Parliamentary Strengthening and the Paris Principles
Cambodia case study

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* Disclaimer: The views presented in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of DFID or CIDA, whose financial support for this research is nevertheless gratefully acknowledged.

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<tr>
<td>CCLSP</td>
<td>Cambodia-Canada Legislative Support Project</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CPP</td>
<td>Cambodian People’s Party</td>
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<td>CSOs</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>FUNCINPEC</td>
<td>National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia</td>
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<td>KAS</td>
<td>Konrad Adenauer Stiftung</td>
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<td>LEAP</td>
<td>UNDP Legislative Assistance Programme</td>
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<td>Sida</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>SRP</td>
<td>Sam Rainsy Party</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNECA</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Commission for Africa</td>
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<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
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Executive summary

Introduction

In theory, parliaments are one of the key institutions of democracy, playing an important role in terms of legislation, oversight and representation. Regrettably, in many developing countries – as well as in many developed countries – parliaments are weak, ineffective and marginalised.

Parliamentary strengthening aims to enhance the effectiveness of parliaments through institutional development, through building the capacity of parliamentary staff, MPs and committees, and through putting in place the nuts and bolts of infrastructure and equipment. However, there is little systematic research or analysis about the effectiveness of parliaments or about the effectiveness of parliamentary strengthening. This makes it difficult for those considering whether and how to spend resources on parliamentary strengthening to make well-informed decisions. It is local politics rather than the actions of Development Partners that play the major role in shaping the effectiveness of a country’s Parliament, but Development Partners can make a difference and have a responsibility to ensure that their engagement is as effective as possible.

This report is one component of a research project on “Parliamentary strengthening and the Paris Principles”. The overall aim of the project is to generate better evidence about parliamentary strengthening, in order to inform decisions about whether and how to provide support to parliaments in developing countries. The project – a collaboration between ODI and the Parliamentary Centre, with funding provided by DFID and CIDA – has involved four country case studies; Cambodia, Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda. The vantage point taken for our analysis is that of the Paris Principles on Aid Effectiveness.

The Paris Principles and parliamentary strengthening

The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness is an international agreement between donors and recipients of aid to make aid more effective. At its core are five inter-locking principles, adherence to which is expected to make aid more effective; ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability. The Paris Principles provide a potentially useful vantage point from which to map the landscape of parliamentary strengthening and could – if they were applied in this sphere – enhance the effectiveness of parliaments and parliamentary strengthening. The intention is not to assess whether parliamentary strengthening activities have been influenced by the Paris Declaration; it would be too soon to make such an assessment. Rather, it is to use the Paris Principles as a vantage point for examining the landscape of parliamentary strengthening.

Ownership: Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle were a parliament to exercise effective leadership over efforts to improve its capacity and performance, for instance through having a clear strategy for parliamentary development that is respected by donors, along with a programme to put it into action. Ownership in parliamentary strengthening implies that it is demand-led and responsive to the needs of the parliament.

Alignment: Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle if donors’ support to parliaments were based on the parliament’s own development strategy, if such support made use of parliament’s own systems for managing resources and if support was provided in a predictable and timely manner that fits well with parliamentary and political timetables.

Harmonisation: Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle if donors coordinated their support to parliaments, using common arrangements and procedures, with each donor focussing on its areas of expertise rather than duplicating their efforts. At the very least,
harmonisation in parliamentary strengthening implies that donors begin with a clear map of the landscape of parliamentary strengthening before thinking about how they can best add value.

**Managing for Results:** Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle if the work of donors and parliaments were driven by a focus on increasing parliamentary effectiveness. This would imply putting in place and making use of frameworks for monitoring and evaluating progress on parliamentary strengthening and making decisions about future activities on the basis of such monitoring and evaluation.

**Mutual Accountability:** Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle if donors and parliaments conducted joint assessments of progress on parliamentary strengthening, with parliaments sharing information with their other stakeholders and donors making available information about their parliamentary strengthening activities.

**Politics: Conflict, democracy and parliament**

Parliaments do not operate in a vacuum; their functioning and effectiveness is shaped very much by the context – and particularly the political context – of which they are part. Cambodia, a post-conflict country, saw its political and social institutions destroyed by many years of conflict. The country has made good progress in rebuilding those institutions, with, for instance, multi-party elections held regularly since 1993, but much remains to be done.

Politics in Cambodia as elsewhere consists of a complex mix of formal politics – elections, parties and Parliament – and the informal politics and social relations that have played an important role in ensuring a sustained period of political stability, if not rapid progress on democratic development. In common with many developing countries, in Cambodia the Executive dominates a resource-starved legislature and one party, the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), dominates the political landscape. Elections in 2008 saw little change to the pattern of CPP dominance. This creates a very challenging environment for the country’s Parliament.

Assessing the performance of the Cambodian Parliament is extremely challenging. This is because neither Parliament itself nor its Development Partners have put sufficient effort into establishing frameworks for performance assessment or into collecting data on performance.

The available evidence indicates that Parliament is ineffective. Many if not most of its Members lack the skills, knowledge or incentives needed to play an independent role in relation to the Executive and the Parliamentary staff is poorly organised and overly-politicised. Recent years have seen some improvement, with, for instance, Commissions playing a more active role in scrutiny, an improvement in the quality of plenary debates and some positive changes in terms of Parliament’s organisational capacities. Nevertheless, Parliament remains weak and lacks the institutional resources, such as an independent Budget Office, that it needs if it is to be an effective counterpart to the Executive.

**The landscape of parliamentary strengthening**

In contrast to countries such as Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda, the landscape of parliamentary strengthening in Cambodia is thinly populated, perhaps as a result of some Development Partners taking the view that the structural and political constraints faced by the Cambodian Parliament are insurmountable. As a result, two Development Partners – CIDA and UNDP – have dominated the landscape with others including Germany’s GTZ, the World Bank Institute and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung playing smaller roles. In 2002, both UNDP and CIDA began major programmes of support to parliamentary strengthening. UNDP’s ended in 2005 and has now entered a new phase; it is to be hoped that UNDP’s new project, the Legislative Assistance Project (LEAP)
benefits from the lessons learned in its earlier programme of work. CIDA’s project was due to be concluded in 2007, but, having achieved impressive results, has been extended to 2009.

Mapping the landscape of parliamentary strengthening from the perspective of the Paris Principles generates a number of insights. In terms of ownership, a Parliament in a post-conflict country faces severe capacity constraints in terms of setting out plans for its own development. In such a context it is perhaps inevitable that Development Partners initially take more of a lead role. However, it is important that their plans include efforts to build the capacity of Parliament so that ownership increases over time. Support provided for the development of a Strategic Framework and Action Plan has done much to enhance Parliament’s ownership of its development and to encourage MPs and the Cambodian Parliament to take the lead in their efforts to make their Parliament more effective. In planning their future support for parliamentary strengthening, Development Partners must take full account of the Strategic Framework and Action Plan.

To establish a wider sense of ownership it is important – particularly in a country such as Cambodia – that parliamentary strengthening is provided for the Parliament, rather than for political parties, so that it does not reinforce barriers to parliamentary effectiveness. Working with all parties together, and working through Project Steering Committees that bring together all parties and the political and technical wings of Parliament, would seem to highly desirable approaches.

The establishment of a Strategic Framework and Action Plan has, not before time, provided a focus for the alignment of Development Partners’ support. Indeed, in its absence, support is inevitably rather ad hoc. In Cambodia, a tension was identified between the goal of alignment as regards parliamentary strengthening and the aid-effectiveness goal of alignment with the country’s development plan. That is: if the development plan is produced by the Executive (often in close consultation with the World Bank and other Development Partners), and the Executive does not want to see a stronger Parliament, and if those consulted don’t insist that Parliament is part of those plans, then alignment with the country’s development plan will result in marginalisation of the Parliament. The time for Development Partners to address this issue is when a country’s development plans are being produced.

For harmonisation, the fact that there are only a small number of Development Partners involved in parliamentary strengthening in Cambodia, and that they share an appreciation of the scale of the task and the limited resources they have available, is a blessing. The key organisations appear to share information and to coordinate their activities relatively well. As harmonisation progresses, important questions as to which Development Partner is best equipped to lead will need to be addressed. There may be value in considering the establishment of a donor steering committee, to work with Parliament, rather than have – as LEAP rather confusingly envisages – such a grouping nested within the UNDP-led project.

As regards managing for results, parliamentary strengthening in Cambodia is afflicted by the same problems as it is worldwide. Little has been done to establish systems to monitor parliamentary performance and to evaluate and learn about what works in terms of parliamentary strengthening. There are however some encouraging signs. Both the CIDA and UNDP programmes have been evaluated and surveys of parliamentary performance have been conducted. But despite the enthusiasm for parliamentary strengthening, neither Development Partners nor parliaments – in Cambodia as elsewhere – have made much progress on assessing effectiveness. If they are serious about the parliamentary strengthening agenda, this must be a priority. Otherwise, the flow of funds to parliamentary strengthening will surely dry up, with resources spent on other issues for which impact can be demonstrated more clearly.

On mutual accountability, there are signs of progress in Cambodia, even though a sound framework for monitoring progress has yet to be established. Parliament’s own Strategic Framework and Action Plan establishes regular discussions between Parliament and its Development Partners to discuss what might be done to enhance parliamentary performance and
the effectiveness of parliamentary strengthening. Such discussions could play an important role, not only in enhancing mutual accountability, but also in fostering a greater degree of harmonisation, alignment and ownership.

Conclusions

Mapping the landscape of parliamentary strengthening from the perspective of the Paris Principles has revealed a number of useful insights about parliamentary strengthening in Cambodia and how it, and the performance of Parliament itself, can be enhanced. Available evidence suggests that if parliamentary strengthening were conducted in a manner that were more in line with the Paris Principles, then it would be more effective.

The Paris Principles are a useful framework for mapping the landscape of parliamentary strengthening and for moving towards more effective partnerships. But as with aid effectiveness more generally, progress depends very much on politics. Donors may be reluctant to engage in parliamentary strengthening in an explicitly political manner, but there is no doubt that parliamentary strengthening requires a good understanding of the political terrain. In Cambodia, a post-conflict country, it will take many years of careful and sustained engagement from Development Partners, alongside favourable shifts in the political landscape, for the Parliament to become an effective player in the country’s system of governance.
1. Introduction

1. In theory, parliament is one of the key institutions of democracy, playing an important role in terms of legislation, oversight and representation. Regrettably, in many developing countries — as well as in many developed countries — parliaments are weak and ineffective.

2. Parliamentary strengthening, supported by a range of bilateral and multilateral donors, aims to enhance the effectiveness of parliaments. However, there is little systematic research or analysis about the effectiveness of parliaments or about the effectiveness of parliamentary strengthening. This makes it difficult for those considering whether and how to spend resources on parliamentary strengthening to make well-informed decisions. It is local politics rather than the actions of Development Partners that play the major role in shaping the effectiveness of a country’s Parliament, but Development Partners can make a difference and have a responsibility to ensure that their engagement is as effective as possible.

3. This report is one component of a research project on “Parliamentary strengthening and the Paris Principles”. The aim of the research project is to generate better evidence about parliamentary strengthening, to inform policy and practice. Emphasising the ways in which a country’s political context shapes its experience of parliamentary strengthening, the project explores the landscape of parliamentary strengthening, taking the Paris Principles on aid effectiveness as a vantage point.¹

4. The Overseas Development Institute has led the research project, with the Parliamentary Centre leading on data collection and analysis for the country case studies. This report is one of four country case studies; the others concern Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda.² The report proceeds as follows:

- Chapter two provides an introduction to the role of parliament in theory and practice, to the field of parliamentary strengthening and to the particular angle – the Paris Principles – taken by this research project;
- Chapter three provides an introduction to politics and democracy in Cambodia, putting the Cambodian Parliament – the National Assembly and the Senate – in context and outlining its key characteristics;
- Chapter four examines the performance of the Cambodian Parliament;
- Chapter five maps out the landscape of parliamentary strengthening in Cambodia;
- Chapter six examines parliamentary strengthening in Cambodia from the vantage point of the Paris Principles; and,
- Chapter seven sets out a series of conclusions and recommendations.

¹ The intention is not to assess whether parliamentary strengthening activities have been influenced by the Paris Declaration; it would be too soon to make such an assessment. Rather, it is to use the Paris Principles as a vantage point for examining the landscape of parliamentary strengthening.
² See Annex A for a note on selection of country case studies.
2. Parliaments and parliamentary strengthening

Parliaments in theory and practice

5. Traditionally, parliaments are seen as having three primary roles: legislation, oversight and representation. Legislation concerns passing the laws which make up a country’s legal framework. Oversight is about keeping an eye on the activities of the executive and holding the executive to account on behalf of the country’s citizens. And representation is about collecting, aggregating and expressing the concerns, opinions and preferences of the country’s citizens, through the political process.

6. Parliaments can play an important role in delivering governance which is good for poverty reduction. Good governance requires that there is a state that is capable, accountable and responsive (DFID, 2006). Assuming that poverty reduction is the goal, a capable state is one that is able to formulate and implement policies that are effective for poverty reduction. An accountable state is one that answers to its citizens, particularly in the event that it fails to live up to its promises. A responsive state is one that seeks to identify and meet the needs of its citizens.

Figure 1: Governance and Parliaments: Elements and Roles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effective governance</th>
<th>Parliamentary roles</th>
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<td>State capability</td>
<td>Legislation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>Oversight</td>
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<tr>
<td>Responsiveness</td>
<td>Representation</td>
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Source: Hudson, 2007

7. Mapping the roles of parliaments onto the elements of good governance (see figure 1) illustrates the contribution that parliaments can make to the delivery of good governance. Legislation is part of state capability, with law-making an important means through which capable states formulate and implement policies. Oversight can contribute to ensuring that the state is accountable to its citizens. And representation – of citizens’ views to the government – is key to responsiveness.

8. In practice, parliaments in many developing countries are weak and ineffective and contribute little to good governance and poverty reduction. For instance, the African Governance Report for 2005 found that: “In terms of enacting laws, debating national issues, checking the activities of the government and in general promoting the welfare of the people, these duties and obligations are rarely performed with efficiency and effectiveness” (UNECA, 2005). This assessment holds true for parliaments in developing countries beyond Africa too, perhaps particularly for post-conflict countries such as Cambodia.

9. There are a number of reasons for the ineffectiveness of parliaments in developing countries. First, parliaments are in a weak position in many political systems, where they are marginalised by the executive and constrained by a constitution which fails to provide for parliamentary independence. Second, parliaments often lack institutional capacity and resources and are dependent on the executive for access to resources. Third, parliaments are often by-passed in the policy process, both by dominant executives and by bilateral and multilateral donors that deal with executive rather than Parliament. Fourth, MPs often lack knowledge, experience, skills and resources. And fifth, voters – as a result of social and cultural norms – are often more
Parliamentary strengthening

10. In recent years an increasing number of organisations have become involved in efforts to strengthen and support parliaments in developing countries, in effect seeking to narrow the gap between parliaments’ potential contribution to good governance and poverty reduction and their performance in practice. Donors’ interest in parliaments is informed by a renewed emphasis on country ownership and domestic accountability, and by donors’ enthusiasm to ensure that spending decisions are scrutinised and that aid is spent effectively.

11. Globally, in terms of bilateral donors, USAID, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) and the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) are particularly active, alongside Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Germany. In terms of multilateral organisations, the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-American Development Bank and the European Union are prominent. In addition, there are a number of national and international parliamentary organisations and networks including the Parliamentary Centre, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA), the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank (PNoWB) and the Global Organisation of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (GOPAC). Parliamentary strengthening activities range from training individual MPs, to working with parliament as an institution, to engaging with the wider political system within which parliament operates.

12. The wisdom of investing resources in parliamentary strengthening depends on the difference that parliamentary strengthening makes, to parliamentary effectiveness and ultimately to development outcomes. Regrettably, donors have made little headway with generating systematic evidence or analysis about the effectiveness of parliamentary strengthening (although see Hubli and Schmidt, 2005), or about the effectiveness of parliaments themselves (Hudson and Wren, 2007, p.16). The World Bank Institute, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and others are working to establish frameworks for assessing parliamentary effectiveness and a number of useful initiatives to shed light on the functioning of parliaments in developing countries are underway, including the work of the African Legislatures Project. Nevertheless, the absence of evidence and analysis remains a serious problem for those tasked with making decisions about whether and how to spend resources on parliamentary strengthening.

Parliamentary strengthening and the Paris Principles: The research project

13. The overall aim of this research project is to generate better evidence about parliamentary strengthening, in order to inform decisions – made by donors and others – about whether and how to provide support to parliaments in developing countries. The vantage point taken for our analysis is that of the Paris Principles on aid effectiveness; ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability. Support provided by donors for parliamentary strengthening is a minor component of aid, but using the Paris Principles as a

3 The initial ambition of this research project was to examine the extent to which consistency with the Paris Principles made for more effective parliamentary strengthening. As the project progressed, methodological challenges and data availability made it prudent to scale back the project’s ambitions.
vantage point or analytical lens can, we believe, generate useful and relevant insights (see figure 2).

**Figure 2: The Paris Principles and Parliamentary Strengthening**

**The Paris Principles on aid effectiveness**

The Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness is an international agreement by donors and recipients of aid to make aid more effective. At its core are five inter-locking principles, adherence to which is expected to make aid more effective. First is the principle of ownership; that aid is used most effectively when developing countries – governments, in consultation with parliament and civil society – take charge of their own development plans and use aid in a coordinated manner to implement those plans. Second is the principle of alignment; that aid should be provided and spent in a manner that supports a country’s development plans. Third is the principle of harmonisation; that donors should coordinate their support to particular developing countries to reduce duplication and transaction costs. Fourth is managing for results; that aid management and planning should be driven by a focus on results. And fifth, is mutual accountability; that donors and recipients of aid should be accountable to each other, in a transparent manner, for aid effectiveness.

**The relevance of the Paris Principles to parliamentary strengthening**

**Ownership:** Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle were a parliament to exercise effective leadership over efforts to improve its capacity and performance, for instance through having a clear strategy for parliamentary development that is respected by donors, along with a programme to put it into action. Ownership in parliamentary strengthening implies that it is demand-led and responsive to the needs of the parliament.

**Alignment:** Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle if donors’ support to parliaments was based on the parliament’s development strategy, if such support made use of parliament’s own systems for managing resources and if support was provided in a predictable and timely manner that fits well with parliamentary and political timetables.

**Harmonisation:** Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle if donors coordinated their support to parliaments, using common arrangements and procedures, with each donor focussing on its areas of expertise rather than duplicating their efforts. At the very least, harmonisation in parliamentary strengthening implies that donors begin with a clear map of the landscape of parliamentary strengthening before thinking about how they can best add value.

**Managing for Results:** Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle if the work of donors and parliaments were driven by a focus on increasing parliamentary effectiveness. This would imply putting in place and making use of frameworks for monitoring and evaluating progress on parliamentary strengthening and making decisions about future activities on the basis of such monitoring and evaluation.

**Mutual Accountability:** Parliamentary strengthening would be consistent with this principle if donors and parliaments conducted joint assessments of progress on parliamentary strengthening, with parliaments sharing information with their other stakeholders and donors making available information about their parliamentary strengthening activities.

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4 The DFID-UNDP-World Bank Institute donor consultation on parliamentary strengthening which took place in May 2007 identified the development of good practice principles for donor support to parliamentary strengthening as one of the ways of moving the parliamentary strengthening agenda forward, specifically indicating that such principles should build on the Paris principles on aid effectiveness as well as on the OECD-DAC’s capacity building principles. See [http://sdnhq.undp.org/governance/parls](http://sdnhq.undp.org/governance/parls)

5 While the focus of this research project is not on the role of parliaments in aid effectiveness, it is worth noting that under the Paris Declaration developing countries are committed to “strengthen as appropriate the parliamentary role in national development strategies and/or budgets” (para 48 of Paris Declaration).
14. In Cambodia, the research process was led by the Parliamentary Centre, with local staff and staff from the Centre’s Ghana office working together. A series of semi-structured interviews were conducted with representatives from the key stakeholders in the field of parliamentary strengthening. These included representatives from bilateral and multilateral Development Partners (donors), the parliamentary staff, civil society organisations and a number of MPs including the chairs of committees with key roles as regards oversight and accountability (see Annex B for a list of interviewees). In addition to these research interviews, a number of documentary sources were reviewed, including a number of reports produced by those Development Partners that have supported the strengthening of the Cambodian Parliament. Prior to the in-country phase of the research those Development Partners that have been active in parliamentary strengthening in Cambodia were invited to provide documentation – including evaluations – of their activities. A number of Development Partners provided useful information.
3. Politics: Conflict, democracy and parliament

15. Parliaments do not operate in a vacuum; their functioning and effectiveness is shaped very much by the country context and in particular the political context (Hudson and Wren, 2007). This chapter outlines the context within which the Parliament of Cambodia operates, outlining: the country’s post-independence political history; the inner workings of the Cambodian Parliament; and, the ways in which one party – the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) – has established its dominance through a series of elections and coalition governments.

16. Cambodia is a country that – only 30 years ago – saw its physical, social and human capital decimated (DFID, 2005). As a post-conflict country, Cambodia faces a huge challenge in consolidating democracy and ensuring that its democratic institutions function effectively. Indeed, the World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy notes that “after decades of war and authoritarian government, Cambodia is in many ways still a post-conflict society and political system” (World Bank, 2005, p.1). This fact – and the inter-play between the formal politics of parties and the complex informal politics of patronage and the position of the monarchy – forms the political bedrock for the landscape of parliamentary strengthening.

From independence to “year zero” and beyond

17. Cambodia achieved independence from France in 1953 under the rule of King Norodom Sihanouk. King Sihanouk ruled the country until he was ousted in 1970 in a US-supported coup led by General Lon Nol. From 1970 to 1975 Cambodia was designated a Republic and the monarchy was abolished. In 1975, the Khmer Rouge seized power, led by “Pol Pot” and supported by China. During Pol Pot’s reign, from 1975-1979, around 1.7 million Cambodians – over 20% of the population – died from starvation, disease or execution as the Communist regime pursued a ruthless genocidal policy of forced rural collectivisation. This was the era of the “killing fields” in which hundreds of thousands of members of the educated urban middle class were tortured and executed in special centres.

Figure 3: Key dates in Cambodia’s post-independence political history

- 1953 – Cambodia gains independence from France.
- 1970 – Military coup by General Lon Nol seizes power, with support of USA.
- 1979 – Vietnam invades Cambodia and ousts the Khmer Rouge.
- 1993 – Elections to National Assembly. FUNCINPEC wins and forms coalition with CPP, forming the first Royal Government of Cambodia and adopting a new Constitution.
- 1998 – Elections to National Assembly. CPP wins and forms coalition with FUNCINPEC.
- 2003-4 – Elections to National Assembly. CPP wins and after a year-long political stalemate forms a coalition government with FUNCINPEC.
- 2004 – King Sihanouk abdicates. His son, Norodom Shihanoni is crowned King.
18. Vietnam invaded Cambodia and ousted the Khmer Rouge in 1979 but conflict continued between the Vietnamese-supported regime and the Khmer Rouge until the Paris Peace Agreements of 1991 and the establishment of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Multi-party democratic elections organised by UNTAC were held in July 1993. The royalist National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) won a narrow victory and formed a coalition government with the Cambodian People’s Party. Under the terms of the coalition, FUNCINPEC’s Prince Norodom Ranariddh became Prime Minister, with the CPP’s Hun Sen the “second Prime Minister”.

19. A new Constitution was adopted in September 1993, establishing the Government of Cambodia as a multi-party liberal democracy under a constitutional monarchy. An elected legislature was established with the powers to oversee the executive, along with an independent judiciary. Politically, Cambodia turned away from socialism and authoritarianism, embarking on a faltering and inconclusive path – including a coup by Hun Sen in 1997 – towards becoming a liberal democracy and a market economy. The monarchy was restored in 1993 with Sihanouk made King.

The inner workings of the Cambodian Parliament

20. The legislative arm of Government comprises of a representative National Assembly and a Senate. The National Assembly has 123 seats elected by voters from 24 constituencies, under universal adult suffrage, with each Assembly elected for five years. The electoral system is a complex system of proportional representation, with a closed party list. Under the terms of the Constitution, the cabinet is responsible to the National Assembly. The Senate was created by amendment to the Constitution in 1999. It plays an advisory role in terms of legislation, and is elected indirectly by representatives of communes, districts and provinces. The Senate has 61 members who are appointed for five years at a time.

21. Both Houses have the power to determine their own rules of procedure and to establish various Commissions (Committees, in Westminster terms). Each House has a governing body, the Permanent Standing Committee. For the National Assembly, its membership consists of the President of the National Assembly, the Vice-President and the Chairpersons of the nine standing Commissions.

22. To deal with the more administrative side of things, each House has a Secretariat (Parliamentary Service). The task of the Secretariats is to provide administrative support and advice on matters of substance to political representatives. The staff of the Secretariat of the National Assembly numbered 700 in 2006, with its Senate counterpart numbering 280. Staff appointment and progression – particularly to the National Assembly – is reported to be related to political affiliation, as is the case in the USA, Spain and Portugal, rather than being a politically neutral matter as is the tradition in Westminster-style systems (UNDP, 2006, p.12). It is reported that many staff do not turn up for work and that appointments continue to be made on the basis of political affiliation rather than ability to do the job.

Elections, coalitions and CPP dominance

23. Marred by allegations of harassment, elections to the National Assembly in 1998 established the CPP as the dominant party in the Second Parliament. Nevertheless, lacking the necessary two-thirds majority, the CPP was required to form a new coalition government with FUNCINPEC. Local elections were held for the first time in 2002, resulting in a landslide for the CPP which won in all but 23 of 1620 communes.
24. Elections to the National Assembly in 2003 saw the CPP win the majority of seats – 73, as opposed to 26 for FUNCINPEC and 24 for the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP). However, this again fell short of the constitutionally required two-thirds majority. After a protracted political stalemate and a temporary alliance between FUNCINPEC and the SRP as the “Alliance of Democrats”, the CPP once again formed a coalition government with FUNCINPEC, with Hun Sen re-elected as Prime Minister. Fourteen women secured seats as Members of the National Assembly.

25. The new government took office in 2004 with the CPP and FUNCINPEC sharing power on a 60:40 basis. Also in 2004, King Sihanouk abdicated and was replaced by his son, Norodom Sihamoni. As well as the Prime Minister Hun Sen, from 2004 to 2008 the Royal Cambodian Government included six deputy prime ministers, 14 senior ministers, 28 ministers, 135 secretaries of state and 146 under-secretaries of state. Ministers are appointed by the Prime Minister, subject to royal approval. Such a large government was, it seems, necessary, to establish the coalition government (DFID, 2005).

26. In 2005, Sam Rainsy, the leader of the self-named opposition party, was exiled in France and, in his absence, convicted for defaming the Prime Minister. In 2006, he received a royal pardon and returned to Cambodia to continue his efforts to highlight government corruption. Also in 2006, the SRP suggested to the CPP that the constitutional requirement that a party win two-thirds of the seats to form a Government on its own be replaced by a requirement for a simple absolute majority of 50% plus 1. In the Senate elections of 2006, a vote by members of the National Assembly and Commune Council Chiefs – the only people eligible to vote in what were the first elections to the Senate – gave 75% of seats to the CPP.

27. A recent report produced as part of the work of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index notes that while Cambodia has enjoyed a long period of relative political stability, there has been “an observable negative trend in Cambodia’s democratic development” (BTI, 2008, p.2). Under the leadership of Prime Minister Hun Sen, the CPP has consolidated power at all levels, national and local. Even as part of a coalition government, the CPP has grown increasingly dominant and has worked aggressively to take advantage of weakening opposition forces that are largely confined to urban areas.

28. The dominance of the CPP shapes the workings and effectiveness of the Parliament. As UNDP note, “The National Assembly and Senate are strongly influenced by party lines. A strong sense of partisanship and loyalty to their respective political party is evident in the distribution and allocation of seats, allocation of chairmanships, argument in the floor debates and voting patterns” (UNDP, 2007). For instance, within the National Assembly, from 2004 to 2006 Opposition Members were not given places on any Commissions, as Chairpersons or as Members (UNDP, 2006, pp.10-11).

29. Following the dismissal of Prince Norodom Ranariddh as Party President in 2006, FUNCINPEC has disintegrated into several small parties with no effective leadership. With the opposition fragmented: “Cambodia has thus witnessed the emergence of a hegemonic party system, in which the CPP has become increasingly dominant and there are no credible challengers” (BTI, 2008, p.4). As a result, according to BTI, “the democratic system of checks and balances – among state, political society and civil society institutions – exists on paper only” (BTI, 2008, p.5).

30. The 2008 elections to the National Assembly saw no change to the pattern of CPP dominance. The National Election Committee’s figures show the CPP winning 58% of the vote, with the Sam Rainsy Party receiving 22%. FUNCINPEC’s share of the vote fell to 5%, with Prince Norodom Ranariddh’s party receiving the same percentage and a new party with the name “Human Rights” taking third place with 6.6%. The allocation of seats is as yet unclear but there is no doubt that the National Assembly will again be dominated by the CPP. The Sam Rainsy
Party described the election results as a “massive fraud”, with Norodom Ranariddh’s party and FUNCINPEC reluctantly accepting the results. Following the elections, the nine Parliamentary Commissions are all chaired by members of the CPP and the sum total of non-CPP members across all Parliamentary Commissions is only two.
4. Parliamentary performance

31. The Parliament of Cambodia operates in a challenging context. Rebuilding the country’s political institutions after years of conflict has been a slow process and the evolution of parliamentary politics in particular has been constrained by the dominance of both the Executive and of the CPP within Parliament. Any assessment of parliamentary performance in Cambodia needs to take full account of the country’s history and political context.

32. This chapter provides a brief outline of the performance of Cambodia’s parliament, organised in terms of its three primary roles; legislation, representation and oversight. The purpose of this chapter is to further set the scene for our exploration of parliamentary strengthening and its effectiveness. It is based on two main sets of data: first, a series of research interviews with individuals that have worked either in or with the Parliament; and second, reports about the effectiveness of Parliament published by Development Partners and others.

33. It should however be noted that neither Development Partners nor the Cambodian Parliament have made much progress in terms of assessing the performance of Parliament. Our in-country research has produced some additional information about parliamentary performance but nevertheless the absence of systematic performance data puts limits on what can be said with confidence, and particularly with quantitative data, about parliamentary performance.

Legislation

34. On average the National Assembly and the Senate passed approximately 36 bills a year into Law in the Parliament that ran to the 2003 elections, with the number declining to about 29 per year in the 2004-08 Parliament. Members of the National Assembly and Senators rely on the work of the Commissions (Committees) to discharge their legislative responsibilities by considering and producing reports on pieces of draft legislation.

35. In the Parliament that stood until the most recent elections of 2008, there were nine Commissions. With the Government consisting of 26 line ministries, this means that each Commission covers a broad range of issues, making it difficult for a Commission to establish expertise over its subject area (UNDP, 2006, p.27). In the National Assembly, each Commission has nine members, in the Senate, five. Commissions will meet between one and ten times to consider a draft law, depending on its importance. In both Houses the work of the Commissions is constrained by their lack of financial, human and technical resources – including the skills and knowledge needed to understand complex pieces of draft legislation – leading them to depend heavily on networks of civil society organisations (CSOs).

36. The effectiveness of the Commissions, and hence the performance of Parliament in terms of legislation, is shaped very much by the Executive’s monopolisation of the legislative initiative. A similar situation exists in many countries; in Cambodia as elsewhere this constrains the independence and effectiveness of Parliament. The inability of Parliament to introduce Private Members Bills, and of the opposition to make its own proposals, are similarly constraining factors.

37. Parliament's legislative effectiveness has – until a recent change in this practice – also been shaped by the Executive’s ability to declare a bill “urgent”, a move which had the effect of limiting the time available for its scrutiny (UNDP, 2006, p.26). However, within these major constraints, the evidence suggests that Members and Commissions are becoming more effective in terms of scrutinising the bills that they consider. Legislators themselves point to a number of substantial amendments as evidence of their increased legislative effectiveness. These include amendments to: the Public Order Law; the Law on Public Administration
Reforms; the Road Traffic Law; and, a number of Constitutional Amendments to improve the environment for democracy.

38. Perhaps most notable are two Constitutional Amendments. The first, in 2006, following the Sam Rainsy case, provided parliamentary immunity for Members so that they cannot be jailed for libel, including criticism of the Government. This amendment, initially proposed by the Government, was supported by 81 of the 87 law-makers attending the session when the amendment was passed. The second, again in 2006, and with the long political stalemate of 2003-04 fresh in peoples’ minds, changed the Constitution, enabling a party to form a Government with a simple, rather than a two-thirds, majority of seats.

39. Both of these amendments did however have the support of the Government; as such they do not represent high-points of parliamentary independence. Indeed, interviewees suggest that the progress of opposition proposals such as the Anti-Corruption Bill onto the agendas of the relevant Commissions has been extremely slow, perhaps reflecting the politicisation of Parliament’s administration. Finally, many laws that have been passed by Parliament have yet to be implemented; this sets an additional external constraint on the legislative effectiveness of Parliament.

Representation

40. The ability of Parliament and its Members to perform their representational function is shaped by the electoral system, with Members of the National Assembly elected on a party list. To be elected, prospective Members have to ensure that they are well regarded by their party. As a result, they – and Members that wish to be re-elected – focus more on loyalty to the party than on representation of their constituents. Voters and constituents continue to regard Members as “servants of their party structure” (UNDP, 2006, p.29) rather than as representatives of their constituents. As is the case in many developing countries, with low levels of civic education and high levels of poverty, constituents also expect that their elected representatives to help in terms of providing food, money or gifts and in terms of settling disputes that cannot be settled at a local level (UNDP, 2006, p.30).

41. Such expectations make some MPs reluctant to visit their constituencies, which means that it is difficult for them to hear about their voters’ concerns. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that MPs are not – in contrast to countries such as Kenya and Uganda – provided with an electorate allowance (UNDP, 2006, p.29). In addition, an absence of resources means that parliamentary outreach programmes have not been able to bridge the gap between MPs and their constituents.

42. One way in which MPs do seek to get more inputs from the public into their work is through public hearings. Such events have on occasion been used to take evidence from experts, including civil society organisations, in relation to particular bills that are in progress through Parliament. This happens rarely, but has enabled a wider range of interests to be represented in relation to issues including labour law, the country’s conflict commission, human rights abuses, the military service law and the public order law. However, with public hearings and consultations often organised and funded by CSOs and Development Partners there is a risk that MPs will feel that they are being driven by others’ agendas rather than being in the lead on matters of public policy.

43. Some efforts have been made to bring MPs closer to their constituents and to strengthen their representational function by creating provincial parliamentary offices and moving in the direction of decentralisation. These parliamentary outposts have been established by the National

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6 No judgement is made here as to whether providing MPs with funds to help them to meet their constituents’ economic needs would be a good thing in terms of enabling them to represent their constituents’ interests.
Assembly to enable Members to receive inputs into the legislative process, to hear the concerns of their constituents and to disseminate information about legislation that has been passed. The Senate too is in the process of establishing regional offices – covering 3 or 4 provinces – for a similar purpose, a move that complements the post-2006 transformation of the Senate from an appointed chamber to an indirectly elected chamber.

44. The success of these initiatives and their impact on the representative performance of Parliament is severely constrained by a lack of resources. A more radical move that is being considered in some quarters is that of amending the constitution to introduce a system of mixed proportional representation or even single member districts, rather than the party-list electoral system. Such a move would have profound implications for Parliament's representative function (UNDP, 2006, p.31).

Oversight

45. The Cambodian Parliament is weakest in terms of its oversight function, as a result of the dominance of the Executive and the CPP, and the absence of a tradition that sees a “loyal opposition” as making a positive contribution to the country’s governance. Research interviews with Members of the National Assembly revealed that in the last decade the Prime Minister has never appeared in Parliament to answer a parliamentary question or to give an account of progress made with implementing a particular programme of policy. Beyond the Prime Minister alone, Government is reported to be slow to respond to parliamentary questions and Ministers are reluctant to come to Parliament to answer questions.

46. On Parliament’s side, the fact is that it has never seriously challenged the Government in any way. All executive appointments are approved without much difficulty. And loan agreements and treaties that come before the Assembly are not effectively scrutinized because many in Cambodia including MPs believe that foreign aid (inflows) are crucial to sustain the economy. The evidence suggests that legislators – particularly those on the CPP benches – are not prepared to question the actions and inactions of government; they have little or no incentive to risk the ire of the party leadership. In addition, MPs may lack the technical capacity and knowledge to engage effectively in the areas of programme design and implementation. Finally, the Secretariats, lacking in skills and – particularly at the lower levels – appointed on the basis of political affiliation, have little incentive to strengthen Parliament’s ability to perform its oversight role more effectively.

Budget involvement

47. Article 91 of the Constitution gives Senators, Members of the National Assembly and the Prime Minister the right to propose amendments to laws except in cases where such amendments might have the effect of reducing public income or increasing the burden on citizens. As such, Parliament does appear to have some powers in terms of budget amendment. However, Parliament has never taken the step of rejecting or significantly amending the budget and does not engage effectively with the budget process. This is a matter of incentives, skills and timing. In terms of incentives, most MPs have no incentive to challenge the Government’s budget. In terms of skills, few MPs have the capacity to engage in what may seem highly technical processes. In terms of timing, the Executive does not provide Parliament with quality information in advance of the budget debate.

48. The Commission on Economy, Finance, Banking and Audit plays the roles that would in other Parliaments be played by two committees, the budget committee and the public accounts committee. To perform its roles, the Commission relies on the support of the Finance Department of Parliament’s Secretariat. However, the Finance Department is itself poorly resourced. The Executive has little incentive to strengthen the capacity of the Finance
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Department or of the Commission itself to provide more effective oversight of the budget process.

Poverty reduction

49. The in-country research process provided evidence that Members of Parliament are aware of the existence of the National Poverty Reduction Strategy; the so-called “Rectangular Strategy” with good governance at its core. A number of respondents noted that they were part of the consultative processes leading to the formulation of the strategy but that they are not now involved in its implementation or monitoring. Indeed some respondents suggested that the poverty reduction strategy lacks sufficient detail to enable Parliament to focus on specific issues. As a result, while some opposition members do occasionally raise questions, Parliament as a whole is not able to play an effective oversight role in terms of the country’s poverty reduction strategy.

Limited signs of improvement in a very challenging environment

50. The Parliament of Cambodia remains a largely ineffective institution, in a political landscape that remains fractured after many years of conflict. Dominated by the Executive and with the CPP hegemonic in a party-list electoral system, Parliament is very constrained. Most of its Members lack the skills, knowledge or incentives needed to play an independent role in relation to the Executive. Parliament as an institution lacks the capacity and resources needed to be effective, with, for instance, the Secretariats of the National Assembly and Senate unable to provide effective support to the legislative process, or to effectively coordinate the work of the two Houses (UNDP, 2007).

51. Nevertheless, participants in research interviews did suggest that there had been some improvement in parliamentary performance in recent years: the National Assembly and Senate are committed to good governance principles; Commissions have begun to play a more effective role in examining draft bills and in providing useful technical inputs for plenary debates in the National Assembly and Senate; opposition Members have been included on a number of Commissions; the quality of debate in plenary about specific subjects has improved; and, there has been some improvement in coordination among the various Commissions. Parliamentary strengthening – supported by bilateral and multilateral donors – aims to build on the recent signs of improvement, and forms the subject of the following chapter.
5. The landscape of parliamentary strengthening in Cambodia

The dilemma of parliamentary strengthening

52. The Cambodian Parliament has played a rather marginal role in Cambodia’s governance system. Parliament’s inability and failure to perform its functions of legislation, oversight and representation effectively, has in turn reduced the capability, accountability and responsive of the state. As chapter four made clear, this is the result, on the one hand, of the political context within which it operates, and, on the other hand, the resource constraints which it faces.

53. In Cambodia, Development Partners have faced a dilemma; should they seek to ease the resource constraints that Parliament faces so that it can be more effective, or is the Parliament so constrained by the political context that resources spent on parliamentary strengthening would themselves be ineffective? A small number of Development Partners – perhaps taking the longer view, and recognizing that a stronger Parliament will in time shape the politics of the country – have taken the decision to provide support for parliamentary strengthening.

54. This chapter outlines the landscape of parliamentary strengthening in Cambodia looking at which Development Partners are engaged in programmes of parliamentary strengthening, setting out the sorts of activities that they engage in, and – making use of the evaluations that have been conducted – commenting on its effectiveness.

A thinly populated landscape of supply-led activities

55. Parliamentary strengthening programmes may focus on individual MPs, on parliamentary staff and the wider parliamentary service, on the work of Committees (Commissions in Cambodia), on parliamentary rules and procedures, or on the nuts and bolts of parliamentary infrastructure such as office space, furniture, libraries and access to the internet. Whatever the approach taken, the ultimate objective of parliamentary strengthening is to help parliament to improve its capacity as a law making body that represents citizens’ interests by passing appropriate legislation and exercising effective oversight over executive actions and the budget.

56. In Cambodia the landscape of parliamentary strengthening has been dominated by CIDA and UNDP. Nevertheless, a number of other Development Partners have been active at various times. Their support has been wide-ranging but a number of partners have sought to address the huge human capacity issues faced by a country still emerging from violent conflict.

57. The Asia Foundation provided training support for the development of the administrative and legislative capacity of MPs and staff of the National Assembly during the 1st Parliament, from 1993-98. The Chinese and Japanese governments have provided assistance, for instance through supplying computing equipment. The World Bank provided short-term support to the 2nd Parliament – from 1998-2003 – to undertake a 2-6 month programme of legislative reform and provided further assistance through its public financial management reform programme. Germany’s development agency, GTZ – working alongside the Cambodia-Canada Legislative Support Project (CCLSP) in strengthening Parliament’s role in the budget process – provided expert advisors to the Senate Commission on Economy, Finance Banking and Audit as well as providing a Legal Advisor for the Senate and additional expertise to assist with the development of administrative procedures at the
Secretariat of the National Assembly. In addition, the Inter-Parliamentary Union has been active and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung has engaged in a number of programmes of support, of around two years duration each, since 1994. USAID funded, from 1992 to 1996 a programme of support that was aimed at: promoting legislative reform and increased awareness of legislative requirements for the rule of law; fostering political pluralism; and, supporting the development of an independent legislature through training, information dissemination and the development of legislative drafting and research units.

The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung’s latest programme of support

The latest programme of cooperation between the National Assembly and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung was agreed in 2008. The objectives are: to improve Parliament’s work in constitutional and political process; to improve Parliament’s internal structures and procedures; to build the capacity of MPs and Secretariat staff; and, to support the international exchange of experience. The programme will operate through a series of workshops, training events, study visits and scholarships involving MPs and staff from the Cambodian Parliament as well as their German counterparts and other international parliamentary specialists.

The Cambodia-Canada Legislative Support Project

Aims

58. Canada has made efforts to support a sustainable transition to democratic government in Cambodia since the early 1990s. This included a number of activities undertaken by the Parliamentary Centre, funded by CIDA, and commencing in 1993. In 1998 the Canadian Government decided to support a major governance initiative and sent a mission to Cambodia to assess the scope for cooperation between the two countries. The mission identified four areas: legal and judicial reform; public administration; gender issues; and strengthening the National Assembly. A subsequent mission in 2000 concluded that the time was ripe for Canada to become involved in bilateral governance and recommended that support for the National Assembly and the Senate constitute the focus of such work.

59. The Parliamentary Centre was chosen by CIDA as the Canadian Executing Agency for a five year programme of parliamentary strengthening, to run from 2002-2007; the Cambodia-Canada Legislative Support Project (CCLSP). The CCLSP had an initial budget of Canadian $5million (approximately US$4 million). The Centre implements and manages the project to promote democracy in Cambodia by building the capacity of both the National Assembly and the Senate. The Centre works with local counterparts, along with legislative and administrative specialists, in order to promote sustainability and local ownership. The programme was intended to be a flagship for parliamentary strengthening in Cambodia.

60. The project envisaged three outcomes. First, enhanced capacity of the National Assembly, the Senate and their Commissions to draft and review legislation. Second, increased responsiveness of MPs to constituents. And third, improved capacity of the Secretariats to support the National Assembly and Senate. Planned sub-outcomes included: for legislation, improved management of the legislative agenda, improved standards of legislative drafting, increasingly professional policy and legislative analysis provided by Parliamentary Commissions, and incorporation of gender analysis in legislation; for representation, improved public policy consultation and record keeping by Commissions; and, in terms of the secretariats, political neutrality in terms of the services provided to all parties, improved communication with the public about parliamentary business, improved legislative support

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7 This summary is taken from the Parliamentary Centre’s web-site – see http://www.parlcent.ca/asia/cclsp_e.php?template=print
8 The project was later extended, with additional resources from CIDA, until 2009.
to Commissions, improved management and administration and improved recruitment and use of female staff.

Activities and effectiveness

61. In each year of its operation, the CCLSP engaged in a range of activities focused on its three expected outcomes: law-making; representation; and, the Secretariat. In the first year, from 2002 to 2003, the focus of the law-making component was to improve the quality of law-making review and analysis by working with and building the capacity of MPs, Senators and staff from the Secretariats of both Houses. A key output was three chapters of the “Parliamentary Best Practices Handbook”. The focus of the representation component was to strengthen the process of public consultation and to support its use by Parliamentary Commissions. A key output from this stream of work was a workshop – held in cooperation with the World Bank Institute – to examine the Government’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper with inputs and testimony provided by representatives of Cambodia’s poor and disenfranchised communities. As regards the Secretariat, the CCLSP carried out a number of activities with staff and senior managers of the Secretariats of both houses. These activities covered strategic planning, human resource development, the drafting of a statute for Parliamentary Civil Servants, the development of clear politically neutral job descriptions for parliamentary staff, as well as training programmes on administrative, language and computer skills.

62. In its second year of operation the CCLSP operated in a situation of political stalemate following the inconclusive elections to the National Assembly. This meant that the programme had to limit its activities with parliamentarians and focus instead on working with parliamentary staff. As part of the lawmaking component, workshops and assignments were held to increase the legal analysis and research capacity of staff. As part of the representation component a workshop was held on the roles and responsibilities of staff of the provincial offices of the National Assembly. As part of the Secretariat component, the CCLSP continued to provide training for parliamentary staff on administrative skills, management, operational planning and human resource management policies and practice. The Secretariats showed considerable enthusiasm in implementing reforms that were and are needed to create a more professional and politically impartial parliamentary staff.

63. Once the political stalemate had been resolved in 2004, the CCLSP was able to resume its work with parliamentarians. Although a heavy legislative agenda kept parliamentarians busier than usual, the CCLSP was able to hold a timely workshop on the World Trade Organisation, launch a programme to increase the capacity of women parliamentarians, and continue to build the legal analysis and research capacity of parliamentary staff. For the representation component, the CCLSP held an orientation session for MPs, in collaboration with UNDP and the KAS, as well as hosting an Asia-Africa symposium to bring together MPs from both continents to discuss issues related to poverty monitoring and evaluation. The Secretariat component in this year included a study visit to Canada and training in financial management and gender awareness.

64. Looking back at the progress and results achieved over its six years of operation, there are a number of highlights in relation to each of the three streams of work; legislative, representative and secretariat. As regards the legislative component, law-makers have been able to bring to bear their recently acquired skills and knowledge in considering a number of laws including laws on anti-corruption, domestic violence and the WTO, and the process of reviewing and analysing draft legislation has been improved. As regards the representative component, the quantity and quality of outreach has increased through a number of public consultations, and CSOs and business interests have become more active participants in the work of the legislature. And as regards the Secretariat, important
steps have been taken towards ensuring that parliamentary staff are equipped and motivated to deliver professional and politically neutral advice and services to both Houses of Parliament. Both Secretariats adopted the practice of producing strategic and annual plans, human resource management was improved, and the skills of parliamentary staff – including at a provincial level – were enhanced.

65. The ways in which the Parliamentary Centre managed the project played an important role in its effectiveness. It worked to achieve consensus amongst political parties in Parliament, to encourage coordination amongst other stakeholders and Development Partners that were working with Parliament, and to build trust between Parliament and the CSOs that can provide it with much useful input. As, initially, a five year programme, the CCLSP had time to gain the trust of parliamentarians, to begin to change the attitudes of parliamentary staff, and to enhance the skills of parliamentarians and parliamentary staff; a shorter programme would not have been able to achieve these things.

66. The Parliamentary Centre insisted that its activities were for Parliament as a whole rather than for particular political parties. It also established a Project Steering Committee comprising leaders of the three main political parties, the President of the National Assembly and the President of the Senate. These moves were crucial in demonstrating that the project was itself politically neutral and played an important role in encouraging cross-party dialogue and enhancing Parliament's ownership of the project. Indeed the steering committee approach has been so successful that a modified version of the arrangement is included in Parliament's own Strategic Framework and Action Plan. The impact of the CCLSP on the development of both Houses of Parliament has been acknowledged by the leaderships of the Secretariats and Commissions of the National Assembly and Senate, as well as by programme officers of KAS and UNDP.

**UNDP’s support to the capacity development of the Cambodian Parliament**

*Aims and activities*

67. UNDP’s major programme of support to the capacity development of the Cambodian Parliament was planned to run from June 2002 to December 2005, with a budget of US$1.7 million drawn from core UNDP resources. The project’s ultimate expected outcome was “increased effectiveness of Parliament to perform its legislative and oversight functions.” The expected results or intermediate outcomes from the project included: a more efficient Parliament with revised rules of procedure, staff regulations and an organisational structure more in line with modern parliamentary practice; and, an increased understanding by Members of key human rights, development and constitutional duties to effectively oversee the executive branch.

68. The project aimed to achieve these outcomes by: strengthening the administrative capacity of the Secretariats of the National Assembly and Senate, the legal counsel function of both Houses, and the capacity of the Commissions; supporting the National Assembly and Senate in their involvement in international and regional events; strengthening the coordination and leadership roles of Parliament; and, encouraging and supporting Parliament to develop its function in the protection of human rights.

69. In the first phase of the project, leading up to the 2003 elections to the National Assembly the focus was on strengthening the administrative capacities of the Secretariats of both Houses. This included legal counselling functions as well as efforts to improve the substantive capacity of the Secretariats so that they would be able to provide better support to MPs on legislative matters. In the second phase of the project, the focus was on

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This summary is taken from a UNDP project summary dated February 2007 and from a UNDP-funded evaluation produced in March 2006.
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strengthening MPs’ capacities in relation to the legislative process and their oversight function, by: supporting their involvement in international and regional events; enhancing their capacity to oversee and review government policy and to analyse and formulate legislation that will contribute to the advancement of the international development agenda and the promotion of human rights.

Effectiveness

70. The evaluation of the UNDP programme of work noted a number of successful aspects along with a series of challenges and lessons that should be taken on board in any subsequent project. Four areas of success were highlighted, all of which related to building the capacity of parliamentarians and of the parliamentary Secretariats. First, the project was extremely successful in engaging MPs and the institution of Parliament, resulting in ownership, eagerness to be fully involved in the next design phase, and expressions of clear satisfaction and appreciation of UNDP’s support. Second, the awareness of Members of the National Assembly and Senators about their roles as Members of Parliament, and the need to mobilize support towards the performance of these duties effectively, was increased. Third, the leadership of National Assembly Secretariat was strengthened with the Secretariats showing a strong commitment to sound management practices and to making the Parliamentary Service more politically neutral. And fourth, the project did much to enhance parliamentarians’ understanding of their roles and responsibilities as constituency representatives.

71. However, the project experienced a number of major challenges in terms of its implementation. The original project objectives were very ambitious and difficult to attain within the limited time-frame and resource constraints of the project. In addition, there were serious problems as regards project management and implementation, with UNDP taking – for good reasons, but perhaps to too great an extent – a hands-off approach to its management which meant that it was unable to deal with emerging staffing issues. As the UNDP evaluation put it: “the relationship between the national counterpart, the project team and UNDP would benefit from greater clarification and understanding of specific roles” (UNDP, 2006, p.6).

72. Perhaps most importantly, while the Secretariats have come to appreciate the importance of reform, their ability to implement changes has been politically-constrained, particularly in the National Assembly, as well as by a lack of resources. It may be that the UNDP project failed to take this into account sufficiently leading to a situation where a number of plans were developed but were not implemented. It is also noteworthy that plans to establish a project steering committee – a “Partnership Forum”, along the lines of CCLSP’s Project Steering Committee – came to little.

**UNDP’s Legislative Assistance Project: Learning the lessons?**

UNDP’s follow up programme of parliamentary strengthening is the Legislative Assistance Project (LEAP). This project will run for 3 years and – with a budget of US$825,000 – aims to support the Cambodian Parliament to further build its legislative, oversight and representative capacity through initiatives targeted for both parliamentarians and their support staff. It is aligned with Parliament’s Strategic Framework and Action Plan.

The project has three strands. The first strand seeks to enhance the representative role of parliamentarians through field trips and hearings in communities as well as through the modernisation of the websites of both houses, and to improve and strengthen the capacities of Members and staff in relation to legislation and oversight through expert training sessions and workshops. The second strand seeks to strengthen the Secretariats of the National Assembly and Senate through staff training. It also envisages the establishment of a Hansard and the provision of support to issue-focussed parliamentary caucuses. The third strand seeks to build the capacity of
the Technical Coordination Secretariat – co-chaired by the Secretary Generals of the National Assembly and Senate – to manage and coordinate not only LEAP, but all donor assistance to the Cambodian Parliament.

LEAP has suffered a number of delays, including in the appointment of key staff, with its plans subject to some considerable criticism. The elections of 2008 have, it appears, delayed implementation further.
6. Parliamentary strengthening and the Paris Principles in practice

73. The agenda of the Paris Declaration as regards aid effectiveness more widely has been taken up wholeheartedly by the Government of Cambodia. The good governance agenda has also been embraced, and is at the core of the country’s Rectangular Strategy for development and poverty reduction. This chapter examines the landscape of parliamentary strengthening in Cambodia from the vantage point of the Paris Principles on aid effectiveness. The principles of ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results and mutual accountability are taken in turn, in order to generate insights about parliamentary strengthening and to throw some light on the extent to which parliamentary strengthening programmes have benefitted from consistency with the Paris Principles.

Ownership

74. Cambodia’s political institutions, including its Parliament, were decimated by years of conflict. Lacking the capacity to direct its own development, efforts to strengthen Parliament and to enhance its effectiveness have, until recently, been driven largely by Development Partners. The UNDP Consultant to Parliament acknowledged that going back to the First Parliament, organisations including the Asian Foundation, the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the Francophone – as well as the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) and UNDP itself – were the initiators of dialogue with the National Assembly. These organisations performed needs assessments and followed them up with suggestions to the National Assembly that set out their priorities. Such initiatives led to the establishment of the Centre for Legal Research, the hiring of a Legal Advisor to the National Assembly and also to the provision of assistance by France to the Library of the National Assembly during the First Parliament.

75. With the introduction of the CCLSP in the Second Parliament and the KAS’s most recent programme of parliamentary strengthening, Parliament has begun to play a more active role. A process of drawing up a strategic plan for the development of the legislative arm of Government of the Royal Kingdom of Cambodia was initiated as part of the CCLSP. The resulting Strategic Framework and Action plan was completed, published by UNDP, and approved by the National Assembly and Senate in 2007. Since its adoption by Parliament, this document has played an important role in establishing a sense of ownership, by Parliament, of its own development. The Strategic Framework was reviewed and approved by both Houses in January 2007. It gives Parliament ownership of its development, and delineates the areas and activities in which the National Assembly and the Senate are seeking the support from the international community.

76. Many Members of Parliament are keen to see parliament become more effective and to play an active role in that process. They recognize the value of having an effective Parliament and the important role that it can play in relation to national reconciliation and development. The success of the National Assembly in securing for itself a new National Assembly Building Complex, financed by resources from the national budget, demonstrates that Parliament has had some success in asserting itself as an important branch of Government. This is an indication of progress in terms of ownership in its wider sense and was intended to show leadership to Development Partners, providing a solid basis for their provision of additional assistance such as computers and information technology.

10 The Legal Advisor to the National Assembly – Dr. Khim – has remained in post and played an important role in boosting the development of capacity for review of bills in the National Assembly.
**Alignment**

77. In the absence of a strategic plan for Parliament’s development, Development Partners had no clear country-owned focus for their support to parliamentary strengthening. As such, while their assistance may – even in the early years – have been valuable, it was not aligned with a clear plan, owned by Parliament, for its own development. Rather, such assistance was provided in a rather ad hoc manner.

78. In addition, while governance has been at the core of Cambodia’s poverty reduction strategy for some years, strengthening Parliament has not been explicitly identified as a key component of strengthening governance. As such, when Development Partners aligned their assistance with the country’s ambitions to improve its governance system, they – as a result – neglected Parliament. If strengthening Parliament is not part of a country’s efforts to enhance its governance systems, and if Development Partners respect ownership in relation to a country’s plans, parliamentary strengthening may fall off the agenda. This raises important issues about country ownership, particularly as it is the Executive – with little incentive to see a stronger Parliament – that plays the key role in setting out a country’s wider strategy for development and poverty reduction.

79. The establishment of a Strategic Framework and Action Plan has provided a much better basis for alignment. Now, all active stakeholders in parliamentary strengthening are committed to ensuring that their activities support the priorities identified in the plan. This commitment has been institutionalized with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between both Houses of Parliament and all stakeholders engaged in parliamentary strengthening. The Cambodian Parliament and Development Partners have jointly committed to strengthening and promoting aid coordination and partnership as per the requests of the Presidents of the two Houses. This joint commitment makes use of a Steering Committee, as successfully pioneered by the CCLSP. Parliament is keen to see long-term partnerships with Development Partners channeling resources through a coordinating agency such as UNDP.

**Harmonisation**

80. In Cambodia as elsewhere, Development Partners have a tendency to want to do their own thing, in an effort to ensure that they can point to the impacts of aid provided by their country’s taxpayers and can be accountable for the aid that they are responsible for delivering. This provides something of a disincentive for harmonization. But as regards parliamentary strengthening in Cambodia there are other factors that encourage harmonization; first, there are few key players, with the CCLSP, UNDP and the KAS the most important; and second, they share the view that the enormity of the task, and the paucity of resources, make harmonization essential.

81. As a result, the landscape of parliamentary strengthening is – as is the landscape of aid effectiveness more widely in Cambodia – characterized by a good degree of harmonization and coordination. Each organization is engaged in capacity building, but each focuses on particular areas. The CCLSP focuses on the Parliamentary Commissions and on building the capacity of the Secretariats and led on the development of Parliament’s Strategic Framework and Action Plan, with UNDP publishing the result. UNDP focuses, especially under the new Legislative Assistance Project (LEAP), on building the capacities of parliamentary staff so that they can provide a better service to MPs. And the KAS – whose latest agreement with the Government stipulates that it coordinate its work with others working with the National Assembly – tends to deliver its support through workshops that tackle a number of issues of legislative performance.
82. Programme Managers from the CCLSP, UNDP and the KAS are in constant communication to ensure that their programmes are complementary rather than duplicative. These organisations have collaborated to run orientation programs for newly elected Members of Parliament. They have also jointly organised annual budget workshops all with the aim of reducing duplication and maximising the use of resources to the best of advantage of the National Assembly and Senate. The prospects for further harmonization are good, with a number of partnerships and co-financing arrangement emerging. The enthusiasm of Development Partners such as DFID for delegated partnership (DFID, 2005), and of UNDP to play a role in harnessing additional donor resources in the form of pooled grants, can only add to the momentum behind harmonization. The key to success will be to ensure that the right people and the right organization(s) have the responsibility for fostering greater harmonization.

Managing for results

83. The Strategic Framework and Action Plan for building the capacity of the Cambodian National Assembly and Senate provides, potentially, a good basis for ensuring that parliamentary strengthening is focused on results. However, relatively little has been achieved in terms of establishing systems for monitoring progress on parliamentary effectiveness or for evaluating the effectiveness of parliamentary strengthening. This makes it extremely difficult for Development Partners or for Parliament to learn about what works and to modify the approach taken to parliamentary strengthening to maximize its effectiveness.

84. There are nevertheless some encouraging signs. Training has been provided to the National Assembly and Senate on results-based monitoring, although the impact has been patchy. More seems to have been achieved at the Senate than at the National Assembly due to a combination of factors including the stability of the Senate leadership and the higher quality of staff at the Senate’s Secretariat. In an effort to promote a focus on results, the CCLSP assisted Parliament to conduct a baseline survey of its performance in 2002, with the exercise repeated in 2005. And it is noteworthy that both of the two major programmes of parliamentary strengthening – the CCLSP and UNDP’s programme of work – have been evaluated (Parliamentary Centre, 2005); in the field of parliamentary strengthening this, regrettably, is somewhat unusual. These initiatives are an important first step towards ensuring that parliamentary strengthening is conducted in a manner that is consistent with the fourth of the Paris Principles. Beyond Parliament itself, CSOs such as the Committee for Free and Fair Elections also make efforts to monitor parliamentary performance.

Mutual accountability

85. On mutual accountability, despite the absence of clear frameworks for assessing progress, there are some grounds for optimism. Parliament and a number of Development Partners hold bi-annual assessments to consider how they might improve the performance of Parliament and the effectiveness of parliamentary strengthening programmes. This assessment is conducted in the context of the joint framework for action established in Parliament’s Strategic Framework and Action Plan.

86. The ways of working established by the Strategic Framework and Action Plan are intended to ensure mutual transparency and accountability with regard to the expected and actual results of parliamentary strengthening activities. It is hoped that this will minimize or eliminate overlap and conflict between different donor-funded activities, enhance the sustainability of benefits. It should also reduce the administrative burden on Parliamentary staff, while encouraging knowledge-sharing and collaboration.
7. Conclusions and recommendations

A map of the landscape of parliamentary strengthening …

87. This case study has explored the landscape of parliamentary strengthening in Cambodia, taking the Paris Principles on aid effectiveness as a vantage point. The bedrock of the landscape is political. In Cambodia, the key feature is that the country is a post-conflict country whose institutions and assets were destroyed by many years of conflict. It is also a country where there are complex relationships between the formal politics of elections, parties and Parliament and the informal politics and social relations that have played an important role in ensuring a sustained period of political stability if not rapid progress on democratic development. And, in common with many developing countries, Cambodia is a place where the Executive dominates a resource-starved legislature and where one party – the CPP – has established its dominance across the political landscape. All of these features have a major bearing on the performance of the Parliament and on the prospects for effective parliamentary strengthening.

88. Assessing the performance of the Cambodian Parliament is, as in many other countries, extremely challenging. This is because neither Parliament itself nor its Development Partners have put sufficient effort into establishing frameworks for performance assessment or into collecting data on performance. The available evidence indicates that Parliament remains largely ineffective. Many if not most of its Members lack the skills, knowledge or incentives needed to play an independent role in relation to the Executive and the Parliamentary staff is poorly organised – it is unclear who does what – and overly-politicised. There have been some improvements in recent years, with Commissions – which now include some members of the opposition – playing a more active role in legislative scrutiny, and the quality of debate in plenary improving, but it remains the case that Parliament is weak. The absence of an independent Budget Office, to strengthen Parliament’s ability to engage in the budget process on the basis of sound analysis, is a major weakness that Parliament, along with its Development Partners might consider addressing.

89. In contrast to countries such as Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda, the landscape of parliamentary strengthening in Cambodia is thinly populated, perhaps as a result of some Development Partners taking the view that the structural and political constraints faced by the Cambodian Parliament are insurmountable. As a result, two Development Partners – CIDA and UNDP – have dominated the landscape with others including Germany’s GTZ, the World Bank Institute and the KAS playing smaller roles. In 2002, both UNDP and CIDA began major programmes of support to parliamentary strengthening. UNDP’s ended in 2005 and has now entered a new phase; it is to be hoped that the new project, the Legislative Assistance Project or LEAP benefits from the lessons learned in the earlier programme of work. CIDA’s project was due to be concluded in 2007 but, having achieved impressive results, has been extended to 2009.
exercise is crucial if parliamentary strengthening is to be made more effective. Without a map of the landscape of parliamentary strengthening, Development Partners and Parliament will be unable to navigate effectively.

... from the vantage point of the Paris Principles

90. Mapping the landscape of parliamentary strengthening from the perspective of the Paris Principles generates a number of insights. In terms of ownership, a Parliament in a post-conflict country faces severe capacity constraints in terms of setting out plans for its own development. In such a context it is perhaps inevitable that Development Partners initially take more of a lead role. However, it is important that their plans include efforts to build the capacity of Parliament so that ownership increases over time. Support provided for the development of a Strategic Framework and Action Plan has done much to enhance Parliament's ownership of its development and to encourage MPs and the Cambodian Parliament to take the lead in their efforts to make their Parliament more effective. In planning their support for parliamentary strengthening, Development Partners must take full account of the Strategic Framework and Action Plan.

91. To establish a wider sense of ownership it is important – particularly in a country such as Cambodia – that parliamentary strengthening is provided for the Parliament, rather than for political parties, so that it does not reinforce barriers to parliamentary effectiveness. Working with all parties together, and working through Project Steering Committees that bring together all parties and the political and technical wings of Parliament would seem to highly desirable approaches.

92. The establishment of a Strategic Framework and Action Plan has, not before time, provided a focus around which Development Partners can align their support. Indeed, in its absence, support is inevitably rather ad hoc. In Cambodia, a tension was identified between the goal of alignment as regards parliamentary strengthening and the aid-effectiveness goal of alignment with the country’s development plan. That is: if the development plan is produced by the Executive (often in close consultation with the World Bank and other Development Partners), and the Executive does not want to see a stronger Parliament, and if those consulted don’t insist that Parliament is part of those plans, then alignment with the country’s development plan will result in marginalisation of the Parliament. The time for Development Partners to address this issue is when a country’s development plans are being produced.

93. The fact that there are only a small number of Development Partners involved in parliamentary strengthening in Cambodia, and that they share an appreciation of the scale of the task and the limited resources they have available, is a blessing in terms of harmonisation. The key organisations appear to share information and to coordinate their activities relatively well. As harmonisation progresses, important questions as to which Development Partner is best equipped to lead will need to be addressed. There may be value in considering the establishment of a donor steering committee, to work with Parliament, rather than have – as LEAP rather confusingly envisages – such a grouping nested within the UNDP-led project.

94. As regards managing for results, parliamentary strengthening in Cambodia is afflicted by the same problems as it is worldwide. Little has been done to establish systems to monitor parliamentary performance and to evaluate and learn about what works in terms of parliamentary strengthening. There are however some encouraging signs. Both the CCLSP and UNDP’s 2002-05 programmes have been evaluated and surveys of parliamentary performance have been conducted. But despite the enthusiasm for parliamentary strengthening, neither Development Partners nor parliaments – in Cambodia as elsewhere – have made much progress on assessing effectiveness. If they are serious about the
parliamentary strengthening agenda, this must be a priority. Otherwise, the flow of funds to parliamentary strengthening will surely dry up, with resources spent on other issues for which impact can be demonstrated more clearly.

95. On mutual accountability, there are signs of progress in Cambodia, even though a sound framework for monitoring progress has yet to be established. Parliament’s own Strategic Framework and Action Plan establishes regular discussions between Parliament and its Development Partners to discuss what might be done to enhance parliamentary performance and the effectiveness of parliamentary strengthening. Such discussions could play an important role, not only in enhancing mutual accountability, but also in fostering a greater degree of harmonisation, alignment and ownership.

96. Mapping the landscape of parliamentary strengthening from the perspective of the Paris Principles has revealed a number of useful insights about parliamentary strengthening in Cambodia and how it, and the performance of Parliament itself, can be enhanced. Available evidence suggests that if parliamentary strengthening were conducted in a manner that were more in line with the Paris Principles, then it would be more effective.

97. The Paris Principles are a useful framework for mapping the landscape of parliamentary strengthening and for moving towards more effective partnerships. But as with aid effectiveness more generally, progress depends very much on politics. Donors may be reluctant to engage in parliamentary strengthening in an explicitly political manner, but there is no doubt that parliamentary strengthening requires a good understanding of the political terrain. In Cambodia, a post-conflict country, it will take many years of careful and sustained engagement from Development Partners, alongside favourable shifts in the political landscape, for the Parliament to become an effective player in the country’s system of governance.
Annex A: Note on the selection of country case studies

8th November 2007

1. **This short note** brings together in one place our initial thinking on case study countries, alongside the various comments received from experts consulted. Its purpose is to provide the basis for a decision about which countries to work in.

2. **Our proposal to DFID** included a long list of countries: Cambodia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda and Vietnam. It stated that our case study countries would be drawn from the long-list, with the main criteria being that of DFID (and perhaps CIDA) involvement and interest in parliamentary strengthening. The proposal said that Cambodia, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda and Vietnam looked like good options, but noted too that conducting two case studies in Asia would stretch the resources available more than seems sensible. Our proposal also noted that DFID had not – and still has not – expressed any desire to include case studies from Eastern Europe or Latin America.

3. **Comments on our proposal**, and on our tentative selection of case studies, have been gratefully received from a number of experts on parliamentary strengthening, including: Jeff Balch (AWEPA), Joel Barkan (African Legislatures Project), Tom Bridle (NDI), Niklas Enander (Sida), Mitsuaki Furukawa (JICA) and Fred Matiangi (SUNY-Kenya).

4. It should also be noted that DFID is keen that our initiative fit well with the work of the **African Legislatures Project**. Careful attention to this will also, I believe, be of benefit to us as we move forward. The Parliamentary Centre is well-connected in many countries, but it is also worth noting, that Sida has offered the assistance of their advisor on democracy in East Africa, and that Alan has good links with Fred Matiangi who is well-connected across East Africa.

5. Comments provided by various experts are organized here, by country.

   - **Benin**: Would be good (Bridle)
   - **Cambodia**: Makes sense from Sida perspective and would be their choice (Enander); Might be challenging to really get at what’s going on (Furukawa)
   - **Ethiopia**: Makes sense from Sida perspective, but would be challenging (Enander); Would be difficult (Matiangi)
   - **Ghana**: Very interesting (Balch); ALP will be working here soon (Barkan); Would be very interesting (Matiangi)
   - **Kenya**: Over-studied, would duplicate ALP work (Barkan); Makes sense from Sida perspective and would be their choice (Enander); Would be very interesting (Matiangi)
   - **Liberia**: Interesting post-conflict and not part of ALP plans (Barkan)
   - **Malawi**: ALP is about to start work here (Barkan); Not that helpful as there has been fairly limited donor activity in recent years (Matiangi)
Parliamentary strengthening and the Paris Principles: Cambodia case study

- **Mozambique**: Very interesting (Balch); ALP has started work here (Barkan)

- **Nigeria**: having another bicameral as well as Cambodia might be good, and that there are interesting stories to tell re DFID-USAID collaboration (DFID-Nigeria).

- **Sierra Leone**: Interesting post-conflict and not part of ALP plans (Barkan)

- **Tanzania**: Interesting re harmonization and UNDP-guarded basket, and contrast with Uganda (Balch); ALP expects to be working here soon (Barkan); Makes sense from Sida perspective and would be their choice (Enander)

- **Uganda**: Interesting re harmonization without a basket, and contrast with Tanzania (Balch); ALP expects to be working here soon (Barkan); would be good (Bridle); Makes sense from Sida perspective and would be their choice (Enander)

- **Vietnam**: Might be challenging to really get at what's going on (Furukawa)

- **Zambia**: ALP has done some work here (Barkan)

6. On the basis of the above, and on his knowledge of parliamentary strengthening, Alan’s proposal is that the case study countries should be Cambodia and Ghana for the Parliamentary Centre, and Tanzania and Uganda for ODI. However, Alan is keen to discuss the above and his proposal with Rasheed and Tony at the Parliamentary Centre. And, even when we have had those discussions, the selection might be changed at the stage of the desk-based review if we discover that finding information about parliamentary strengthening in Tanzania and Uganda is too difficult.
### Annex B: List of interviewees

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role and organisation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MEN, Bunleng</td>
<td>Manager, CCLSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HE CHEA, Chet</td>
<td>Chairman of Finance and Banking Commission of the Senate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHHIV, Thet</td>
<td>Deputy Head of Legal Research Centre of the National Assembly and CCLSP Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HONG, Sokheang</td>
<td>Programme Officer, Canadian Cooperation Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hutchinson, Nicolai</td>
<td>Operations and Management Advisor UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHIENG, Sochivy</td>
<td>Deputy Programme Manager DFID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HE KIM, Ly</td>
<td>Head of Department, Legal Research Centre of the Senate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HE KY, Lum Ang</td>
<td>Chairperson of 9th Commission of the National Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOM, Saroeun</td>
<td>KAF Program Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOM, Sokhayouk</td>
<td>Deputy Manager, CCLSP</td>
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<tr>
<td>POK, Panhavichetr</td>
<td>Director, Canadian Cooperation Office</td>
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Annex C: References


Royal Government of Cambodia (undated) The Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia


