Parliamentary Strengthening and the Paris Principles
Tanzania case study

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<tr>
<td>AAPPG</td>
<td>African All Party Parliamentary Group (UK Parliament)</td>
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<td>AWEPA</td>
<td>European Parliamentarians for Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Chama cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary Party)</td>
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<td>CHADEMA</td>
<td>Party for Democracy and Progress</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Commonwealth Parliamentary Association</td>
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<td>CSOs</td>
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<td>CUF</td>
<td>Civic United Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCCB</td>
<td>Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sida</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>TANU</td>
<td>Tanganyika African National Union</td>
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<td>SUNY</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNECA</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Commission for Africa</td>
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Executive summary

Introduction

In theory, parliaments are one of the key institutions of democracy, playing an important role in terms of legislation, oversight and representation. Regrettably, in many developing countries – as well as in many developed countries – parliaments are weak, ineffective and marginalised.

Parliamentary strengthening aims to enhance the effectiveness of parliaments through institutional development, through building the capacity of parliamentary staff, MPs and committees, and through putting in place the nuts and bolts of infrastructure and equipment. However, there is little systematic research or analysis about the effectiveness of parliaments or about the effectiveness of parliamentary strengthening. This makes it difficult for those considering whether and how to spend resources on parliamentary strengthening to make well-informed decisions. It is local politics rather than the actions of Development Partners that play the major role in shaping the effectiveness of a country’s Parliament, but Development Partners can make a difference and have a responsibility to ensure that their engagement is as effective as possible.

This report is one component of a research project on “Parliamentary strengthening and the Paris Principles”. The overall aim of the project is to generate better evidence about parliamentary strengthening, in order to inform decisions about whether and how to provide support to parliaments in developing countries. The project – a collaboration between ODI and the Parliamentary Centre, with funding provided by DFID and CIDA – has involved four country case studies; Cambodia, Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda. The vantage point taken for our analysis is that of the Paris Principles on Aid Effectiveness.

The Paris Principles and parliamentary strengthening

The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness is an international agreement between donors and recipients of aid to make aid more effective. At its core are five inter-locking principles, adherence to which is expected to make aid more effective; ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability. The Paris Principles provide a potentially useful vantage point from which to map the landscape of parliamentary strengthening and could – if they were applied in this sphere – enhance the effectiveness of parliaments and parliamentary strengthening. The intention is not to assess whether parliamentary strengthening activities have been influenced by the Paris Declaration; it would be too soon to make such an assessment. Rather, it is to use the Paris Principles as a vantage point for examining the landscape of parliamentary strengthening.

Ownership: Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle were a parliament to exercise effective leadership over efforts to improve its capacity and performance, for instance through having a clear strategy for parliamentary development that is respected by donors, along with a programme to put it into action. Ownership in parliamentary strengthening implies that it is demand-led and responsive to the needs of the parliament.

Alignment: Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle if donors’ support to parliaments were based on the parliament’s own development strategy, if such support made use of parliament’s own systems for managing resources and if support was provided in a predictable and timely manner that fits well with parliamentary and political timetables.

Harmonisation: Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle if donors coordinated their support to parliaments, using common arrangements and procedures, with each donor focussing on its areas of expertise rather than duplicating their efforts. At the very least,
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Harmonisation in parliamentary strengthening implies that donors begin with a clear map of the landscape of parliamentary strengthening before thinking about how they can best add value.

**Managing for Results:** Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle if the work of donors and parliaments were driven by a focus on increasing parliamentary effectiveness. This would imply putting in place and making use of frameworks for monitoring and evaluating progress on parliamentary strengthening and making decisions about future activities on the basis of such monitoring and evaluation.

**Mutual Accountability:** Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle if donors and parliaments conducted joint assessments of progress on parliamentary strengthening, with parliaments sharing information with their other stakeholders and donors making available information about their parliamentary strengthening activities.

**Politics, democracy and parliament**

Parliaments do not operate in a vacuum; their functioning and effectiveness is shaped very much by the context – and particularly the political context – of which they are part. Tanzania’s Parliament, the Bunge, has been in existence since Independence in 1961, but until the first multi-party national elections of 1995 it operated in a system of one-party politics with a strong President and ruling party. Tanzania’s political landscape remains dominated by a single party, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), placing major constraints on the functioning and independence of the Bunge. Politics is key at a micro-level too, with individual MPs having to balance their constituents’ demands to deliver development, with their party’s demands for them to support the Government, with their responsibility to play an effective role in terms of legislation and oversight, and their desire to be re-elected.

Assessing the performance of the Parliament of Tanzania is, as in many other countries, extremely challenging. This is because neither Parliament itself nor its Development Partners have put sufficient effort into establishing frameworks for performance assessment or into collecting data on performance. In terms of legislation, the available evidence suggests that Parliament continues to perform poorly, passing a limited number of Bills and with the vast majority of those Bills originating from Government. This is perhaps not surprising as any Bill requires Presidential assent prior to becoming law.

There are some signs that Parliament is becoming more pro-active with MPs beginning to introduce their own bills and motions. In terms of representation, the introduction of a regular Prime Minister’s question time and increased TV and radio coverage of Parliament has helped to narrow the gap between MPs and their constituents a little. In terms of oversight, Parliament has until recently struggled to hold the Executive to account, with the Parliament dominated by MPs from the CCM Party, many parliamentarians lacking appropriate skills and resources, and the Parliamentary Service ill-equipped to provide support.

In recent years however, Parliament has been very active in asserting its authority to hold Ministers to account and played a part in the proceedings that led to the resignation of the Prime Minister and other senior Ministers who were caught up in the power supply scandal. MPs were emboldened in their efforts by their constituents’ demands – informed by increased media coverage of parliamentary issues – that corruption should not be tolerated. The strengthening of parliamentary committees, changes to parliamentary rules and procedures, and improved collaboration between civil society organisations and Parliament, have also been important steps towards more effective oversight.

**The landscape of parliamentary strengthening**
A large number of Development Partners have provided support to Tanzania’s Parliament since the transition to multi-party politics in the early 1990s. UNDP has provided support for many years, initially by meeting Parliament’s basic needs for physical infrastructure. Since 2007, UNDP has been the lead coordinating donor for the multi-donor Deepening Democracy programme which includes within it a parliamentary component. Taking seriously the importance of ownership, the Deepening Democracy programme and its parliamentary component seek to apply some of the lessons that were learnt from an earlier USAID-led programme of technical assistance which was regarded with some suspicion by the Bunge and particularly its leadership. USAID continues to provide parliamentary support in Tanzania, but outside of what is now the primary mechanism for parliamentary support, the Deepening Democracy initiative.

Mapping the landscape of parliamentary strengthening from the perspective of the Paris Principles generates a number of insights. In Tanzania, achieving ownership, the most clearly political of the Paris Principles, has been and remains the most important challenge. Parliament and the Government more widely has at times been suspicious of Development Partners’ engagement in the politics of the country and has felt that parliamentary support has amounted to undue interference. On the parliamentary side of the relationship, a weak parliamentary service has been unable and has – as the absence of a clear strategic development plan demonstrates – failed to assert ownership effectively. Development Partners and Parliament should work together to finalise the strategic development plan as a matter of priority. Once this plan is completed it should provide a better basis for alignment, not only with the Government’s plans – which should not be assumed to include an aspiration for a stronger Parliament – but also with Parliament’s plans for its own development.

In terms of the harmonisation of parliamentary support, there is much room for progress, as indeed there is as regards aid effectiveness more widely. In recent years, UNDP’s leadership and increasingly effective communication and collaboration amongst a wider – but still not comprehensive – group of Development Partners as part of the Deepening Democracy programme are encouraging signs. Much is expected of the Deepening Democracy programme; it seems eminently sensible to have parliamentary support as one component of a wider and well-integrated programme of assistance for governance. However, putting all one’s eggs in one basket, or all of one’s money through a basket fund, does entail some risks and will require regular and systematic reviews.

On managing for results and mutual accountability, little has been achieved. In Tanzania as elsewhere, progress on monitoring parliamentary performance or the impact of parliamentary strengthening has been slow. If Development Partners and Parliament are to enhance the effectiveness of their collaboration, they must work together to learn the lessons from successes and failures. Progress on these principles, as with ownership, alignment and harmonisation, requires that Development Partners work to build the capacity of the Parliamentary Service so that it can be a more equal partner, coordinating the work of Development Partners and providing high-quality support to MPs and Parliament.

Conclusions

Mapping the landscape of parliamentary strengthening from the perspective of the Paris Principles has revealed a number of useful insights about parliamentary strengthening in Tanzania and how it, and the performance of Parliament itself, can be enhanced. The available evidence suggests that if parliamentary strengthening were conducted in a manner that were more in line with the Paris Principles, then it would be more effective.

The Paris Principles are a useful framework for mapping the landscape of parliamentary strengthening and for moving towards more effective partnerships. But as with aid effectiveness
more generally, progress depends very much on politics; parliamentary support is not a purely technical matter. Donors may be reluctant to engage in parliamentary strengthening in an explicitly political manner, but there is no doubt that parliamentary strengthening requires a good understanding of the political terrain. In Tanzania, a country that has a long history of one-party rule and executive dominance, it will take a sustained effort from Development Partners and from Parliament itself to build a Parliament that is an effective and independent player in the country’s system of governance.
1. Introduction

1. In theory, parliament is one of the key institutions of democracy, playing an important role in terms of legislation, oversight and representation. Regrettably, in many developing countries – as well as in many developed countries – parliaments are weak and ineffective.

2. Parliamentary strengthening, supported by a range of bilateral and multilateral donors, aims to enhance the effectiveness of parliaments. However, there is little systematic research or analysis about the effectiveness of parliaments or about the effectiveness of parliamentary strengthening. This makes it difficult for those considering whether and how to spend resources on parliamentary strengthening to make well-informed decisions. It is local politics rather than the actions of Development Partners that play the major role in shaping the effectiveness of a country’s Parliament, but Development Partners can make a difference and have a responsibility to ensure that their engagement is as effective as possible.

3. This report is one component of a research project on “Parliamentary strengthening and the Paris Principles”. The aim of the research project is to generate better evidence about parliamentary strengthening, to inform policy and practice. Emphasising the ways in which a country’s political context shapes its experience of parliamentary strengthening, the project explores the landscape of parliamentary strengthening, taking the Paris Principles on aid effectiveness as a vantage point.¹

4. The Overseas Development Institute has led the research project, with the Parliamentary Centre leading on data collection and analysis for the country case studies. This report is one of four country case studies; the others concern Cambodia, Ghana and Uganda.² The report proceeds as follows:

- Chapter two provides an introduction to the role of parliament in theory and practice, to the field of parliamentary strengthening and to the particular angle – the Paris Principles – taken by this research project;
- Chapter three provides an introduction to politics and democracy in Tanzania, putting the Tanzanian Parliament in context;
- Chapter four examines the performance of the Tanzanian Parliament;
- Chapter five maps out the landscape of parliamentary strengthening in Tanzania;
- Chapter six examines the landscape of parliamentary strengthening in Tanzania from the vantage point of the Paris Principles; and,
- Chapter seven sets out a series of conclusions and recommendations.

¹ The intention is not to assess whether parliamentary strengthening activities have been influenced by the Paris Declaration; it would be too soon to make such an assessment. Rather, it is to use the Paris Principles as a vantage point for examining the landscape of parliamentary strengthening.
² See Annex A for a note on selection of country case studies.
2. Parliaments and parliamentary strengthening

Parliaments in theory and practice

5. Traditionally, parliaments are seen as having three primary roles: legislation, oversight and representation. Legislation concerns passing the laws which make up a country’s legal framework. Oversight is about keeping an eye on the activities of the executive and holding the executive to account on behalf of the country’s citizens. And representation is about collecting, aggregating and expressing the concerns, opinions and preferences of the country’s citizens, through the political process.

6. Parliaments can play an important role in delivering governance which is good for poverty reduction. Good governance requires that there is a state that is capable, accountable and responsive (DFID, 2006). Assuming that poverty reduction is the goal, a capable state is one that is able to formulate and implement policies that are effective for poverty reduction. An accountable state is one that answers to its citizens, particularly in the event that it fails to live up to its promises. A responsive state is one that seeks to identify and meet the needs of its citizens.

7. Mapping the roles of parliaments onto the elements of good governance (see figure 1) illustrates the contribution that parliaments can make to the delivery of good governance. Legislation is part of state capability, with law-making an important means through which capable states formulate and implement policies. Oversight can contribute to ensuring that the state is accountable to its citizens. And representation – of citizens’ views to the government – is key to responsiveness.

8. In practice, parliaments in many developing countries are weak and ineffective and contribute little to good governance and poverty reduction. For instance, the African Governance Report for 2005 found that: “In terms of enacting laws, debating national issues, checking the activities of the government and in general promoting the welfare of the people, these duties and obligations are rarely performed with efficiency and effectiveness” (UNECA, 2005).

9. There are a number of reasons for the ineffectiveness of parliaments in developing countries. First, parliaments are in a weak position in many political systems, where they are marginalised by the executive and constrained by a constitution which fails to provide for parliamentary independence. Second, parliaments often lack institutional capacity and resources and are dependent on the executive for access to resources. Third, parliaments are often by-passed in the policy process, both by dominant executives and by bilateral and multilateral donors that deal with executive rather than Parliament. Fourth, MPs often lack knowledge, experience, skills and resources. And fifth, voters – as a result of social and cultural norms – are often more concerned that their MPs provide them and their constituencies with school and hospital fees, funeral expenses, roads and electricity, than that they legislate, oversee and represent their interests effectively in Parliament (see Hudson and Wren, 2007). Parliament faces a particular challenge
in a country such as Tanzania, where there has been a recent transition from a one-party regime to democratic pluralism with the previously hegemonic regime now competing in a system of multi-party politics (Mmuya, 1998).

**Parliamentary strengthening**

10. In recent years an increasing number of organisations have become involved in efforts to strengthen and support parliaments in developing countries, in effect seeking to narrow the gap between parliaments’ potential contribution to good governance and poverty reduction and their performance in practice. Donors’ interest in parliaments is informed by a renewed emphasis on country ownership and domestic accountability, and by donors’ enthusiasm to ensure that spending decisions are scrutinized and that aid is spent effectively.

11. Globally, in terms of bilateral donors, USAID, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) CIDA, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) and the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) are particularly active, alongside Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Germany. In terms of multilateral organisations, the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-American Development Bank and the European Union are prominent. In addition, there are a number of national and international parliamentary organisations and networks including the Parliamentary Centre, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA), the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank (PNoWB) and the Global Organisation of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (GOPAC). Parliamentary strengthening activities range from training individual MPs, to working with parliament as an institution, to engaging with the wider political system within which parliament operates.

12. The wisdom of investing resources in parliamentary strengthening depends on the difference that parliamentary strengthening makes, to parliamentary effectiveness and ultimately to development outcomes. Regrettably, donors have made little headway with generating systematic evidence or analysis about the effectiveness of parliamentary strengthening (although see Hubli and Schmidt, 2005), or about the effectiveness of parliaments themselves (Hudson and Wren, 2007, p.16). The World Bank Institute, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and others are working to establish frameworks for assessing parliamentary effectiveness and a number of useful initiatives to shed light on the functioning of parliaments in developing countries are underway, including the work of the African Legislatures Project. Nevertheless, the absence of evidence and analysis remains a serious problem for those tasked with making decisions about whether and how to spend resources on parliamentary strengthening.

**Parliamentary strengthening and the Paris Principles: The research project**

13. The overall aim of this research project is to generate better evidence about parliamentary strengthening, in order to inform decisions – made by donors and others – about whether and how to provide support to parliaments in developing countries. The vantage point taken for our analysis is that of the Paris Principles on aid effectiveness; ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability.\(^3\) Support provided by donors for parliamentary strengthening is a minor component of aid, but using the Paris Principles as a vantage point or analytical lens can, we believe, generate useful and relevant insights (see figure 2).\(^4\)

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\(^3\) The initial ambition of this research project was to examine the extent to which consistency with the Paris Principles made for more effective parliamentary strengthening. As the project progressed, methodological challenges and data availability made it prudent to scale back the project’s ambitions.

\(^4\) The DFID-UNDP-World Bank Institute donor consultation on parliamentary strengthening which took place in May 2007 identified the development of good practice principles for donor support to parliamentary strengthening as one of the ways of moving the parliamentary strengthening agenda forward, specifically
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Figure 2: The Paris Principles and Parliamentary Strengthening

The Paris Principles on aid effectiveness

The Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness is an international agreement by donors and recipients of aid to make aid more effective. At its core are five inter-locking principles, adherence to which is expected to make aid more effective. First is the principle of ownership; that aid is used most effectively when developing countries – governments, in consultation with parliament and civil society – take charge of their own development plans and use aid in a coordinated manner to implement those plans. Second is the principle of alignment; that aid should be provided and spent in a manner that supports a country’s development plans. Third is the principle of harmonisation; that donors should coordinate their support to particular developing countries to reduce duplication and transaction costs. Fourth is managing for results; that aid management and planning should be driven by a focus on results. And fifth, is mutual accountability; that donors and recipients of aid should be accountable to each other, in a transparent manner, for aid effectiveness.⁵

The relevance of the Paris Principles to parliamentary strengthening

Ownership: Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle were a parliament to exercise effective leadership over efforts to improve its capacity and performance, for instance through having a clear strategy for parliamentary development that is respected by donors, along with a programme to put it into action. Ownership in parliamentary strengthening implies that it is demand-led and responsive to the needs of the parliament.

Alignment: Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle if donors’ support to parliaments was based on the parliament’s development strategy, if such support made use of parliament’s own systems for managing resources and if support was provided in a predictable and timely manner that fits well with parliamentary and political timetables.

Harmonisation: Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle if donors coordinated their support to parliaments, using common arrangements and procedures, with each donor focussing on its areas of expertise rather than duplicating their efforts. At the very least, harmonisation in parliamentary strengthening implies that donors begin with a clear map of the landscape of parliamentary strengthening before thinking about how they can best add value.

Managing for Results: Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle if the work of donors and parliaments were driven by a focus on increasing parliamentary effectiveness. This would imply putting in place and making use of frameworks for monitoring and evaluating progress on parliamentary strengthening and making decisions about future activities on the basis of such monitoring and evaluation.

Mutual Accountability: Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle if donors and parliaments conducted joint assessments of progress on parliamentary strengthening, with parliaments sharing information with their other stakeholders and donors making available information about their parliamentary strengthening activities.

14. In Tanzania, the research process was led by staff from the Parliamentary Centre’s Africa Headquarters, in Ghana, working alongside local researchers. A series of semi-structured interviews were conducted with representatives from the key stakeholders in the field of parliamentary strengthening. As well as MPs and parliamentary staff, these included indicating that such principles should build on the Paris principles on aid effectiveness as well as on the OECD-DAC’s capacity building principles. See http://sdnhq.undp.org/governance/parls
⁵ While the focus of this research project is not on the role of parliaments in aid effectiveness, it is worth noting that under the Paris Declaration developing countries are committed to “strengthen as appropriate the parliamentary role in national development strategies and/or budgets” (para 48 of Paris Declaration).
representatives from bilateral and multilateral Development Partners (donors), and civil society organisations (see Annex B for a list of interviewees). In addition to these research interviews, a number of documentary sources were reviewed. Prior to the in-country phase of the research those Development Partners that have been active in parliamentary strengthening in Tanzania were invited to provide documentation – including evaluations – of their activities. A number of Development Partners provided useful information. The research project focussed on the National Parliament and did not extend to the independent Parliament of Zanzibar.
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3. Politics, democracy and parliament

15. Parliaments do not operate in a vacuum; their functioning and effectiveness is shaped very much by the country context and in particular the political context (Hudson and Wren, 2007). This chapter outlines Tanzania’s post-independence political history and the gradual emergence of multi-party democracy through a series of Presidential and Parliamentary elections. While Tanzania opted for multi-party democracy in 1992, its politics remains dominated by the party of the former one-party state, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM); this has important implications for the position of parliament in the country’s system of governance.

Post-independence political history

16. Tanganyika gained independence from Britain in 1961, led by the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) under its leader – and Prime Minister – Julius Nyerere. Since 1961, the country has enjoyed virtually uninterrupted political stability and peace (DFID, 2007, p.5). In 1964, a union was established with Zanzibar, creating the United Republic of Tanzania with Nyerere as its all-powerful President.

17. Reflecting TANU’s history as a mass party with a trade union base, the 1967 Arusha Declaration proclaimed Tanzania as a socialist country with clear aspirations to end its dependence on and domination by outside (western) interests. In 1977, the Constitution came into force, formalising the one-party state with CCM – bringing together TANU from the mainland and the Afro-Shirazi Party from Zanzibar – the sole political party. In 1985, after 24 years of largely peaceful rule, President Nyerere stepped down and was replaced in elections by Ali Hasan Mwinyi, also of the CCM. Nyerere retained an influential role in Tanzanian politics as chairperson of the CCM.

18. With Tanzania’s experiment with socialism deemed a failure, President Mwinyi embarked on a process of economic liberalisation and re-established links with the Bretton Woods Institutions. President Mwinyi was re-elected, for his second five-year term, in 1990. The process of economic liberalisation added momentum to debates about political liberalisation. Former President Nyerere declared his support for a move to multi-party politics in 1991 and in 1992 the United Republic of Tanzania formally adopted a multi-party system.

Figure 3: Key dates in Tanzania’s post-independence political history

- 1961 – Tanganyika gains independence from Britain, led by the Tanganyika African National Union, with Julius Nyerere as Prime Minister.
- 1964 – Article of Union establishes United Republic of Tanzania (Tanganyika and Zanzibar).
- 1967 – Arusha Declaration proclaims Tanzania to be a country based on the principles of *Ujama na Kujitegemea* (Socialism and Self-reliance).
- 1977 – Constitution comes into force, formalising the one-party state with Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) the sole political party for both the mainland and Zanzibar.
- 1985 – Ali Hasan Mwinyi (CCM) is elected to Presidency. Pursues policies of economic liberalisation which generates debate about political liberalisation.
- 1990 – President Mwinyi (CCM) re-elected.
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- 1994 – Referendum of CCM members opts to retain existing system of Government, with Zanzibar, but not Tanganyika, having a separate Parliament.
- 1995 – Benjamin W. Mkapa (CCM) elected President in first multi-party elections; makes good governance a priority.
- 2000 – President Mkapa (CCM) re-elected.
- 2005 – Jakaya Kikwete (CCM) elected as President. Vows to continue reform agenda.

Parliament, electoral processes and the Constitution

19. The National Assembly of Tanzania – the Bunge, or Tanzanian Parliament – is the legislative body for the United Republic of Tanzania. The semi-autonomous islands of Zanzibar have their own House of Representatives, with jurisdiction over all matters that are not considered Union issues. However, as per the Constitution, Zanzibari voters also elect representatives to the National Assembly.

20. The Bunge is a unicameral legislature headed by the Speaker who is assisted by the Deputy Speaker and the Clerk to the National Assembly, who is also the head of the Secretariat of the National Assembly. The President appoints the Prime Minister, with that person serving as the Government’s representative to the National Assembly. For better discharge of its functions the National Assembly has a number of Committees. Eight of the 17 Committees are departmental or select committees, established in 2001 to examine government estimates (resource allocation proposals). The Constitution stipulates that elections for the Presidency and for the national Parliament will be held concurrently every five years. There is a two-term limit for Presidents; in Tanzania this constitutional limit has been respected.

21. Representatives to the Bunge are elected, through a combination of direct election to represent constituencies and proportional representation. The majority of MPs (232 of 324) are elected by popular vote to represent constituencies with just over 20% of these directly elected MPs representing constituencies in Zanzibar. The remainder of MPs are: five members elected by the House of Representatives of Zanzibar from among its members; the Attorney General; not more than ten Presidential appointees; and, constituting at least 20% of MPs, women elected from the ranks of political parties in proportion to the number of elected seats won by each political party. Nearly 30% of current MPs are women, a figure which puts Tanzania at the forefront of East African countries as regards female representation in Parliament.

22. Parliament receives from the Government a budget to conduct its activities. However, a recent report by the UK Parliament’s Africa All-Party Parliamentary Group (AAPPG) noted that the Tanzanian Parliament is unable to determine and approve its own budget, suggesting that the low level of funding that Parliament receives is both a symptom and a cause of its institutional weakness (AAPPG, 2008, p.25 and p.30). As the Speaker of the Tanzanian Parliament had told the AAPPG, “Government can call the shots because it controls the purse strings. This makes a mockery of holding the government to account” (AAPPG, 2008, p.26).

Elections and the gradual emergence of multi-party democracy

23. Prior to 1995, voters were able to vote only yes or no in national elections; resounding endorsements were given to CCM – the state’s party – as a matter of course. The first multi-party elections of 1995 saw 62% of votes in the Presidential elections go to the CCM’s Benjamin Mkapa. The National Convention for Construction and Reform secured 28% of votes in the Presidential elections, although the party became fractured after the elections. In third place was
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the Civic United Front (CUF) – a party that is national in outlook but which draws most of its support from Zanzibar – with 6% of the vote. With 28 seats, the CUF was the largest opposition party in a Parliament dominated by the CCM with 214 seats.⁶

24. President Mkapa was re-elected in 2000, receiving 72% of votes in the Presidential elections. The CUF’s candidate, Ibrahim Lipumba, received 16% of the votes. In Parliament, the CCM gained 243 seats with the CUF the main opposition party with 21 seats. Twenty-one percent of MPs in the 2000-05 Parliament were women. Elections on the mainland were regarded as largely free and fair, but in Zanzibar there were serious irregularities in the vote and considerable post-election violence. President Mkapa made good governance a central theme of his Presidency and – through the National Framework for Good Governance – made good progress on what a group of Development Partners described as “the most ambitious and comprehensive restructuring of the state in sub-Saharan Africa” (Joint Analysis, 2006, p.15).

25. In 2005, the CCM’s Presidential candidate, Jakaya Kikwete was elected in a landslide, winning 80% of the vote, with the CUF’s Lipumba gaining only 12% of the vote and 6% going to the candidate selected by CHADEMA, the Party for Democracy and Progress. The CCM continued its parliamentary dominance, gaining 264 seats in an expanded parliament of 323 members, with the CUF and CHADEMA gaining 30 and 11 seats respectively. Thirty percent of MPs in the 2005-2010 Parliament were women, reflecting in large part an increase in the proportion of special seats reserved for women. After the elections, President Kikwete committed his Government to continuing the reforms and policies of his predecessor and to accelerating the process of reconciliation in relation to Zanzibar (DFID, 2007, p.5).

26. The recent history of elections in Tanzania is one of continuing CCM dominance in Presidential and Parliamentary elections, with the opposition weak and fragmented. In Tanzania, a good case could certainly be made for Development Partners extending their support to parliaments to the functioning of political parties. While CHADEMA has increased in popularity in recent years, the CUF remains the only significant opposition, with its support drawn predominantly from Pemba, the second of Zanzibar’s main islands. The CCM draws its support and membership from all regions and social strata and includes amongst its membership many influential civil and public servants, former directors of parastatal corporations, cultural elites and opinion formers. The adoption of multi-party democracy has not as yet diminished the political dominance of the CCM, a state of affairs that has important implications for parliamentary performance and for parliamentary strengthening.

27. Nevertheless, as UNECA’s governance profile for 2004 notes, “the multi-party system has brought with it significant changes in power relations among various institutions, namely the executive, the legislature and the judiciary”. The CCM remains dominant but a series of constitutional amendments have led to some dispersal of decision-making powers from the party to various state institutions (UNECA, 2004, p.6).

⁶ All data is taken from EISA’s web-site www.eisa.org.za which itself makes use of reports from Tanzania’s National Electoral Commission.
4. Parliamentary performance

28. The Parliament of Tanzania operates in a political environment that remains dominated by the ruling CCM party. Any assessment of the performance of the country’s Parliament must take this into account, along with the severe resource constraints that the Parliament operates under. This chapter provides a brief outline of the performance of the country’s parliament, organised in terms of its three primary roles; legislation, representation and oversight. The purpose of this chapter is to further set the scene for our exploration of parliamentary strengthening and its effectiveness. It is based on two main sets of data: first, a series of research interviews with individuals that have worked either in or with the Parliament; and second, reports about the effectiveness of Parliament published by Development Partners and others.

29. It should however be noted that neither Development Partners nor the Parliament of Tanzania have made much progress in terms of assessing the performance of Parliament. Our in-country research has produced some additional information about parliamentary performance but nevertheless the absence of systematic performance data puts limits on what can be said with confidence, and particularly with quantitative data, about parliamentary performance.

Legislation

30. The executive dominates the legislature in Tanzania, with the Executive retaining, ultimately, the power to dissolve the Parliament (UNECA, 2004, p.19). The Government – despite the CCM party having a huge parliamentary majority – does not always recognise Parliament’s constitutional role. Instead, Parliament can find itself playing a secondary role in relation to party committees and – constitutionally. However, Parliament has on occasion voted down bills proposed by the government (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008) and in the early 1990s played a major role in debates about the governance of Zanzibar and its relationship to the mainland, eventually passing a motion that led to a referendum being held on the question of the political status of Tanzania’s component parts, Tanganyika and Zanzibar, (Ahluwalia and Zegeye, 2001).

31. Relatively few bills have been passed by the Tanzanian Parliament. In the 2000-05 Parliament, the average number of bills passed per year was 22. In the first three years of the 2005-2010 Parliament, an average of 13 bills were passed each year. As well as being a reflection of constitutional limits placed on the Bunge this perhaps reflects Parliament’s relatively low level of legislative dynamism. It is also noteworthy that virtually all bills considered by the Bunge are official bills, introduced by the Government, a fact that again reflects the CCM’s dominance of Tanzanian politics and parliament.

32. There are however some positive developments. Firstly, the Bunge is now being very selective to ensure that bills that will promote transparency and accountability in public life are fast tracked. For example a new bill to give autonomy to the Controller and Auditor General so that accounts can be submitted directly to Parliament was passed in this manner. Second, MPs are beginning to take the opportunity to introduce private members bills. Nevertheless it remains highly unlikely that a member of the opposition would be able to successfully introduce a piece of legislation. And, with any piece of legislation requiring Presidential assent – and the President retaining the right to dissolve Parliament and trigger a new election – the President enjoys an effective legislative veto (Mukangara, 2005, pp.26-27). It has also been suggested that supporters of bills that the government is unenthusiastic about will find themselves marginalised by the Speaker’s interpretation of parliamentary procedure (Baregu, 2004).
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Representation

33. Tanzanian MPs face a huge challenge in their efforts to represent their constituencies. It is a challenge that entails considerable financial expenditure. As is the case in many developing countries, voters expect their MPs to provide them with services and have little appreciation of the role that MPs are expected to play within the country’s Parliament. If MPs wish to get re-elected, they cannot afford to ignore their constituents’ demands. As a result MPs often spend private resources on community development projects or take out loans to do so.

34. Many MPs take the view that the establishment of a constituency development fund such as has been established in Kenya, Uganda and Ghana would ease the financial burden on them as they perform their representation function. However, many stakeholders interviewed in the development community – for instance, Development Partners – argue that the introduction of such a fund would reduce the efficiency of financial administration at the local government level. They argue that MPs’ ability to independently oversee local government finance would be compromised were they to be involved in disbursing resources within those same localities. This is a hot topic, in Tanzania as elsewhere.

35. Again, there have been some positive developments in terms of the representational element of parliamentary performance. One is an increase in the number of elected MPs (as opposed to appointed MPs) in the current Parliament. Another is the establishment of question time in parliament. Broadcast live on television and radio, this is regarded as MPs’ prime opportunity to demonstrate to their constituents that they are working hard to promote their interests and has become popular among MPs and the wider population. As in other Parliaments, the quality of the questions and the candour of the answers vary (Biddle et al 2002; Wang, 2005), with those asking and answering questions hampered by a lack of access to reliable information, but nevertheless question time does provide a useful way for MPs to engage with their constituents.

Oversight

36. Under the system of one-party rule, the Tanzanian Parliament played a marginal role in the policy process. This, and the subsequent period of CCM dominance, has left the Parliament unable to play an effective role as regards oversight. As the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania puts it: “Whilst Tanzania is now a multiparty democracy, and local and national leaders submit themselves to elections every five years, the traditional dominance of the ruling party, as well as the strongly consensual culture of political debate, means that leaders are rarely called to account” (United Republic of Tanzania, 2006. p.17). In addition, MPs lack the capacity to actively participate in the policy process and the Secretariat lacks the capacity and expertise to provide MPs with the systematic support in policy analysis that they need to conduct effective oversight.

37. As a result, while some MPs are able to engage in policy dialogue at a general level, they are unable to effectively engage with the executive on matters of policy implementation. A case in point is the consultation with MPs that was conducted as part of the process of preparing Tanzania’s PRSP. Members of Parliament were consulted in July 2000 to establish their reactions to the findings of the zonal workshops and to solicit their views on a process that started in October 1999. The main players in the process were a committee of Ministers and the Governor of the Bank of Tanzania (United Republic of Tanzania, 2000). At the end of the consultation MPs were said merely to have concurred with the findings of the zonal workshops and to have underscored the regional differences in the incidence of poverty.

Parliament, power and corruption

Tanzania suffers serious blackouts as a result of there being a lack of generating capacity. Blackouts hit the poor hardest while the more powerful have sought to make money from the situation. In 2006 the
Government found itself embroiled in a contract for the delivery of gas turbines that had all the marks of being a scam. Opposition MPs pressed for an independent parliamentary committee to investigate the widespread allegations of high-level Executive corruption associated with the deal. In April 2007, Ministers prevented Parliament from debating the issue, passing it the Government’s own Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB).

A tug of war developed between the PCCB and Parliament. The Speaker sought to assert Parliament’s authority to consider the issues, but with the CCM pulling the strings of the vast majority of MPs, it was able to stop Parliament getting involved. Nevertheless, Parliament continued to press for inquiries into emerging scandals in the power sector as well as other allegations of corruption (Source: Global Integrity, 2008). In February 2008, after the publication by a parliamentary committee of a highly critical report into the affair, the Prime Minister and two cabinet ministers resigned, before President Kikwete dissolved the entire cabinet.

In recent years, with a new Speaker and Deputy Speaker at the helm, Parliament has begun to play a more assertive role in relation to oversight. This has been particularly apparent in its investigations into the power crises, with these investigations leading to the resignation of the Prime Minister and demands for the prosecution of a number of Ministers. The establishment of regular sessions in which MPs can put questions to the Prime Minister is regarded as an important development as regards oversight, as it is for representation. Increased coverage of parliamentary and political issues on TV and radio – coverage that has proved very popular – has led to more voters asking questions of their MPs and demanding that they put questions to the Government. This has emboldened some MPs to ask questions, altering the incentives faced even by members of the ruling party; that is, MPs’ instinct for self-preservation is working to encourage them to play a more effective oversight role.

Institutionally, Parliament has itself taken some important steps to equip itself to play a more effective oversight role, by strengthening the role of parliamentary committees, including Departmental Select Committees tasked with the oversight of specific Government departments. The establishment of such committees – and a change from a practice of circulating members each year, to keeping Committee membership constant for the life of a Parliament albeit with Chairs circulating every two and a half years – is a useful supplement to the earlier system of standing committees (Kelsall, 2003; Wang; United Republic of Tanzania, 2006, p.17), and provides an additional set of mechanisms for more effective parliamentary oversight. Parliamentary Committees are, it seems, beginning to have more of an impact on proposed bills (Biddle et al, 2002, p.22), with MPs from the ruling and opposition parties expressing a reasonable degree of contentment with their operation (Wang, 2005).

Budget involvement

Parliament performs poorly in terms of budget oversight and involvement in the budget process, with the relevant parliamentary committee – the Committee on Finance and Economy – seldom engaging in a serious manner and no independent parliamentary budget office established. To illustrate, the current budget process is as follows: the budget is submitted to the Committee on Finance and Economy; that Committee reviews the estimates; the Minister of Finance moves the motion in a plenary session of Parliament; the Chairman of the Committee on Finance and Economy supports the motion; and then there is time for plenary debate. In most instances, the budget is approved without amendments (Almagro, 2003). In an effort to accommodate more effective budget scrutiny the amount of time devoted to budget debates has in recent years been increased from 35 to 45 days. There is some scope for a more pro-active Committee on Finance and Economy, and Committee Chair, to strengthen its role in the budget process.

Domestic accountability and oversight for development assistance?
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Some respondents pointed out that with approximately 40% of Tanzania’s budget financed by donors, the real oversight power lies with Development Partners rather than with the Bunge. If the Tanzanian Parliament is to exercise oversight over all of its Government’s expenditure – aid and non-aid resources – its capacity will have to be increased, and Development Partners will need to meet their commitments to provide more of their aid as General Budget Support.

As the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania makes clear, General Budget Support “strengthens the Parliamentary role for decision-making in resource allocation by including more external resources into the national budget approval process. It thus contributes to shifting Governmental accountability from Development Partners to citizens through the Parliament” (United Republic of Tanzania, 2006, p.17).

Poverty reduction

41. The budget and associated Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) processes provide a key entry point for Parliaments as regards poverty reduction (Wang, 2005; Eberlei and Henn, 2003). However, the evidence suggests that parliaments especially in sub-Saharan Africa have played a marginal role in the development and implementation of poverty reduction strategies (see, Eberlei and Henn 2003; McGee et al. 2002; Booth 2003; Bwalya et al 2004). This certainly seems to be the case in Tanzania, with some commentators arguing that PRSP processes have actually contributed to weakening parliamentary authority (Gould and Ojanen 2003; Eberlei and Henn 2003). There has been some recent appreciation of the importance of involving parliaments – rather than just civil society organisations – in PRSP processes, but there is little evidence that this has as yet led to increased involvement and influence of parliament (Wang, 2005).

42. In Tanzania there has been some progress, with parliament having some involvement in the second PRSP process. However, parliament was not allocated any role in the monitoring and evaluation system for the poverty reduction strategy meaning that despite the emphasis that Development Partners give to the concept of “ownership” MPs do not have direct oversight of the implementation of the national poverty reduction strategy.

Towards a rejuvenated parliament?

43. Tanzania’s Parliament has, in the years since the move to a multi-party system in 1992, continued to play a marginal role in the policy process. It has been inactive as regards legislation. Its Members have struggled to represent their constituents’ interests and to meet their expectations. And, with the Parliament dominated by MPs from the ruling CCM party, its Members have – in addition to facing severe capacity constraints – had little incentive to exercise effective oversight. MPs are expected to toe the party line, with the party’s wishes often taking precedence over the views of voters (UNECA, 2004, p.19). CCM dominance shapes the performance of Parliament by shaping the incentives faced by individual MPs. As the AAPPG’s report put it: “The combined power of the President, the Executive and the CCM Party restricts the scope of Parliament to hold the Executive to account” (AAPPG, 2008, p.27).

44. There are some signs that Parliament is beginning to assert its authority. As regards legislation, a number of private members bills have been passed. As regards representation, the institution of a regular question time is enabling and forcing MPs to engage more with their constituents. And as regards oversight, there are some encouraging signs too, not least in Parliament’s assertiveness as regards the power sector inquiry and other issues concerning corruption over the course of the last two years.

45. Parliament has also made changes to its own rules and procedures, enabling the Speaker to allocate more time to the consideration of motions and bills put forward by private members and committees. And Development Partners have, in their 2006 Joint Assistance Strategy, made clear that parliamentarians have the responsibility for overseeing Government activities and
scrutinising the national budget with attention to its strategic direction (United Republic of Tanzania, 2006, pp.5-6).

46. Research interviews conducted in Tanzania revealed considerable optimism about parliamentary performance. For a number of respondents, while Parliamentary effectiveness remains limited, the dynamic is good: voters are demanding more of their MPs’ parliamentary performance, and MPs, wanting to be re-elected, are responding to these demands.
5. Parliamentary strengthening in Tanzania

Nurturing parliamentary development

47. The Parliament of Tanzania, the Bunge, has played a rather marginal role in the country’s system of governance, with the CCM – the ruling party, established during the era of one-party politics – dominating the political process and Parliament lacking the resources and support that it needs to do its job effectively. Parliament’s inability and failure to perform its functions of legislation, oversight and representation effectively, has in turn compromised the capability, accountability and responsiveness of the state.

48. However, there have been some recent signs of enhanced parliamentary performance. Development Partners have played a role in supporting parliamentary strengthening with some of the key players showing considerable enthusiasm for this agenda in recent years (Mmuya, 2007). Parliamentary strengthening programmes may focus on individual MPs, on parliamentary staff and the wider parliamentary service, on the work of Committees, on parliamentary rules and procedures, or on the nuts and bolts of parliamentary infrastructure such as office space, furniture, libraries and access to the internet. Whatever the approach taken, the ultimate objective of parliamentary strengthening is to help parliament to improve its capacity as a law making body that represents citizens’ interests by passing appropriate legislation and exercising effective oversight over executive actions and the budget.

49. This chapter outlines the landscape of parliamentary strengthening in Tanzania looking at which Development Partners have engaged in programmes of parliamentary strengthening, setting out the sorts of activities that they engage in, and commenting on its effectiveness.

The landscape of parliamentary strengthening

50. The landscape of parliamentary strengthening in Tanzania is dominated by the UNDP-led Deepening Democracy project that commenced in 2007 (see below), but a number of other donors have been active at various times, including the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Institute of Democracy and Accountability for Southern Africa (Africa), the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank, AWEPA, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, the World Bank Institute, DANIDA, DFID and USAID. Research interviews in Tanzania, at the Bunge, emphasized too the important and ground-breaking contributions of a number of Scandinavian countries in the early years of multi-partyism.

Promoting the reform of rules and procedures

A number of workshops and international benchmarking activities have exposed the Tanzanian Parliament to different ways of operating. Such exposure has played an important role in Parliament’s moves to increase the time given to budget debate, to introduce weekly Prime Minister’s questions and to modify rules of procedure so that committees and individual members are able to present motions and bills.

51. One of the first parliamentary strengthening projects was conducted by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, with the support of the Norwegian Development Agency NORAD. This project, which ran from 1993-95 was to support the development of the parliamentary library, at a cost of around $70,000. The project including the provision of equipment, staff training, the establishment of a library committee involving MPs and parliamentary staff, and the compilation of a collection of basic reference books for the library. With a narrow technical
focus, little room for mis-understanding and few political obstacles, the project was a success, delivering a library and library services that were better able to support MPs and Parliament.

52. The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) has been another long-standing provider of support to parliamentary strengthening. Following the transition to multi-party politics, FES has sought to build the capacity of parliamentary committees. Support has been provided for: civic education programmes to draw parliament’s attention to issues of public concern; the establishment of an “economic discussion circle” involving MPs, representatives of trade unions, universities, the business community and CSOs; opposition parties; the operation of the Parliamentary Press Corps so that they understand the rules and procedures of parliament and are able to report appropriately the issues coming out of parliament for the benefit of citizens; and, the publication of a Who is Who in Parliament to provide citizens with better information about their representatives. Most recently, the FES started a programme to re-establish a press club in parliament at the request of the Clerk of the National Assembly in 2008. The purpose of the club is to strengthen the relationship between the Clerk’s office and the Press to promote public education on parliamentary procedures in the National Assembly.

USAID/DFID: Encountering obstacles and suspicion

53. Suspicions about the motivations of Development Partners and their implementing agencies seem to have played an important role in undermining the effectiveness of USAID and DFID’s joint programme of Technical Assistance for strengthening Tanzania’s National Assembly. This programme of support was initially scheduled to run from 2003 to 2005, with the State University of New York (SUNY) the implementing agency.\(^7\)

54. The USAID/DFID programme aimed at improving the representative, lawmaking and oversight functions of the Parliament. Its specific goals were: to improve representation by increasing citizen access to and understanding of the legislative process; to support more effective lawmaking by assisting parliamentary committees make better use of research and more actively solicit inputs from civil society in the consideration of legislation in targeted sectors; to support more effective oversight through increased legislative capacity to monitor public expenditure and oversee implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy; and, to enhance management and administration through increased quality and efficiency of service delivery to all members by parliamentary administrative support units.

55. Activities conducted as part of the Programme included: constituency level hearings on public bills; joint parliamentary – civil society workshops and issue papers; a study visit to the Ugandan Parliament; sensitization workshops based on the current Standing Orders of Parliament; outreach programmes; the development of a parliamentary newsletter; support for a women's caucus; workshops on committee operations; the creation of a panel of substantive-area experts; support for an electronic bill tracking system; assistance with the development of a modernization strategy and plan; a student internship program; and issues-based workshops on budget and governmental oversight (SUNY, 2007).

56. According to USAID, a decision to extend the project to 2009 was taken after an independent review in 2005. Following this review, SUNY sought to learn the lessons of the earlier project and to give more emphasis to the sustainability of activities and to their ownership by the Bunge. USAID reports that the project came to a conclusion in 2007 because of funding difficulties (USAID Tanzania, personal communication). Other interviewees have however suggested that the programme encountered serious difficulties.

\(^7\) This description is taken from SUNY’s web-site [http://www.cid.suny.edu/governanceMarch07.htm](http://www.cid.suny.edu/governanceMarch07.htm) and from research interviews conducted in Tanzania.
implementation difficulties because of uneasy relationships between the implementation agency (SUNY) and key parliamentary personnel, including, in the first two years of the initial project, the Speaker (see also Hudson and Wren, 2007, p.7 and p.40). The implication is that implementation difficulties led first to a review of the project and second to its early termination.

**A thaw in relations between Parliament and civil society**

The USAID/DFID funded programme of support to parliamentary strengthening did have some success in improving relations between Parliament and civil society and in countering suspicions that CSOs were pushing a US agenda and that CSO leaders harboured parliamentary ambitions. This was achieved first by holding – working with the Foundation for Civil Society – an exhibition for the Bunge which emphasized the importance of parliamentary engagement with civil society.

The exhibition has become a regular event and has made a useful contribution to bridging the gap between parliament and CSOs. Building on this, the Foundation for Civil Society facilitated a dialogue between parliamentary committees and CSOs, including, in 2007, a three-day working session involving the Standing Committee on Social Welfare and Community Development and a number of CSOs. As a result of this and other initiatives, collaboration between CSOs and Parliament has improved with some CSOs providing technical support and expert policy analysis inputs for a number of Committees and others advocating for changes in legislation and in parliamentary procedures.

**UNDP: Marshalling support and trying to be neutral**

57. UNDP has been perhaps the most active Development Partner in the field of parliamentary strengthening. Its engagement with the Bunge commenced with the transition to multi-party politics with – in 1997 – the commencement of a project to address the immediate needs of the Parliament for equipment including computers and servers. A second phase of UNDP engagement was intended to strengthen Parliament as a key player in the participatory democratic system. This programme of activities ran for four years, a period of time that allowed it to get established and to gain the trust of Parliament. It was financed through a Governance Thematic Trust Fund that a number of bilateral donors contributed to. Following thorough and exhaustive discussions with the Government of Tanzania and the Bunge and a needs assessment conducted by the University of Dar es Salaam, the programme was designed to strengthen Parliament’s representative and law-making functions in key sectors, to enhance parliamentary oversight and to improve the management and administrative capacities of the parliamentary Secretariat. The main activities were the provision of technical assistance and training and progress with implementation was monitored through Annual Reviews involving UNDP, Government and other relevant stakeholders.

**The success of civic education**

The work of UNDP and other Development Partners on civic education seems to have had a positive impact. Parliament has acknowledged the importance of deepening its representation function by reaching out to communities to explain its functions, and has passed important laws to safeguard individual freedoms. As a result – and a good indicator of the success of a programme – the civic education component has been institutionalized as part of Parliament’s own work, with funds to be contributed from Parliament’s own budget.

58. The most recent programme of support to parliamentary strengthening that UNDP has engaged in is the Deepening Democracy programme.\(^8\) The programme began in 2007 and is

\(^8\) Deepening Democracy Project Document is available at [www.tz.undp.org/docs/Prod%20dg%20ddtp.pdf](http://www.tz.undp.org/docs/Prod%20dg%20ddtp.pdf)
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scheduled to run until mid-2010. UNDP leads the Deepening Democracy programme, with funding of between one and two million dollars provided by a number of donors including UNDP itself, the European Commission, the UK’s DFID, Sweden’s Sida, Canada’s CIDA, Denmark’s DANIDA, and the Netherlands and the Irish and Norwegian Embassies. Development Partners’ total contribution to the programme amounts to $12.6 million, with the Government of Tanzania itself contributing just over $1 million. USAID, notably, does not provide financial support to Deepening Democracy, in part because US laws do not permit US funds to be provided through basket funding arrangements.

59. Deepening Democracy is wide-ranging and aims to enable key institutions of democracy – including the Parliament – to become effective and efficient in the exercise of their mandates. The programme has four strategic areas: implementing the African Peer Review Mechanism; strengthening election management bodies and the electoral process; civic education; and, good and accountable governance (parliament and political parties). Support to Parliament is one element of the wider programme, and is closely linked with a number of elements including support to the media and political parties.

60. Planned activities for the parliamentary support component of Deepening Democracy include the following:

- a needs assessment of Parliament in order to produce recommendations to feed into the Office of the National Assembly’s development of a “corporate plan” to support Parliament’s Strategic Plan;
- building multi-donor support for the Corporate Plan to establish strategic coordination of donor efforts in order to ensure more coherent, consistent and locally-driven support to Parliament;
- training workshops to build the capacity of key Parliamentary Committees in order to enhance oversight and nurture appreciation of the importance of the separation of powers;
- support to Parliament’s research unit and the provision of new IT facilities for the Parliamentary Library;
- support for enhanced parliamentary engagement with civil society and the media;
- a review of Standing Orders and parliamentary procedure; and
- the establishment of a MKUKATA Working Group in Parliament to track progress with implementation and to make recommendations.

61. With the programme having been in operation for only a year, no formal evaluations are as yet available. However, research interviews suggest that Parliament holds the Deepening Democracy programme in high regard. It is particularly notable that the parliamentary support is integrated within a wider democratization and governance agenda. As Parliament is part of a wider governance system, such an approach seems to make good sense. It also aligns such support with the Tanzanian Government’s national strategy for growth and poverty reduction, MKUKATA, the third pillar of which – building on former-President Mkapa’s National Framework for Good Governance – is focused on governance and
accountability. It is early days, but the ongoing UNDP-led Deepening Democracy programme provides, perhaps, a good example of how to go about providing support for parliamentary strengthening.

A landscape of lingering suspicion

62. As is regrettably the case in many countries, little effort has been put – by Development Partners or Parliament – into evaluating the effectiveness of parliamentary strengthening and learning the lessons of both successes and failures. In Tanzania, there is a general sense that support to parliamentary strengthening has been useful and that there has been some progress with the way in which programmes of support are implemented. Relationships between Parliament and its Development Partners do however continue to pose challenges.

63. The history and landscape of parliamentary strengthening in Tanzania demonstrates that external support for parliamentary strengthening may be regarded with some suspicion by national stakeholders. The Government of a country, and its Parliament – especially when more than 80% of MPs are from the governing party – may feel that parliamentary strengthening is intended not just to strengthen democracy, but also to support the opposition and to impose external agendas. Such views have been prevalent in Tanzania and continue to linger, along with concerns that parliamentary strengthening activities are sometimes planned with insufficient account being taken of their implications for Parliament. Development Partners from their side may have question marks about the competence and attitudes of parliamentary staff and be unsure as to the real motives of Parliament in accepting support for parliamentary strengthening, perhaps taking the view that MPs are interested primarily in support for their costly constituency work and for overseas visits.

64. These challenge points to the importance of clear communication and mutual accountability for parliamentary strengthening and to the paramount importance of national Parliamentary ownership and goals and results frameworks that Parliament and its Development Partners can agree on. Without such foundations, programmes of support to parliamentary strengthening may run up against major obstacles. In short, ensuring that support to parliamentary strengthening is consistent with the Paris principles – perhaps with a more trusted multilateral donor taking the lead for Development Partners – can play an important role in building the partnerships that are crucial if parliamentary strengthening is to be effective.
6. Parliamentary strengthening and the Paris Principles in practice

65. Tanzania is a country that has been at the forefront of efforts to enhance the effectiveness of aid for many years and has been an enthusiastic supporter of the Paris Agenda. This chapter examines the landscape of parliamentary strengthening in Tanzania from the vantage point of the Paris Principles on aid effectiveness. The principles of ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results and mutual accountability are taken in turn, in order to generate insights about parliamentary strengthening and to throw some light on the extent to which parliamentary strengthening programmes have benefitted from consistency with the Paris Principles.

Ownership

66. The history of parliamentary strengthening in Tanzania demonstrates that the Bunge regards ownership as being crucial and that achieving ownership has been a major challenge. The chequered history of USAID’s engagement with the Parliament, working alongside SUNY and with the support of DFID, demonstrates that Parliament can be suspicious of the motives of external actors and that if such suspicions are not addressed, and if trust is not built, the effectiveness of parliamentary strengthening can be significantly reduced.

67. Research interviews in Tanzania suggested that programmes on parliamentary strengthening often begin with the best of intentions, with agreement reached between Development Partners and Parliament about what needs to be done and what will be done. Indeed, the forerunner to the Deepening Democracy programme, led by UNDP, included a needs assessment, something which ought to be the starting point for any programme of parliamentary strengthening. However, different stakeholders interpret agreed plans for parliamentary strengthening in different ways, and have varying expectations about how the programmes will proceed. As implementation proceeds, these varying expectations become more and more apparent, and if they cannot be met in a coherent manner, implementation will likely be delayed. This points to the importance of ensuring that expectations and understandings are shared at an early stage of planning.

68. Research interviews in Tanzania also suggested that Development Partners sometimes pay insufficient attention to the rules and procedures of Parliament when they are providing support to Parliament and that this can impose additional responsibilities and costs on the Bunge. Specifically, Parliament’s own rules oblige it to contribute to the costs of MPs attending workshops within Tanzania and abroad. As such, when Development Partners decide to organize such workshops, this has financial implications for the Parliament itself.

69. Perhaps most noteworthy as regards ownership is the fact that progress on producing a corporate plan for Parliament’s development has been very slow; the document remains only in draft form. The existence of such a document does not in itself indicate that ownership has been achieved, but without such a plan achieving ownership is practically impossible. In Tanzania it seems the Development Partners sought to facilitate the production of a parliamentary development plan, but that – somewhat paradoxically – Parliament failed to engage sufficiently and to assert ownership over its development.

Alignment

70. The absence of a finalized plan for parliamentary development presents a major obstacle for alignment. Without such a plan, Development Partners lack a clear idea of what exactly they
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might be aligning their support with. Development Partners have sought to ensure that their parliamentary strengthening activities are integrated with their wider governance programmes. If these programmes are aligned with the Government’s governance agenda, then parliamentary strengthening assistance – as a component of governance assistance – is likely to be reasonably well-aligned with Parliament’s plans. However, this assumes that the Government’s plans for Parliament are the same as Parliament’s own plans for its development. With the CCM Party dominant in Government and Parliament this may be a reasonable assumption, but such a state of affairs is likely to prove a major challenge as regards strengthening the effectiveness and independence of Parliament.

71. There is little evidence of Development Partners providing funds directly to Parliament. And, intriguingly, DFID’s Country Assistance Plan for 2007-2010 makes the point that its capacity to support work with Parliament and political parties will “depend on the scale of non-PRBS (budget support) funds at our disposal” (DFID, 2007, p.14). This suggests that DFID at least takes the view that funds provided to the Government through Budget Support may not filter through to Parliament. In terms of timing, research interviews revealed that with donors failing to provide aid and support to parliament in a predictable manner, Parliament sometimes has to fund activities in anticipation of reimbursement from Development Partners.

Harmonisation

72. Tanzania has been very keen to see greater harmonization of its development assistance to reduce the transaction costs that it has faced in engaging with a large number of Development Partners. Harmonisation of Development Partners’ support for parliamentary strengthening is a priority too. The ongoing Deepening Democracy programme is an important effort to harmonise the support that Development Partners provide for governance – which includes the National Assembly – in Tanzania. Indeed, harmonization provides much of the motivation for donors coming together, with UNDP in the lead, to provide support through the Deepening Democracy programme. It is however notable, that one major donor, USAID, remains outside the programme.

73. Deepening Democracy includes a number of mechanisms that are intended to foster greater harmonisation for donors governance support; it is hoped that these mechanisms will contribute too to greater harmonisation as regards parliamentary strengthening. First, donors have signed a Memorandum of Understanding, which makes UNDP responsible for formalising a single set of common processes for consultations, decision-making, disbursements, financial management, reporting, auditing, procurement, monitoring, review and evaluation. Second, an oversight committee has been established, chaired by the Government and including three representatives from key Development Partners, three from beneficiary institutions including government, and two from independent institutions. This oversight committee will consider quarterly progress reports. Third, a donors forum has been established for them to share information, including work-plans and plans for visits to and engagement with the parliament in the capital Dodoma. Fourth, Deepening Democracy will be funded through a basket-funding mechanism. The use of a basket fund is intended to enhance coherence, improve coordination and reduce the risk of there being either gaps or duplication in the assistance provided by Development Partners.

74. The fact that Development Partners’ support to Parliament is part of their wider programme of governance assistance has the added benefit of enabling all donors – including those that are not especially engaged with the Parliament – to interact with the Bunge and to have an influencing on the support provided to Parliament by the wider group of donors. Beyond the role of UNDP, the European Commission chairs a donor group on Parliament that is focussed on supporting improved performance as regards budget oversight by strengthening
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the key accountability committees; the Public Accounts Committee, the Local Government Accounts Committee and the Public Corporations Accounts Committees.

Managing for results

75. Of the five Paris Principles, support to parliamentary strengthening in Tanzania is perhaps least consistent with that of “managing for results”. As is the case globally, Development Partners and Parliament itself have achieved little in terms of establishing systems for monitoring progress on parliamentary effectiveness or for evaluating the effectiveness of parliamentary strengthening. This makes it extremely difficult for Development Partners or for Parliament to learn about what works and to modify the approach taken to parliamentary strengthening to maximize its effectiveness.

76. Research interviews suggested that there have been few efforts to monitor and evaluate the parliamentary strengthening activities that have taken place, and evaluation reports have – in contrast to the situation in Cambodia, one of the other case study countries – been not been available. Parliament and Development Partners share the responsibility for the failure to monitor and evaluate, with research interviews providing evidence that progress reports produced by Parliament are weak and lacking in detail, and do little to document whether and how project activities have contributed to objectives and goals.

77. Some respondents suggested that this lack of detail conceals – perhaps deliberately – the gap between planned activities and activities that have actually been implemented. Parliamentary respondents, for their part, took the view that the MPs, Committee Chairs and Heads of Department who are the targets for parliamentary strengthening are not informed about what is required of them or about the nature and timing of the Development Partners’ workplan; this brings us back to the issue of ownership.

78. As with parliamentary strengthening more widely, much is expected of the Deepening Democracy programme. It is too early to say if it is adopting and encouraging a clear focus on results, but UNDP’s earlier efforts to conduct a needs assessment of Parliament and to institute annual reviews, provide some limited grounds for optimism. Perhaps of most importance is the establishment, within Deepening Democracy, of an Annual Stakeholder Review Meeting – with participants drawn from Government, beneficiary institutions, Development Partners and CSOs – which will have the task of reviewing progress, sharing experiences and recommending general guidelines for effective implementation.

Mutual accountability

79. There is a strong sense in Tanzania, including in its Parliament, that the government is more accountable to Development Partners than it is to its own citizens. In such a situation – which parliamentary support is in part intended to address – mutual accountability has a rather limited meaning. Mutual accountability for parliamentary support, as well as aid more widely, is limited. Parliament often has little awareness of Development Partners’ plans and procedures, making it difficult for mutual accountability to emerge. Participants in research interviews held out the hope that progress on mutual accountability for aid, an important part of the shift towards Budget Support, would strengthen the role of Parliament and act as a model for the emergence of mutual accountability as regards the provision of support to Parliament.
7. Conclusions and recommendations

A map of the landscape of parliamentary strengthening …

80. This case study has explored the landscape of parliamentary strengthening in Tanzania, taking the Paris Principles on aid effectiveness as a vantage point. The bedrock of the landscape is political. In Tanzania the key feature is that while Parliament has been in existence since Independence in 1961, it operated as part of a system of one-party politics, with a strong President and ruling party, until the first multi-party national elections were held in 1995. The legacy of one-party rule and executive dominance continues to shape – alongside severe financial and technical resource constraints – the functioning and performance of the Tanzanian Parliament.

81. The performance of Parliament is also shaped by the incentives faced by individual MPs whose Party – for 80% of them, the CCM – expects them to support the Government and whose constituents expect them to deliver development for them rather than demanding that they play an effective role in terms of legislation and oversight. In Tanzania as elsewhere, parliamentary strengthening needs to take better account of the political context and of the incentives faced by individual MPs.

82. Assessing the performance of the Parliament of Tanzania is, as in many other countries, extremely challenging. This is because neither Parliament itself nor its Development Partners have put sufficient effort into establishing frameworks for performance assessment or into collecting data on performance. In terms of legislation, the available evidence suggests that Parliament continues to perform poorly, passing a limited number of Bills and with the vast majority of those Bills originating from Government. This is perhaps not surprising as any Bill requires Presidential assent prior to becoming law.

83. There are however, some signs that Parliament is becoming more pro-active with MPs beginning to introduce their own bills and motions. In terms of representation, MPs face a huge challenge, seeking to balance the requirement to represent their constituents in Parliament with their constituents’ demands that they deliver development. More positively, the introduction of a regular Prime Minister’s question time and increased TV and radio coverage of Parliament has helped to narrow the gap between MPs and their constituents a little.

84. In terms of oversight, with the Parliament dominated by MPs from the CCM Party, many parliamentarians lacking appropriate skills and resources, and the Parliamentary Service ill-equipped to provide support, it is not surprising that Parliament has struggled to hold the Executive to account. That said, in recent years, Parliament has been very active in asserting its authority to hold Ministers to account and played a part in the proceedings that led to the resignation of the Prime Minister and other senior Ministers who were caught up in the power supply scandal. Interestingly, it seems that MPs were emboldened in their efforts by their constituents’ demands that corruption should not be tolerated. The strengthening of parliamentary committees, changes to parliamentary rules and procedures, and improved collaboration between CSOs and Parliament, have also been important steps towards more effective oversight.

85. A large number of Development Partners have provided support to Tanzania’s Parliament since the transition to multi-party politics in the early 1990s. UNDP has provided support for many years, beginning by meeting Parliament’s basic needs for physical infrastructure. Since 2007, UNDP has been the lead coordinating donor for the multi-donor Deepening Democracy programme which includes within it a parliamentary component. Taking seriously
the importance of ownership, the Deepening Democracy programme and its parliamentary component seek to apply some of the lessons that were learnt from the difficulties encountered by the earlier USAID-led programme of technical assistance. USAID continues to provide parliamentary support in Tanzania, but outside of the Deepening Democracy initiative, an initiative that is now the primary mechanism for parliamentary support.

### Mapping the landscape of parliamentary strengthening

Our research has revealed that despite some progress having been made in recent years, there remains a lack of information and knowledge sharing about parliamentary strengthening and particularly about its impacts. There is considerable value in conducting – in any country where Development Partners are planning to support the emergence of an increasingly effective parliament – a simple process of mapping and sharing information about the parliamentary strengthening activities and plans of various Development Partners. Indeed we would go so far as to say that such a mapping exercise is crucial if parliamentary strengthening is to be made more effective. Without a map of the landscape of parliamentary strengthening, Development Partners and Parliament will be unable to navigate effectively.

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### … from the vantage point of the Paris Principles

86. Mapping the landscape of parliamentary strengthening from the perspective of the Paris Principles generates a number of insights. In Tanzania, achieving ownership, the most clearly political of the Paris Principles, has been and remains the most important challenge. Parliament and the Government more widely has at times been suspicious of Development Partners’ engagement in the politics of the country and felt that parliamentary support constitutes undue interference. On the parliamentary side of the relationship, a weak parliamentary service has been unable and has – as the absence of a clear strategic development plan demonstrates – failed to assert ownership effectively. Development Partners and Parliament should work together to finalise the strategic development plan as a matter of priority. Once this plan is completed it should provide a better basis for alignment, not only with the Government’s plans – which should not be assumed to include an aspiration for a stronger Parliament – but also with Parliament’s plans for its own development.

87. In terms of harmonisation of parliamentary support, there is much room for progress, as indeed there is as regards aid effectiveness more widely. In recent years, UNDP’s leadership and increasingly effective communication and collaboration amongst a wider – but still not comprehensive – group of Development Partners as part of the Deepening Democracy programme are encouraging signs. In addition, it seems eminently sensible to have parliamentary support as one component of a wider and well-integrated programme of assistance for governance. Much is expected of the Deepening Democracy programme. However, putting all one’s eggs in one basket, or all of one’s money through a basket fund, does entail some risks and will require regular and systematic reviews.

88. On managing for results and mutual accountability, little has been achieved. In Tanzania as elsewhere, progress on monitoring parliamentary performance or the impact of parliamentary strengthening has been slow. If Development Partners and Parliament are to enhance the effectiveness of their collaboration, they must work together to learn the lessons from successes and failures. Progress on these principles, as with ownership, alignment and harmonisation, requires that Development Partners work to build the capacity of the Parliamentary Service so that it can be a more equal partner, coordinating the work of Development Partners and providing high-quality support to MPs and Parliament.
To conclude, mapping the landscape from the perspective of the Paris Principles has revealed a number of useful insights about parliamentary strengthening in Tanzania and how it, and the performance of Parliament itself, can be enhanced. Nevertheless, and as with aid effectiveness more widely, politics – including ownership – is key. The Paris Principles are useful, but efforts to make parliamentary strengthening more effective must engage too with the politics of parliament and parliamentary strengthening rather than regarding parliamentary support as a purely technical matter. In Tanzania, a country that has a long history of one-party rule and executive dominance, it will take a sustained effort from Development Partners and from Parliament itself to build a Parliament that is an effective and independent player in the country’s system of governance.
Annex A: Note on the selection of country case studies

8th November 2007

1. **This short note** brings together in one place our initial thinking on case study countries, alongside the various comments received from experts consulted. Its purpose is to provide the basis for a decision about which countries to work in.

2. **Our proposal to DFID** included a long list of countries: Cambodia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda and Vietnam. It stated that our case study countries would be drawn from the long-list, with the main criteria being that of DFID (and perhaps CIDA) involvement and interest in parliamentary strengthening. The proposal said that Cambodia, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda and Vietnam looked like good options, but noted too that conducting two case studies in Asia would stretch the resources available more than seems sensible. Our proposal also noted that DFID had not – and still has not – expressed any desire to include case studies from Eastern Europe or Latin America.

3. **Comments on our proposal**, and on our tentative selection of case studies, have been gratefully received from a number of experts on parliamentary strengthening, including: Jeff Balch (AWEPA), Joel Barkan (African Legislatures Project), Tom Bridle (NDI), Niklas Enander (Sida), Mitsuaki Furukawa (JICA) and Fred Matiangi (SUNY-Kenya).

4. It should also be noted that DFID is keen that our initiative fit well with the work of the **African Legislatures Project**. Careful attention to this will also, I believe, be of benefit to us as we move forward. The Parliamentary Centre is well-connected in many countries, but it is also worth noting, that Sida has offered the assistance of their advisor on democracy in East Africa, and that Alan has good links with Fred Matiangi who is well-connected across East Africa.

5. Comments provided by various experts are organized here, by country.

   - **Benin**: Would be good (Bridle)
   - **Cambodia**: Makes sense from Sida perspective and would be their choice (Enander); Might be challenging to really get at what’s going on (Furukawa)
   - **Ethiopia**: Makes sense from Sida perspective, but would be challenging (Enander); Would be difficult (Matiangi)
   - **Ghana**: Very interesting (Balch); ALP will be working here soon (Barkan); Would be very interesting (Matiangi)
   - **Kenya**: Over-studied, would duplicate ALP work (Barkan); Makes sense from Sida perspective and would be their choice (Enander); Would be very interesting (Matiangi)
   - **Liberia**: Interesting post-conflict and not part of ALP plans (Barkan)
   - **Malawi**: ALP is about to start work here (Barkan); Not that helpful as there has been fairly limited donor activity in recent years (Matiangi)
   - **Mozambique**: Very interesting (Balch); ALP has started work here (Barkan)
Parliamentary strengthening and the Paris Principles: Tanzania case study

- **Nigeria**: having another bicameral as well as Cambodia might be good, and that there are interesting stories to tell re DFID-USAID collaboration (DFID-Nigeria).

- **Sierra Leone**: Interesting post-conflict and not part of ALP plans (Barkan)

- **Tanzania**: Interesting re harmonization and UNDP-guarded basket, and contrast with Uganda (Balch); ALP expects to be working here soon (Barkan); Makes sense from Sida perspective and would be their choice (Enander)

- **Uganda**: Interesting re harmonization without a basket, and contrast with Tanzania (Balch); ALP expects to be working here soon (Barkan); would be good (Bridle); Makes sense from Sida perspective and would be their choice (Enander)

- **Vietnam**: Might be challenging to really get at what's going on (Furukawa)

- **Zambia**: ALP has done some work here (Barkan)

6. On the basis of the above, and on his knowledge of parliamentary strengthening, Alan's proposal is that the case study countries should be Cambodia and Ghana for the Parliamentary Centre, and Tanzania and Uganda for ODI. However, Alan is keen to discuss the above and his proposal with Rasheed and Tony at the Parliamentary Centre. And, even when we have had those discussions, the selection might be changed at the stage of the desk-based review if we discover that finding information about parliamentary strengthening in Tanzania and Uganda is too difficult.
### Annex B: List of interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role and organisation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kate Ewart-Biggs</td>
<td>Director British Council, Tanzania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr Baffour Agyeman-Duah</td>
<td>Governance Advisor, UNDP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aliens Hedegaard Jorgensen</td>
<td>First Secretary, Governance, Royal Danish Embassy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Theo Kasper</td>
<td>First Secretary, Governance, Democratic processes and Civil Society, Delegation of the European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>Daniel P. Loya</td>
<td>Executive Director, Tanzania Centre for Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Claire Lwehabura</td>
<td>Project Officer, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hon. Anne Makinda</td>
<td>Deputy Speaker, The Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Victor Matinde</td>
<td>Programme Coordinator, Deepening Democracy Programme, UNDP.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elisa D.F. Mbise</td>
<td>Assistant Director (Planning) The Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Demetrius Mgalami</td>
<td>Assistant Director (Protocol &amp; International Relations), The Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania</td>
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<td>African Mlay</td>
<td>Governance Advisor, Canadian Cooperation Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aluswe Mwalwega</td>
<td>Business Director, British Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joseph Mzinga</td>
<td>Policy &amp; Development Manager, The Foundation for Civil Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>E.N. Shapiro</td>
<td>Governance Advisor, DFID Tanzania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Donna Bug-by Smith</td>
<td>Director, Smith and Busby Associates Ltd, Chief of Party survey project and Senior Policy Advisor, USAID/British Council project</td>
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<tr>
<td>John Ulanga</td>
<td>Executive Director, The Foundation for Civil Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cecilia Muloki Zidadu</td>
<td>Programme Officer, Tanzania Centre Democracy</td>
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Annex C: References


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