Uganda “has transformed from a nearly failed state as a result of various dictatorships, to a country that has achieved consistently high economic growth rates, significant reductions in poverty, and steady improvements in health and education status” (Joint Assistance Strategy Development Partners, 2005, p.2). Uganda has become something of a “donor darling”, attracting increasing volumes of aid as the country and the Government has made good progress in terms of economic development and poverty reduction.

20. Development Partners have been patient and have acknowledged the contribution that the NRM and the Movement system have made to economic development and political stability. Over time however, they have become increasingly keen to see progress on political liberalisation, the introduction of multi-party politics and tackling corruption as well as on economic development. After years of debate, the first multi-party elections for 25 years took place in 2006 with Museveni – unconstrained after the abolition of presidential term limits in 2005 – re-elected President.
Parliaments, Presidents and multi-party politics

21. Uganda’s parliamentary history dates back to the establishment by the Imperial British East African Company in 1881 of an administration with responsibilities for taxation and justice. The country’s first formal Parliament – the National Assembly, consisting of a mixture of elected and nominated representatives – was established in 1962 after general elections which led to a coalition government. The Second Parliament ran under the Republican Constitution of 1967, lasting until Parliament was put out of action by General Idi Amin’s 1971-79 military regime. The Third Parliament, an Interim Parliament or National Consultative Council, operated until the general elections of 1980 ushered in the Fourth Parliament. The Fourth Parliament was ousted in 1985 by Okello’s brief military regime and was then replaced by the National Resistance Council – in effect “the Fifth Parliament” – when the NRM and President Museveni took power in 1986.

22. The National Resistance Council (NRC) was initially made up of 38 Historical Members of the National Resistance Army/Movement, with this number increased to 240 at elections in 1989. Created by the NRC to study and review the Constitution with a view to making proposals for its improvement, the Constitutional Commission presented a draft Constitution in 1993 which was ultimately adopted in October 1995. The Constitution confirmed that Uganda’s political system would remain the “Movement” system, in effect a no-party or one-party state. Under the Constitution, both President and Parliament are elected for a period of five years in elections that are separate but which take place in the same year.

23. Uganda’s first direct Presidential elections were held under the new Constitution in May 1996 with parliamentary elections to elect the Sixth Parliament of Uganda, held under the Movement
system, taking place shortly after. The Sixth Parliament consisted of 214 Constituency Representatives, 39 District Women Representatives, 10 Representatives of the Uganda People’s Defence Force, 5 Youth Representatives, 5 Representatives of People with Disabilities and 3 Workers’ Representatives. While there were no political parties or opposition MPs, some of the elected representatives had clear oppositional tendencies (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008). In the Presidential elections, Museveni received 74% of the vote.

24. A referendum was held in 2000 to determine whether the country should adopt a system of multi-party politics. But with the Movement system of no parties endorsed by more than 90% of those who voted in the referendum, the 2001 elections to the Seventh Parliament were held under the existing system. The number and proportion of District Women Representatives increased reflecting in part the NRM’s desire to ensure a broad representation of marginalised groups. In Presidential elections that were marred by violence and irregularities, Museveni won 69% of the vote with Colonel Kizza Besigye, his main rival, receiving 28%.

25. Over the course of the Seventh Parliament pressure for a transition to multi-party politics increased, with Development Partners playing an important role. The Political Parties and Organisations Act was introduced in 2001 with a much-revised version passed by Parliament in 2003. President Museveni ultimately declared his support for multi-partyism, a move that led – via a Parliamentary motion calling for a referendum, and a “yes” vote of validation in the referendum of 2005 – to a Constitutional Amendment establishing a multi-party political system. At the same time, in a compromise that Museveni was content with, the Constitution was amended to remove Presidential term limits.

26. The Elections of 2006 were the first to be conducted under a multi-party system for 25 years. Opposition parties had little time to prepare for the election and found it difficult to get their views across to the electorate with the NRM having far greater resources, dominating the media and with Besigye, again the main challenger, imprisoned at various times. Nevertheless, the dominance of Museveni was reduced with the incumbent securing 59% of the vote as opposed to Besigye’s 37%. The NRM dominated the parliamentary elections, gaining 214 out of 331 seats, with the Forum for Democratic Change – the main opposition party – gaining just 38 seats.

27. Regional and ethnic divides continue to play an important role in Ugandan politics. The NRM enjoys strong support in central and western Uganda, but is resented in the North in part as a result of the ongoing conflict between the Government of Uganda and the Lords Resistance Army. The Forum for Democratic Change, established in 2004 as an umbrella grouping for opposition MPs, tends to be more popular in urban areas as well as being strong in the North.

The nuts and bolts of parliamentary administration

28. Uganda’s Parliament has a single House, the National Assembly, with the Speaker of Parliament elected by Members of Parliament from their own number. Prior to 1996, Parliament worked in plenary, but the rules of procedure of Uganda’s Parliament now stipulate that it operate through a number of Standing, Sessional and Ad Hoc Committees. The Budget Committee is, exceptionally, established by an Act of Parliament, something which bolsters its independence. The so-called “accountability committees” – the Public Accounts Committee; the Local Government Accounts Committee; the Committee on Statutory Authorities and State Enterprises; and, the Committee on Government Assurances – are amongst the most powerful Committees.

29. The Parliamentary Commission was established in 1997 by the Administration of Parliament Act. The Commission is chaired by the Speaker with the Leader of Government Business (the Prime Minister), the Leader of the Opposition, a representative of the Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development, four elected back-benchers and the Parliamentary Clerk as members.
The Commission is responsible for ensuring that Parliament is able to fulfil effectively its constitutional mandate to be an independent arm of Government.

30. The Parliamentary Commission has two wings; the political wing and the technical wing or Parliamentary Service. The political wing comprises, in addition to the formal parliamentary committees, various Parliamentary fora or caucuses which are voluntary cross-party groupings focused on particular issues such as the conflict in the North of Uganda, women, the Millennium Development Goals and food security. The Parliamentary Service includes the Legislative Service (Clerks, Legal Counsel, Library and Research Department, Official Report, Parliamentary Budget Office) and the Administrative Service (Finance and Administration, Human Resources, Parliamentary Development Coordination Office, Information and Communication Technology and the Sergeants at Arms). To strengthen the autonomy of Parliament, the 1997 Administration of Parliament Act established the Parliamentary Service as parallel to the public service (APRM, 2007b, p.119).

31. In terms of its finances however, Parliament remains beholden to the executive. This “severely compromises parliamentary autonomy and leaves Parliament vulnerable to under-funding, to the politically-motivated interruption of funding or to corruption” (AAPPG, 2008, pp.25-6). As the AAPPG report put it – drawing on evidence collected in the Ugandan Parliament as well as others – low levels of funding for Parliament are both a symptom and a cause of Parliament’s institutional weakness (AAPPG, 2008, p.30).
4: Parliamentary performance

32. Uganda is at the early stages of the transition to multi-party politics. The country’s politics and its Parliament are overwhelmingly influenced by the legacy of the Movement system and the continued – albeit slowly decreasing – dominance of President Museveni and the National Resistance Movement (NRM). Any assessment of the performance of the country’s Parliament must take this into account, along with the resource constraints that the Parliament operates under. Another challenge is that in Uganda as in many developing countries, turnover rates for MPs are very high at around 50%, with the result that large numbers of MPs spend most of a Parliament coming to terms with its procedures.

33. This chapter provides a brief outline of the performance of the country’s Parliament, organised in terms of its three primary roles: legislation, representation and oversight. The purpose of this chapter is to further set the scene for our exploration of parliamentary strengthening and its effectiveness. It is based on two main sets of data: first, a series of research interviews with individuals that have worked either in or with the Parliament; and second, reports about the effectiveness of Parliament published by Development Partners and others.

34. It should however be noted that neither Development Partners nor the Parliament of Uganda have made much progress in terms of assessing the performance of Parliament. Our in-country research has produced some additional information about parliamentary performance but nevertheless the absence of systematic performance data puts limits on what can be said with confidence, and particularly with quantitative data, about parliamentary performance.

Legislation

35. The current structure and mandate of Parliament derives from the 1995 Constitution which provided for a reorganized and more empowered Parliament and enabled parliamentarians to more actively engage in lawmaking and oversight of the Executive. The adoption of a Committee system has enabled more systematic review of bills and policy proposals from the Executive as well as more effective oversight. The Sixth Parliament (1996-2001) adopted several laws, including the Administration of Parliament Act of 1997 that furthered Parliament’s development as a separate and independent branch of government. Of similar import for the independence and performance of Parliament itself, in 2000 the Sixth Parliament passed – in the face of prolonged resistance from the Executive – a private member’s Budget Bill that gave Parliament significantly enhanced powers to engage in the budget process.

36. A survey conducted as part of USAID’s evaluation of its parliamentary strengthening activities in Uganda – an evaluation that continues to set the benchmark for other Development Partners – found that 73% of respondents felt that the Seventh Parliament was either somewhat or very effective at enacting legislation in the national interest (USAID, 2007, p.8). Survey respondents reported that the two most significant legislative accomplishments of the Seventh Parliament were the Leadership Code Bill of 2001 and the Access to Information Bill of 2005. Other major bills passed by the Seventh Parliament were: the Inspectorate of Government Bill (2001); the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Bill (2002); the Occupational Safety and Health Bill (2005); the Persons with Disabilities Bill (2005) and, perhaps most significantly, the Constitutional Amendment Bills of 2005 which included provision to remove presidential term limits.

37. The Bill to remove presidential term limits, notoriously, was passed after MPs were paid $3000 each, supposedly to facilitate consultations in their constituencies (ARPM, 2005, p.62). This episode demonstrated quite clearly the limits of the legislature’s and of individual MPs’ independence, particularly in a context where the Government insisted that the ways in which
Representation

38. Effective representation of citizens’ interests was, at least on paper, central to the agenda of the NRM under the Movement system, as demonstrated by the fact that a significant number of parliamentary seats were reserved for women, representatives of youth, workers and people with disabilities, as well as for the Uganda People’s Defence Force. One indicator of efforts to enhance the representational role of Parliament is that the number of District Women representatives has been increased from 39 in the Sixth Parliament to 79 in the Eighth.

39. A further key feature of the Movement system was the fact that MPs were elected on merit rather than because of their party affiliations. However, the system never operated purely on the basis of merit. Rather, communities and constituencies selected and elected their most educated and talented sons (or occasionally daughters) to represent their interests in Parliament in the expectation that they would share with their communities the goods that they were able to access as a result of their participation on the national political stage. Nevertheless, the merit system and the absence of political parties may, at times, may have had some advantages in allowing individual MPs to speak their minds.

40. One way of assessing the effectiveness of Parliament and its constituent MPs in terms of representation is to consider citizens’ views of Parliament’s performance. In Uganda, it remains the case that most citizens regard Parliament and MPs as ineffective. This can be seen in the public outcry that greeted Parliament’s approval of supplementary appropriations for the Commonwealth Heads of Government conference in 2007 and in widespread public opposition to suggestions that MPs’ salaries be increased. It was also apparent in public reaction to the fact that MPs were paid $3000 each to remove presidential term limits, with many MPs severely criticised by their constituents to the extent that some even returned the money.

The Parliamentary Scorecard: Strengthening MPs’ incentives to perform!

The Parliamentary Scorecard, produced by the Africa Leadership Institute, is an innovative approach to enhancing the accountability of MPs to their constituents. It works by providing systematic, transparent and publicly-available ratings of MPs’ performance so that citizens can make informed decisions at the ballot box. The Parliamentary Scorecard increases the incentives for MPs to perform well and has stimulated substantial debate, both in Parliament and in MPs’ constituencies. Performance assessment relies on the existence of an Access to Information Act, with assessments made in terms of three variables: attendance; participation; and influence.

Funded initially by USAID and now by the Netherlands, the Scorecard is constantly evolving. Most recently, in response to user-demands, it has expanded to include an assessment of MPs’ constituency work. The forthcoming version will include an assessment of the effectiveness of Parliament as an institution. And, in time the scorecard may expand to include information about MPs’ voting records. The Africa Leadership Institute intends to conduct systematic research to ascertain whether the ratings make a difference to voter behaviour but there is some evidence to suggest that they do.

41. As is the case in many developing countries, there is in Uganda a mismatch between what citizens expect of their representatives and the role that MPs are expected to play within a system of representative parliamentary democracy. Put simply, citizens – living in poverty and more concerned about day-to-day survival than the longer term – expect their MPs to deliver
development rather than engaging with national policy debates and holding the Executive to account. The tendency of MPs to make promises during election campaigns about what they will deliver to their constituencies exacerbates this challenge. There are no easy answers – and it is far from clear that the establishment of a Constituency Development Fund in Uganda has helped – but if Development Partners are serious about supporting Parliaments to enable them to be more effective, they must address rather than ignore the mismatch between their views about what roles MPs should play and the views of voters.

Oversight

42. Parliament has an important role to play in considering the national budget, exercising control over the activities of Ministries and Departments, holding the Executive to account for the fulfilment of its assurances, supporting the work of various watchdog institutions, ensuring equitable development and support for equal opportunities, receiving petitions from the electorate on matters of public concern, and considering proposed presidential appointees (Parliament of Uganda, 2006). Since 1996, Parliament has operated through the work of Committees as well as in plenary. This is reported to have greatly increased its effectiveness (APRM, 2007b, p.121) although a recent survey reported that only 5% of respondents felt that Parliament is always effective in holding the executive accountable (Barya, 2008, p.53).

43. The quality and effectiveness of parliamentary oversight depends very much on the ability of Parliament to engage in the policy process. Under the Movement system, there was a very close link between the Legislature and the Executive, with members of the Executive also members of the legislature. While this system placed clear limits on the independence of the legislature, it did ensure that Parliament was part of the policy process! However, under the Movement system and more recently – and in a manner that will be familiar to readers from some developed countries – the Executive has tended to regard Parliament as an advisory body whose recommendations can be brushed aside, rather than as the supreme body where the sovereignty of the people and the nation is expressed.

The National Social Security Fund scandal

In August 2008, reports began to appear in the press raising questions about a purchase of land by the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) from two men, one of whom was Security Minister Amama Mbabazi, a close ally of President Museveni. The suggestion was that the purchase involved a conflict of interest, political pressure and misuse of resources.

Parliament was centre stage in probing into the deal. The Parliamentary Committee on Commissions, Statutory Bodies and State Enterprises held a high profile inquiry. While the majority of the Committee members concluded that the Ministers should be censured, intensive lobbying by the President and others led six Committee members to insist on producing a minority report absolving Ministers and the management of the NSSF of any wrong-doing. Both the Committee's reports were debated by Parliament. The decisive factor was a last-minute ruling by the Attorney General that the Committee had exceeded its mandate in crucial areas. Opposition MPs walked out of the House in protest. The majority report was amended to, in effect, spare the Ministers.

The NSSF scandal dominated political debate in Uganda for much of the second half of 2008. It demonstrated that while there is some enthusiasm within Parliament and amongst the public to hold the executive accountable – 9 MPs did not buckle under the weight of presidential arm-twisting – the major political outcomes are nonetheless determined by President Museveni, through the NRM Caucus. Parliament remains, ultimately, subordinate to the Executive and to the person of the President. To the Ugandan public, the affair made Parliament look weak and ineffective.
44. Since the formation of the Eighth Parliament following the multi-party elections of 2006 the so-called “accountability committees”, chaired by energetic and vocal members of the opposition, have done much to enhance the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight. There are question marks about the extent to which their activities, taking place against a background of continued Executive dominance, have led to significant changes in policy or practice but there is no doubt that by asking searching questions and demanding evidence-based answers and explanations they have contributed to more effective oversight. With substantial support provided by a number of Development Partners, they have also improved public perceptions of Parliament and MPs. However in July 2008 the NRM replaced a number of Committee chairs, putting in place MPs who were considered more loyal to the Government. This was a backward step for the independence of Parliament and its oversight function.

Budget involvement

45. The Parliament of Uganda is, in comparison to parliaments in many developing countries, relatively well-placed in terms of its ability to engage in the budget process. This is in large part because of the passing of the Budget Act in 2001 and the subsequent establishment of the Parliamentary Budget Office. As part of the Parliamentary Service, the Parliamentary Budget Office has the task of providing objective and timely analysis to Parliament's Budget Committee and Parliament more widely to improve the quality of parliamentary engagement with the budget process and financial management.

46. The Budget Committee includes the Chairpersons of all other Parliamentary committees as ex officio members. In this respect it is at the apex of parliamentary oversight. The Budget Act sets out the role of the Budget Committee as being: to focus on the preliminary estimates and the macroeconomic plan and programs and submit recommendations to the Speaker; to consider the National Budget and compile amendments and refer them to the relevant Committees; and, to carry on such other functions relating to the Budget as may be assigned to it by Parliament under the Act or any other law in force. The Budget Act requires that every bill introduced into Parliament be accompanied by an explanation of its financial implications and that such explanations are tabled alongside bills for their first reading and consideration by the relevant committee. Significantly, Parliament now has the power to defer bills to another financial year so that their potential impact can be properly considered.

47. While the Parliamentary Budget Office operates under serious resource constraints, its support to the Budget Committee has certainly made a difference to the quality of parliamentary engagement in the budget process. The Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) reports that “the role of Parliament in national planning and resource allocation has been strengthened. The Executive is now required to share the budget proposals with Parliament well in advance, and all external borrowing has to be authorised by Parliament. Parliament is assisted in performing this scrutiny by the Parliamentary Budget Office” (Government of Uganda, 2005, p.118). Uganda’s APRM report echoes this assessment, noting that the budgetary process has been much improved and that Parliament “has been given a significant and constructive role in decision-making on national spending and oversight over the Executive” (APRM, 2007b, p.119).

Poverty reduction

48. Many of Uganda’s Development Partners regard Uganda’s Poverty Eradication Action Plan as something of a model PRSP and have provided large volumes of development assistance to support its implementation. One of the ways in which Uganda’s PEAP compares favourably to other countries’ PRSPs is as regards the degree of civil society involvement. Parliamentary involvement remains limited however. The PEAP itself suggests that “Parliament has a fundamental role both in passing legislation that bears on poverty reduction, and in scrutinising the executive” (Government of Uganda, 2005, p.8). In practice, Parliament’s involvement in developing and monitoring progress against the PEAP has been limited (Eberlei and Henn, 2003; Seewald, 2007). Parliamentary approval of the PEAP was not required, there has been no
official parliamentary debate about the PEAP and its review, and Parliament has not been involved in the Annual PEAP Implementation Review. This suggests very strongly that neither the Executive nor Development Partners have regarded parliamentary involvement in Uganda’s plans for poverty reduction as particularly important.

49. For their part, relatively few MPs have pushed for greater participation. This may be because they feel that their participation will have little impact, because they have limited knowledge, or because they have been unable or unwilling to prioritise participation in PEAP-related meetings (Seewald, 2007). Indeed, it was suggested to us in Uganda that 80% of MPs will not have read the PEAP. It has also been suggested that whereas under the Movement system Parliament regarded the PEAP as a national programme, it is now viewed as a party agenda, with the result that oppositional MPs are less supportive. In this respect, the shift to multi-party politics may, at least temporarily, have partially undermined the sense of ownership around Uganda’s plans for poverty reduction.

50. A revised PEAP is in the process of being prepared with a greater role envisaged for Parliament in assessing the mismatch between policy and implementation (Seewald, 2007). Wider parliamentary engagement with the process could play an important role in strengthening the sense of national ownership for the PEAP, beyond the NRM-dominated Executive. Development Partners should consider providing focussed support to Parliament to enable it to engage effectively in formulating and monitoring progress on plans for poverty reduction.

Parliament in a multi-party system

51. It is too early to say whether Parliament is more effective in the emerging multi-party system than it was under the no-party Movement system. Commentators look back fondly at the Sixth Parliament as a model of parliamentary independence (APRM, 2007b, p.xxiv), attributing its effectiveness in part to the fact that MPs were not controlled by party whips and to an influx of young, energetic and idealistic MPs. However, despite Parliament being more vocal, the Executive and the President remained very much in control. For instance, while Parliament censured four Ministers in the Sixth Parliament, the President brought them back into office at a later date (APRM, 2007b, p.119; USAID, 2005, p.32). It is also the case that vocal MPs who were considered to be trouble-makers were disciplined and, by the time of the Seventh Parliament, were made to toe the NRM line.

Liberal democracy and parliamentary independence – the views of the African Peer Review Panel

“Ironically, the main bottlenecks to Parliamentary independence in Uganda relate to the essence of liberal democracy. This form of democracy is associated with political affiliation and this has its rigidities premised on political party discipline. In the case of Uganda, President Museveni is an exceptionally skilled and influential political actor. He has played a key role in restoring Uganda’s political and economic stability, which makes him a factor to reckon with. In the 2006 general elections his political party, the NRM, achieved a sweeping legislative victory of 82%. There is an argument that since the President has called for strict party discipline, and given his influence, his actions are likely to water down the legislative freedom and autonomy that Uganda experienced under the Movement with the Individual Merit principle” (APRM, 2007b, p.122)

52. The Eighth Parliament is showing some signs of being more effective, particularly through the activities of the accountability committees, and because information – for instance about corruption – now has an outlet through the opposition. But Parliament and MPs themselves will inevitably take some time to become accustomed to multi-party politics and its implications. And, the reality of overwhelming Executive, Presidential and NRM dominance has not changed. Indeed, we were told in Kampala firstly that the President had said that he didn’t care if MPs
slept on the job, as long as they woke up to vote [for his policies] and second, that decisions in Parliament are made by an NRM caucus with the result that Parliament remains little more than a rubber-stamp institution (see also Barya, 2008, p.54).

53. Looking ahead, as the elections of 2011 approach, and internal NRM debates become more heated, Parliament may evolve into a forum where policies are discussed, constituents are represented and the Executive is held accountable. Development Partners have an important role to play in providing support to Parliament to enable it to become more effective.
5: Parliamentary strengthening in Uganda

Nurturing parliamentary development

54. With politics dominated by the NRM and President Museveni during the Movement system and since the transition to multi-party politics, the Parliament of Uganda has played a somewhat marginal role in the country’s system of governance. Nevertheless, a number of Development Partners have provided support for parliamentary strengthening to enable Parliament to play a more effective role when the political constraints allow.

55. There are a wide variety of approaches to parliamentary strengthening, but whatever the approach taken, the objective is to help parliament to improve its capacity as a law-making body that represents citizens’ interests by passing appropriate legislation and exercising effective oversight over executive actions and the budget. This chapter outlines the landscape of parliamentary strengthening in Uganda, identifying a number of themes in its evolution and commenting on its effectiveness.

The landscape of parliamentary strengthening

56. Since the elections of 1996, an increasing number of Development Partners have provided support for parliamentary strengthening in Uganda. Support has ranged from the provision of equipment, to capacity building for MPs, parliamentary staff and committees, to institutional development, to work with civil society organisations on the demand-side of accountability and with political parties, to efforts to strengthen Parliament as part of the wider system of emerging democracy.

57. It has not been easy to obtain accurate information about which Development Partners were primarily responsible for which component of parliamentary strengthening, but it seems clear that USAID, UNDP and DFID have, for some years, been the key players. A number of other Development Partners including DANIDA, Irish Aid, the Netherlands' Embassy and the EU have also played important roles. Beyond the bilaterals and UNDP, the Parliamentary Centre, the World Bank Institute and AWEPA have provided capacity building and training for MPs and parliamentary staff on issues including effective financial scrutiny. A number of NGOs have played important roles in engaging parliamentarians on issues such as HIV/AIDS, people living with disabilities, and the conflict in the north of Uganda.

58. The landscape and history of parliamentary strengthening in Uganda is complex. However, there are three key themes: firstly, putting the institutions in place; secondly, balancing work on the “supply-side” with work on the “demand-side” of governance and accountability; and thirdly, integrating support for Parliament with support for deepening democracy more widely.

Putting the institutions in place

59. After an initial phase of providing basic equipment and training for MPs and parliamentary staff, Development Partners including USAID, DFID and UNDP decided to take a more strategic approach in an effort to ensure that their support for parliamentary strengthening would deliver long-term sustainable results. In this approach, the focus was on working with Parliament to establish institutions that would help Parliament to deliver on its mandate.

60. The Constitution of 1995 provided the basis for the re-emergence of the Ugandan Parliament in the late 1990s. On that basis, and after the first Plan for the Modernization of Parliament in 1996, the Administration of Parliament Act of 1997 established a Parliamentary Commission and a Parliamentary Service separate from the civil service. Development Partners played an
important role in supporting these institutions in their early years, with USAID’s Uganda Parliamentary Technical Assistance Project which ran from 1998-2002 and was implemented by SUNY at the forefront. Support from USAID was instrumental too in the establishment of an independent Parliamentary Budget Office, which was eventually opened for business in 2001. These institutions – the Parliamentary Commission, the Parliamentary Service and the Parliamentary Budget Office – helped to give Parliament a clear identity and the infrastructure to play its roles more effectively, particularly as regards financial oversight.

61. A second stage of institutional development saw DFID take more of a role, working closely alongside USAID, with the involvement of other Development Partners including UNDP and Irish Aid. This involved two major elements: the establishment of the Parliamentary Development and Coordination Office (PDCO); and the production of a Parliamentary Strategic Investment and Development Plan (PSIDP). Both PDCO and the PSIDP have gone through various stages of evolution to get to their current form. PDCO’s forerunner, the Office of Parliamentary Professional Development, was established in 2003 with strong support from DFID. With Development Partners frustrated with its performance, in 2004 it was professionalised and turned into the Parliamentary Development and Coordination Office.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>DFID’s support to the Parliament of Uganda since 2003</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>2003, on behalf of Parliament, DFID funded an organisational review of the Parliamentary Service.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004, DFID funded a consultancy to help develop the Parliament of Uganda Strategic Investment and Development Plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005, DFID channelled £50,000 towards the training of the Parliamentary Service in Preparation for the transition to a multi-party system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/7, DFID funded a local and an international consultant to adapt the PSIDP to the new multi-party environment and to develop an action plan and liaise with donor groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID has also funded committee members in relation to their mandate and functions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID has contributed £100,000 towards priority areas identified by parliament in the PSIDP and £1.5m of institutional support to parliament from 2007/8 to 2011/12 through a multi-donor ‘Deepening Democracy Programme’.</td>
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Source: AAPPG, 2008, p.39

62. PDCO is currently led by the energetic and knowledgeable Dison Okumu and has the task of coordinating all aspects of Development Partners’ support to the Parliament of Uganda. PDCO is a unique institution in terms of parliaments in developing countries and plays a central role in aligning parliamentary strengthening with Parliament’s plans for its own development. Parliament’s plans for its own development are set out in the Parliamentary Strategic Investment and Development Plan. The first PSIDP was launched in 2004, with a revised version, fit for the new system of multi-party politics, finalised in 2007. Development Partners including USAID, DFID and UNDP supported Parliament in producing the first PSIDP and in its subsequent revision.

**Balancing supply and demand-side engagement**

63. Once a number of parliamentary institutions had been established, a number of Development Partners, with USAID most prominent, began to turn their attention to the demand-side of governance and accountability. The rationale for this was that of balancing efforts to build the capacity of Parliament as an institution with efforts to ensure that there was a demand – from
citizens, civil society organisations and political parties – for Parliament to play an effective role in the emerging democracy. By 2006 USAID had decided that providing support for basic infrastructure and institutional development was no longer the best use of its resources (USAID, 2007, p.44).

**USAID’s Legislative Support Activity, 2002-06: Mixed success in a challenging environment**

USAID commissioned a review of its support to the Ugandan Parliament, political process and elections. That the commissioning of such a review is in itself commendable speaks volumes for the paucity of Development Partners’ efforts to evaluate and learn from their support for parliamentary strengthening.

The review found mixed results as regards the legislative support activities supported by USAID. On the positive side field visits and consultative workshops by parliamentary committees and MPs had helped to focus parliamentary attention on issues including the conflict in Northern Uganda, the rights of the disabled and HIV/AIDS. This had led to improved legislation on Persons with Disabilities and to a Parliamentary Resolution declaring Northern Uganda a crisis area. These activities were considered so useful that Parliament set aside some of its own resources to continue them, an indicator of success that could be more widely applied.

On the negative side, there was inadequate follow up on a number of planned activities: plans to establish a bill-tracking system came to nothing; a national media campaign on HIV/AIDS did not materialise; no plans were put in place to continue with the production of the Parliamentary Briefer newsletter once USAID support ended; and, in-depth specialized training for the Parliamentary Budget Office did not take place.

Engaging with Parliament and MPs around the time of the Constitutional Amendments of 2005 was clearly a challenge, but the USAID-supported project would, it seems, also have benefited from better communication with PDCO to ensure that planned activities were aligned with Parliament’s own plans and that PDCO was informed about funding decisions.

64. “Linkages” is the third of USAID’s major programmes of parliamentary support. The programme builds on the successful parliamentary outreach and field visits that were part of USAID’s 2002-06 programme of legislative support. Run by Eva Mulema – a woman who has played a central role in parliamentary development in Uganda – Linkages aims to strengthen democratic linkages within and among the Ugandan Parliament, selected local governments and civil society organisations, as well as to build their capacities, in order to enhance accountability and improve service delivery. The programme began in 2007 and is scheduled for completion at the end of 2010.

65. Linkages operates by supporting a number of parliamentary committees to focus on particular themes by undertaking field visits to investigate whether policies and budget recommendations made in Parliament are translated into action at local levels. The Committees that have been involved include those whose mandates cover issues including health, education, local government, HIV/AIDS, natural resources, peace, recovery and development in northern Uganda.

66. The EU’s current contribution to parliamentary strengthening is part of its wider Human Rights and Good Governance Programme. This programme of work has two aspects: working with state actors including Parliament, as well as the police and prisons; and, working with civil society actors including the media. However, the parliamentary element of the Human Rights and Good Governance programme is rather small, amounting to only Euros 250k. This reflects concerns about the ability of Parliament to absorb additional resources. An additional obstacle to further EU engagement in coordinated parliamentary strengthening is that the country office has been told by Brussels that it cannot be part of a the current basket funding arrangement. This demonstrates some of the challenges for donor harmonisation.
Deepening Democracy and/or strengthening Financial Management and Accountability

67. The latest phase of support for Parliamentary Strengthening in Uganda is part of a wider programme called Deepening Democracy. Deepening Democracy runs from 2008 to 2011 and has an overall budget of in excess of $20 million. The programme aims to support Ugandan actions which deepen democracy and facilitate the transition towards greater political participation. Deepening Democracy has a number of elements including work on elections, political parties, civic education, civil society, the media and parliament. Coordinated by an independent programme management unit hosted by DANIDA, the programme involves a number of Development Partners who are part of the embassy-level Partners for Democracy and Governance group, including the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Norway. USAID, UNDP and the EU are not part of the programme, although they remain part of the wider Democratisation Working Group which USAID currently chairs.

68. In line with the PSI DP, the parliamentary component of Deepening Democracy focuses on strengthening the institution of Parliament and the work of key oversight committees. The parliamentary support element of Deepening Democracy is based on a realisation that Parliament’s effectiveness is shaped in large part by the wider political context of faltering progress towards effective multi-party democracy. Expected results include: more effective oversight of the Executive by selected committees; enhanced parliamentary support services to these committees and parliamentarians; and, the selective enhancement of administrative capacity and infrastructure.

69. It is too early to comment on the effectiveness of Deepening Democracy or of its parliamentary component, but the initiative is clearly seeking to apply the lessons learnt from earlier initiatives, including previous basket fund arrangements. Buttressed by a Memorandum of Understanding between the participating Development Partners, Deepening Democracy is well-placed to foster a greater degree of harmonisation, and to ensure that support is aligned with Parliament’s own strategic plan.

The Financial Management and Accountability Programme (FINMAP): Effectiveness or coordination?

The Financial Management and Accountability Programme (FINMAP) includes a parliamentary element alongside an extensive programme of support for financial management. Managed by the Ministry for Financial Planning and Economic Development, FINMAP’s parliamentary work focuses on the accountability committees, helping them to clear a six-year backlog of reports from the Office of the Auditor General.

With a tight focus on financial accountability, FINMAP runs in parallel with the Deepening Democracy programme. Its parliamentary element is only loosely coordinated with the bulk of Development Partners’ support to Parliament. Nevertheless, with MPs paid $60 per day to sit over parliamentary recesses, progress on reducing the backlog of reports and improving the effectiveness of key parliamentary committees has been good. Whether the benefits of a focus on financial accountability outweigh the costs of a lack of coordination with Deepening Democracy remains an open question.

Evolving and adapting to the political context

70. The landscape of parliamentary strengthening in Uganda has been complex, with a large number of Development Partners seeking to support Parliament to play an effective role in the transition to multi-party politics. In contrast to the situation in some developing countries, the story of parliamentary strengthening in Uganda demonstrates that Development Partners – working closely with an increasingly effective Parliamentary Commission and a Parliamentary Development and Cooperation Office with its own Parliamentary Strategic Investment and Development Plan – have sought to learn and apply the lessons from their earlier experiences
and to take full account of the political context. USAID’s shift to focussing on the demand-side of governance and accountability, and the establishment of the Deepening Democracy programme, are promising developments which could play an important role in enhancing the effectiveness of parliamentary support and in enabling Parliament to play a more effective role in Uganda’s system of governance.

71. There are however some concerns that Development Partners change their focus too frequently. This can mean first that insufficient time is given to address a particular issue and second that Parliament has to make continued efforts to ensure that its work plans are phrased in such a manner that they are aligned with Development Partners’ latest thinking rather than focussing its efforts on the effective implementation of existing programmes. Development Partners should – while remaining responsive to changing realities on the ground – seek to maintain some degree of consistency in their focus.
6: Parliamentary strengthening and the Paris Principles in practice

72. Uganda has been at the forefront of efforts to enhance the effectiveness of aid for many years and has been an enthusiastic supporter of the Paris Agenda. With many donors providing the country with large volumes of development assistance in a wide variety of ways, Uganda has been keen to ensure that such aid is provided effectively, with low transactions costs, and in a manner that supports the country’s own development plans as set out in the PEAP.

73. This chapter examines the landscape of parliamentary strengthening in Uganda from the vantage point of the Paris Principles on aid effectiveness. The principles of ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results and mutual accountability are taken in turn, in order to generate insights about parliamentary strengthening and to throw some light on the extent to which parliamentary strengthening programmes have benefitted from consistency with the Paris Principles.

Ownership

74. Just as the Ugandan Government has become increasingly assertive in terms of its ownership of plans for poverty reduction, so too has the Ugandan Parliament with its plans for its own development. Parliament’s plans are set out in the Parliamentary Strategic Investment and Development Plan (PSIDP). The PSIDP builds on the foundations provided by the Constitution of 1995, the first Plan for the Modernisation of Parliament which dates from 1996, and the Administration of Parliament Act of 1997 which led to the establishment of a Parliamentary Commission and Parliamentary Service.

75. The development of the first PSIDP began in 2002 with the resulting plan launched in 2004. It set out the strategic direction of Parliament based on it's own vision of being "an effective and independent Parliament that protects and promotes democratic governance, accountability and sustainable development" (Report on Review, p.2). The PSIDP sets out information about objectives, activities, inputs and outputs. It is intended to provide the framework and starting point for all support to parliamentary strengthening and gives a clear message to all Development Partners that Parliament is serious about its own progress. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the production of the PSIDP was supported and very actively encouraged, if not directed, by a number of Development Partners, including USAID and DFID. This demonstrates, somewhat paradoxically, that Development Partners can – if they are sensitive about being too directive – play a useful role in encouraging a Parliament to strengthen its ownership of its development plans.

76. While the first PSIDP attracted considerable funding from Development Partners and, reportedly, the Government of Uganda (PSIDP, 2007-11, p.4), there were some concerns that it was not realistically costed or sufficiently prioritised. PDCO revised the PSIDP in 2007 after the multi-party elections of 2006. The current version runs until 2011 and focuses on the following objectives: enhancing the knowledge and expertise of MPs and staff to operate effectively in a multiparty environment; improving Parliamentary legislative, administrative and infrastructural support services to enable members to legislate and perform oversight functions more effectively; strengthening parliament’s representative capacity through external partnerships and linkages; and, increasing parliament’s engagement in peace building, conflict management and resolution and in deepening democratic governance (PDCO, 2007a).
Alignment

77. The PSIDP provides the basis for alignment of Development Partners’ parliamentary support with Parliament’s own plans for its development. With the revised PSIDP including elements that are concerned with strengthening multi-party politics, and with less “parliamentary tourism” included, it is likely to prove increasingly popular with Development Partners. However, rather than simply set out its vision and then hope that Development Partners align their support with that vision, the Parliament of Uganda has – again, with the support of Development Partners – gone one step further by establishing an institution to promote alignment, the Parliamentary Development and Coordination Office (PDCO). The PDCO has the task of coordinating all aspects of Development Partners’ support to the Parliament of Uganda, striving to ensure that Development Partners’ support is aligned with the PSIDP.

78. PDCO evolved from the earlier Office of Parliamentary Professional Development, an institution that had been established to help to strengthen the capacity of Parliament and parliamentarians, but which Development Partners became frustrated with. Such frustrations led to the professionalization of the institution, with disbursements made conditional on the production of annual work plans. Manuel Pinto, who had been the Director of the Office of Parliamentary Professional Development was made coordinator of PDCO with Dison Okumu the Director.

Aligning support for democracy

The Deepening Democracy programme should do much to maximise the effectiveness of aid provided in support of political governance. There is however a gap in terms of alignment, as there is no clear Government counterpart or lead agency for Deepening Democracy. If Deepening Democracy is to be effective, Development Partners will need to ensure that this institutional mis-match does not lead to Government failing to engage with the programme.

79. Today PDCO is the principal link between Parliament and Development Partners. Most of the funds provided for parliamentary strengthening are channelled through PDCO and aligned with the PSIDP with relatively few activities – such as NGO engagement with Parliament and support for parliamentary fora sometimes bypassing PDCO. From 2006 to 2007, UNDP, DFID, Irish Aid, the Netherlands Embassy provided support for the PSIDP with UNDP, making a considerable effort to align its support with Parliament’s plans, providing more than half of the funds provided in this manner. AWEPA and USAID made direct payments for services and materials (PDCO, 2007b, p.19). Most Development Partners regard PDCO as an effective collaborator and have been keen to align their support with the PSIDP. From the parliamentary side, there are some concerns that close alignment with the PSIDP has some costs in terms of PDCO having the flexibility to respond to unexpected challenges and opportunities.

Harmonisation

80. The Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy provides the primary mechanism for the harmonisation of development assistance in support of Uganda’s Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP). Support to pillar 4 of the PEAP, the good governance pillar, includes support for strengthened political governance. This involves a number of donors coordinating their support for political governance through the Partners for Democracy and Governance basket fund and the associated Deepening Democracy programme.

81. Most of the support provided to the Parliament of Uganda by Development Partners is now to be part of the Deepening Democracy programme. This should deliver major gains in terms of harmonization, reducing transactions costs and duplication and promoting coordination. Both the Deepening Democracy programme and the Financial Management and Accountability
Parliamentary strengthening and the Paris principles: Uganda case study

Programme (FINMAP) are resourced through basket funds. This should deliver greater harmonization; effective coordination between FINMAP’s parliamentary component and the parliamentary component of Deepening Democracy would deliver still more harmonization.

82. While there is good progress on harmonization of support to Parliament, with most donors sharing information about their plans, there remains room for further progress. USAID, UNDP and the EU have signed the Deepening Democracy memorandum, but are not part of the basket funding arrangement. USAID is obliged by Congress to use its own procedures and operates through independent contractors. UNDP has a different reporting format and will not be part of a basket funding arrangement that it does not manage; and other donors do not want UNDP to manage the basket fund. And the EU’s delegation has been instructed by Brussels that it cannot be part of a basket funding arrangement. The fact that these three donors do not have a central role in Deepening Democracy and its financing places clear limits on the extent of harmonization that will be achieved.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Harmonisation needed: Changing the culture of per diems</th>
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<tr>
<td>The practice of some Development Partners continuing to pay per diems to MPs to encourage them to participate in workshops provides a clear example of the dangers of a lack of harmonization. The efforts of most donors to change the culture and to ensure that MPs make decisions about which meetings to attend on the basis of substance rather than cash inducements are easily undermined if one or two Development Partners continue to pay per diems.</td>
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83. A number of respondents in Kampala mentioned that there is room for progress on harmonization in other ways too; Development Partners reportedly have a tendency to pick and choose which elements of the PSIDP they support, pursuing different agendas and keen to focus on areas where pointing to their impact is relatively easy. The focus of support on the so-called accountability committees, when other areas of Parliament are in need of support too, provides a good example of this. The costs of seeking to ensure that all areas are covered thus falls to PDCO when these costs could be minimized by better inter-donor coordination. Similarly, unless there is a good degree of harmonization between Development Partners, Parliament will be able and may be tempted to pick and choose between Development Partners’ and their various offers of support, or – worse still – to approach more than one donor to support the same activity.

Managing for results

84. The PSIDP provides a framework that could be useful for ensuring that support to parliamentary strengthening is provided in a manner that learns from experience and is about managing for results. With the vast majority of Development Partners keen to emphasise that their support is aligned with the PSIDP, the potential is certainly there, but there is little evidence to suggest that the PSIDP has been used effectively in this manner.

85. As in most (developing) countries, little effort has been put into assessing parliamentary effectiveness or the effectiveness of support to parliamentary strengthening. Indeed the APRM self-assessment report notes that no official assessment of Parliament’s effectiveness and weaknesses (APRM, 2007b, p.119). USAID’s evaluation of its 2002-2006 programme of support, which included its Legislative Support Assistance, is a notable and highly commendable exception, but even in that case the framework for evaluation was, it seems, designed by USAID and its evaluators rather than being informed by the PSIDP (USAID, 2007).

86. Some efforts are however being made as regards evaluating the effectiveness of parliament and parliamentary support. These include the use of public opinion surveys such as Afrobarometer, staff assessments, performance monitoring plans and the aforementioned parliamentary
scorecard. And, as the APRM self-assessment report notes the draft PSIDP provides for annual assessment of Parliament’s performance (APRM, 2007b, p.119).

**Mutual accountability**

87. The basic architecture for mutual accountability as regards support to parliamentary strengthening is in place in Uganda. On Parliament’s side, there is the PSIDP and the PDCO. On the Development Partners’ side, there is the Deepening Democracy programme and its associated basket fund. PDCO has to provide Development Partners with quarterly reports on its activities and the use that has been made of resources for parliamentary strengthening. Development Partners do not as yet provide regular reports to Parliament.

88. In interviews in Kampala one of the Development Partners suggested that the Memorandum of Understanding and principles that are at the core of the Deepening Democracy initiative could, in time, be used by Parliament to hold Development Partners to account, as well as being used by one Development Partner to ensure that other Development Partners live up to their commitments. Indeed, it was suggested that this model and mechanism for mutual accountability might find wider application. Beyond Deepening Democracy, we were told that Parliament now – helpfully in terms of strengthening accountability – asks the USAID Linkages project for quarterly reports and budgets. However, with Parliament still dependent on Development Partners for resources, it may have little incentive to hold Development Partners to account for the promises that they make or to refuse funds that are not harmonized or aligned with parliamentary priorities.
7: Conclusions and recommendations

A map of the landscape of parliamentary strengthening …

89. Taking the Paris Principles as a vantage point, this case study has explored the landscape of parliamentary strengthening in Uganda. The bedrock of the landscape is political. In Uganda, the key feature is that the country moved to a multi-party system of politics as recently as 2005, with the first multi-party elections for 25 years held in 2006. The legacy of one-party rule and the continuing dominance of the NRM, the Executive and President Museveni – now able to run for the Presidency again in 2011 – continue to shape the functioning and performance of the Ugandan Parliament.

90. Assessing the performance of the Parliament of Uganda is, as in many other countries, extremely challenging. This is because neither Parliament itself nor its Development Partners have as yet put sufficient effort into establishing frameworks for performance assessment or into collecting data on performance. In terms of legislation it is too early to assess the performance of the Eighth Parliament. The independence of previous parliaments has been compromised, and, on occasion, bought, but there are some grounds for optimism. The Sixth and Seventh Parliaments managed to pass important bills, improving some bills though their participation in the policy process and in some cases managing to pass bills such as the Budget Act of 2001 and the Access to Information Bill of 2005 that strengthen Parliament’s role and independence from the Executive.

91. In terms of representation, voters do not feel that their MPs do an effective job of representing their interests, taking the view that most MPs are in politics primarily for their own ends. In Uganda as in many developing countries voters, many of them living in poverty, expect their MPs to deliver development to their constituencies rather than demanding that they play an effective role in terms of legislation and oversight. This issue must be addressed if parliamentary strengthening is to be effective; the Parliamentary Scorecard is one innovative approach to addressing this issue. Understanding the functioning of political parties is, particularly in a country such as Uganda where multi-party politics is new, crucial too. Development Partners may be nervous but they urgently need to increase their engagement with political parties to support the emergence of parliamentary democracy as a competition between ideas and agendas rather than a contest between individuals.

92. As regards oversight, there are some concerns that the current Eighth Parliament is proving to be less effective than the Sixth in particular. It is widely believed that under the Merit system, MPs were more able and willing to speak out and that under the multi-party dispensation they are required to toe the party line. This too is a challenge that could be addressed by Development Partners engaging more with political parties and party caucuses. Nevertheless, oversight does seem to have improved in some regards, with the accountability committees asking searching questions of Ministries and Departments and with Parliament engaging more effectively with the budget process.

93. A number of Development Partners have engaged in parliamentary strengthening in Uganda since 1996, with USAID, UNDP and DFID playing particularly important roles. In the years immediately following the elections of 1996, the focus was on the provision of equipment and training for MPs and parliamentary staff. Considerable efforts were made to put in place some key parliamentary institutions including the Parliamentary Commission, the Parliamentary Service and the Parliamentary Budget Office and then – setting out Parliament’s vision and seeking to ensure that Development Partners aligned their support with it – the Parliamentary Strategic Investment and Development Plan and the Parliamentary Development and Coordination Office. Development Partners pushed hard for these institutions to be established,
but, as their necessity was recognised by the Parliament itself, they encountered little opposition. More recently, Development Partners have shifted their attention from the supply-side of parliamentary strengthening to the demand-side, working more on parliamentary outreach and civic engagement, and – most recently – situating parliamentary strengthening within a wider programme of work on Deepening Democracy.

### Mapping the landscape of parliamentary strengthening

Our research has revealed that despite some progress having been made in recent years, there remains a lack of information and knowledge sharing about parliamentary strengthening and particularly about its impacts. There is considerable value in conducting – in any country where Development Partners are planning to support the emergence of an increasingly effective parliament – a simple process of mapping and sharing information about the parliamentary strengthening activities and plans of various Development Partners. Indeed we would go so far as to say that such a mapping exercise is crucial if parliamentary strengthening is to be made more effective. Without a map of the landscape of parliamentary strengthening, Development Partners and Parliament will be unable to navigate effectively.

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**… from the vantage point of the Paris Principles**

94. Mapping the landscape of parliamentary strengthening from the perspective of the Paris Principles generates a number of insights. For many years the Government of Uganda has been keen to build a partnership of equals on aid effectiveness with its Development Partners. The Parliament of Uganda, with some initial prompting and support, has taken a similar stance, setting out its own plans for its development in the Parliamentary Strategic Investment and Development Plan as well as working with Development Partners to establish a Parliamentary Budget Office. It is notable, if somewhat paradoxical, that the key parliamentary institutions were established under the Movement no-party system of politics (Kasfir and Twebaze, 2005). The existence of the Parliamentary Budget Office and the PSIDP – as well as a number of other key parliamentary institutions – put Uganda towards the forefront of parliaments in developing countries, clearly asserting Parliament’s ownership over its destiny and over the use to be made of resources provided for parliamentary strengthening. Development Partners have played a commendable role in supporting the establishment of these institutions.

95. To encourage alignment of parliamentary support with the PSIDP the Parliament of Uganda – again, with the support of Development Partners – has established the Parliamentary Development and Coordination Office. PDCO provides the principal link between Parliament and the Development Partners, with the vast majority of funds for parliamentary strengthening channelled through PDCO. The Parliamentary Development and Coordination Office is regarded as an increasingly effective collaborator and provides something of a model for parliaments in other developing countries. Development Partners should consider working with Parliaments that may wish to establish similar coordination offices.

96. On harmonisation, the Deepening Democracy programme promises much improvement with shared goals, better information sharing, less duplication and lower transactions costs as well as an agenda that extends beyond Parliament to include the wider political system. There is however further work to be done. Some of the key Development Partners are somewhat marginal to the Deepening Democracy programme and one important element of support to Parliament is provided by the Financial Management and Accountability Programme which is imperfectly coordinated with other parliamentary support. It is to be hoped that Deepening Democracy will demonstrate the benefits of harmonisation to Development Partners, to the Parliament and to the Government of Uganda.
On managing for results and on mutual accountability, there is considerable room for progress with few donors conducting systematic evaluations of their support to Parliament and little effort having been put into assessing the effectiveness of Parliament. The PSIDP provides a potentially useful framework as well as requiring an annual assessment of Parliament’s performance. Development Partners will need to push and provide support to ensure that such potential is realised and that such assessments take place. They should also instigate the practice of providing annual reports to Parliament and encouraging Parliament to hold them to account for progress made on Deepening Democracy.

To conclude, mapping the landscape from the perspective of the Paris Principles has revealed a number of useful insights about parliamentary strengthening in Uganda and how it, and the performance of Parliament itself, can be enhanced. Nevertheless, and as with aid effectiveness more widely, politics – including the politics of ownership – is key. The Paris Principles are useful, but efforts to make parliamentary strengthening more effective must engage too with the politics of parliament, political parties, and the politics of parliamentary strengthening rather than regarding parliamentary support as a purely technical matter. In Uganda, a country that has only recently emerged from a system of no-party rule and that continues to be dominated by the NRM and President Museveni, it will take a sustained effort from Development Partners and from Parliament itself – alongside a favourable shift in the political landscape – to build a Parliament that is an effective and independent player in the country’s system of governance.
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Annexes

Annex A: Note on the selection of country case studies
8th November 2007

1. This short note brings together in one place our initial thinking on case study countries, alongside the various comments received from experts consulted. Its purpose is to provide the basis for a decision about which countries to work in.

2. Our proposal to DFID included a long list of countries: Cambodia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda and Vietnam. It stated that our case study countries would be drawn from the long-list, with the main criteria being that of DFID (and perhaps CIDA) involvement and interest in parliamentary strengthening. The proposal said that Cambodia, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda and Vietnam looked like good options, but noted too that conducting two case studies in Asia would stretch the resources available more than seems sensible. Our proposal also noted that DFID had not – and still has not – expressed any desire to include case studies from Eastern Europe or Latin America.

3. Comments on our proposal, and on our tentative selection of case studies, have been gratefully received from a number of experts on parliamentary strengthening, including: Jeff Balch (AWEPA), Joel Barkan (African Legislatures Project), Tom Bridle (NDI), Niklas Enander (Sida), Mitsuaki Furukawa (JICA) and Fred Matiangi (SUNY-Kenya).

4. It should also be noted that DFID is keen that our initiative fit well with the work of the African Legislatures Project. Careful attention to this will also, I believe, be of benefit to us as we move forward. The Parliamentary Centre is well-connected in many countries, but it is also worth noting, that Sida has offered the assistance of their advisor on democracy in East Africa, and that Alan has good links with Fred Matiangi who is well-connected across East Africa.

5. Comments provided by various experts are organized here, by country.

- **Benin**: Would be good (Bridle)
- **Cambodia**: Makes sense from Sida perspective and would be their choice (Enander); Might be challenging to really get at what’s going on (Furukawa)
- **Ethiopia**: Makes sense from Sida perspective, but would be challenging (Enander); Would be difficult (Matiangi)
- **Ghana**: Very interesting (Balch); ALP will be working here soon (Barkan); Would be very interesting (Matiangi)
- **Kenya**: Over-studied, would duplicate ALP work (Barkan); Makes sense from Sida perspective and would be their choice (Enander); Would be very interesting (Matiangi)
- **Liberia**: Interesting post-conflict and not part of ALP plans (Barkan)
- **Malawi**: ALP is about to start work here (Barkan); Not that helpful as there has been fairly limited donor activity in recent years (Matiangi)
- **Mozambique**: Very interesting (Balch); ALP has started work here (Barkan)
- **Nigeria**: having another bicameral as well as Cambodia might be good, and that there are interesting stories to tell re DFID-USAID collaboration (DFID-Nigeria).

- **Sierra Leone**: Interesting post-conflict and not part of ALP plans (Barkan)

- **Tanzania**: Interesting re harmonization and UNDP-guarded basket, and contrast with Uganda (Balch); ALP expects to be working here soon (Barkan); Makes sense from Sida perspective and would be their choice (Enander)

- **Uganda**: Interesting re harmonization without a basket, and contrast with Tanzania (Balch); ALP expects to be working here soon (Barkan); would be good (Bridle); Makes sense from Sida perspective and would be their choice (Enander)

- **Vietnam**: Might be challenging to really get at what's going on (Furukawa)

- **Zambia**: ALP has done some work here (Barkan)

6. On the basis of the above, and on his knowledge of parliamentary strengthening, Alan’s proposal is that the case study countries should be Cambodia and Ghana for the Parliamentary Centre, and Tanzania and Uganda for ODI. However, Alan is keen to discuss the above and his proposal with Rasheed and Tony at the Parliamentary Centre. And, even when we have had those discussions, the selection might be changed at the stage of the desk-based review if we discover that finding information about parliamentary strengthening in Tanzania and Uganda is too difficult.
## Annex B: List of interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role and organisation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donal Cronin</td>
<td>Irish Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>Srikiran Devara</td>
<td>UNDP Governance Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hon. Geoffrey Ekanya</td>
<td>Parliament – Chair of the Local Government Accounts Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephen Charles Kaduuli</td>
<td>African Leadership Institute – Deputy Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Julius Kiiza</td>
<td>Makerere University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. Nandala Mafabi</td>
<td>Parliament – Chair of the Public Accounts Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hon. William Oketcho</td>
<td>Parliament – Chair of the Budget Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. Reagan Okumu</td>
<td>Parliament – Opposition MP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gloria Mugambe</td>
<td>Chair of donor group on Public Financial Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eva Mulema</td>
<td>USAID Linkages Programme – Chief of Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Johnson Mutesigensi</td>
<td>Financial Management &amp; Accountability Programme (FINMAP) – Programme Manager</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joyce Ngaiza-Rugunda</td>
<td>Netherlands, Governance Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dison Okumu</td>
<td>Parliament – Director, Planning and Development Coordination Office (PDCO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Simon Osborn</td>
<td>Deepening Democracy Programme – Manager (DANIDA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>David Pukol</td>
<td>African Leadership Institute – Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Rukare</td>
<td>EU-funded Human Rights &amp; Good Governance Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT Hon. Edward K. Ssekandi</td>
<td>Parliament – Speaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicholas Waddell</td>
<td>DFID, Governance Advisor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex C: References


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